

102095

JPRS-EPS-85-030

5 March 1985

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
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DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

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EAST EUROPE REPORT

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CONTENTS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Slovak Police Get Civilian Help
(Frantisek Melis; PRAVDA, 27 Dec 84) 1
- West German Military Budget Criticized
(Juraj Bydzovsky; PRAVDA, 29 Dec 84) 3

HUNGARY

- Effects of Alcoholism in Military
(Istvan Horvath Interview; IGAZ SZO, Apr 84) 5

POLAND

- Growing Role of Church as Center of Cultural Life
(Various sources, various dates) 10
- Past, Present Accomplishments, by Bozena Kulczynska
Provocative Topics Discussed
Politicization of Catholic Culture, by Pawel Krzyzan
- Independent, Censored Account of Popieluszko Murder Trial Published
(Jacek Ambroziak; NIEDZIELNY, No 2, 13 Jan 85) 18
- Catholic Weekly Continues Censored Coverage of Torun Trial
(Jacek Ambroziak; TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, No 3, 20 Jan 85) 34

ROMANIA

- Roundtable on Complete Unity of Foreign, Domestic Policies
(Constantin Vlad, et al.; ERA SOCIALISTA, No 20, 25 Oct,
No 21, 10 Nov 84) 53

5 March 1985

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

SLOVAK POLICE GET CIVILIAN HELP

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 27 Dec 84 p 2

[Article by Frantisek Melis: "Service for Society"]

[Excerpt] The ranks of those who are helping Public Security are gratifyingly growing. We have already met the quotas for 1986. The plan for this period called for 26,000 auxiliary guard of Public Security and we have exceeded this number by 463 organized into 3,372 units. In view of this fact, the demands on each individual auxiliary guard are much higher than ever before. The members of the auxiliary guard must be mature morally and politically and appear in this light in everyday life. The main demand on members of the auxiliary guard is quite naturally an expectation that they constantly be socially involved in their workplace and their place of residence. We must put our foot down when we meet those who identify membership in the auxiliary guard with personal benefits.

The entire significance of units of the Public Security's auxiliary guard is that they assist in protecting societal interests in every part of our lives. This main goal is being successfully carried out. After all, the statistics for the first 6 months of 1984 confirm that. Members of the Public Security's auxiliary guard apprehended 88 perpetrators of criminal acts and misdemeanors and helped to indict 164 persons the police were looking for, 81 drunk truck drivers, 14 individuals who tried to cross state borders, and 2,349 individuals who violated public order.

As we list these statistics we do not mean that this is the only goal of the Public Security's auxiliary guard. Though these activities so far predominate in their work, the focus of the Public Security's auxiliary guard is shifting toward preventive actions. The tasks of the auxiliary guard for the next 2 months are being channeled in this direction; in a nutshell, each member of the Public Security's auxiliary guard is to become socially involved not only when he carries a yellow armband displaying four initials but at all times, especially in those instances where the interests of society can be damaged. Again, as arguments for this point of view, we should fall back on the statistics for the first 6 months of 1984, when the members of the auxiliary guard were involved in 1,885 acts defending socialist property and uncovered 1,038 violations in this respect. Assigning members of the auxiliary guard to watch over parking places prevents the theft of cars. Also very successful is their work in protecting garden plots and country homes.

The work of the individual units of the Public Security's auxiliary guard is being improved. The number of CPCZ members in their ranks, presently over 13,000, is on the rise. Over 2,700 members are members of the Socialist Youth Union; 3,474 are deputies of national committees at all levels, and 1,879 of them are actively involved in the work of public law and order commissions of the national committees. An effective method for improving the conscience and work of members of the auxiliary guard is a cyclical 3-year course based on the program prepared and carried out by the Slovak Ministry of the Interior. A very useful measure is that each member of the Public Security's auxiliary guard receives free of charge a copy of BEZPECNOST [Security]. However, the most important factor in improving the work of the auxiliary guard is socialist competition for the honorary title of Exemplary Unit. Currently, 696 units in Slovakia are competing for this title, and 291 units are defending it. However, members of the Public Security's auxiliary guard are not merely satisfied with such competition; they also actively join other contests organized by the okres and kraj national committees. The best situation in this respect is in West Slovak Kraj.

Experience clearly shows that the activity of the units of the Public Security's auxiliary guard brings about good results and is an effective instrument for protecting society and the individuals against harm. Such activity must be pursued in the future, and everything indicates that it will.

1277

CSO: 2400/223

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

WEST GERMAN MILITARY BUDGET CRITICIZED

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 Dec 84 p 5

[Article by Juraj Bydzovsky]

[Text] A state budget is public testimony which can hardly be ignored. The 1985 budget of the Federal Republic of Germany earmarks DM 73 billion to the military. The arms manufacturing corporations in the FRG are allocated an additional DM 13.5 billion in the form of direct capital investments.

Thus, there are no cuts as far as arms are concerned. Military policy, related to the aggressive plans of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and fully subordinated to the aggressive course of the present U.S. Government, is expensive. Increased military expenses are accompanied by talks about the peaceful efforts of the West German Government. FRG citizens are asking a legitimate question: who is expected to take these words seriously? Money which is so needed to solve economic and social problems will be wasted to an increasing extent as a result of the exaggerated arms buildup, which cannot be rationally justified.

True, one has to save. The best way to save is to cut allocations for the most pressing needs of society. Thus, the new West German budget once again reduces allocations for social needs, health care, and education. It is perhaps not necessary to emphasize that the people in the FRG have pointed out for some time that the allocations for these sectors are insufficient and that they do not meet all the real needs.

The schools operate under unsuitable conditions. There is a shortage of teachers, while on the other hand the number of unemployed teachers is alarming. Overfilled hospitals and the inability of the health care sector to meet the demands stemming from the deterioration of the public health situation also result in alarming commentaries in the West German press. The state is unable to secure minimal care for the growing number of unemployed and primarily for young people who leave school without any hope of getting a job to give them a chance to lead a normal existence. The streets of West German cities are at present filled with young people without a future, without the possibility of leading lives normal for working individuals.

A group of West German scientists prepared a memorandum giving their views on this budget. It states, among other things, that the interests of West German citizens are firmly linked to the interests of preserving peace and that it is necessary to reduce the allocations earmarked for placing the new American nuclear first-strike missiles and the allocations enabling cooperation with the United States in the area of laser weapons.

However, as far as pressing demands are concerned, the Government of the FRG is deaf. The fate of the working people and of all the people in general is nothing but a subject of empty cliches for it.

1277

CSO: 2400/223

HUNGARY

EFFECTS OF ALCOHOLISM IN MILITARY

Budapest IGAZ SZO in Hungarian Apr 84 pp 4-5

[Interview with Major General Istvan Horvath, Chairman of the Health Protection and Education Council of the Hungarian People's Army, by Dr Laszlo Ujlaki:
"Exclusive Interview with..."; time and place of interview not specified]

[Text] The scene is all too familiar, nearly commonplace. The soldier on leave first enters the railway restaurant as if he were going to the ticket office. There are few alcohol consumers more boisterous than he on the train. We likewise recall from our military days that the male community practically forces its members into heavy drinking, and he who confines himself to one or two glasses of beer is sometimes virtually a subject of humor and lays himself open to idiotic jokes. The life conduct and state of health of our soldier sons lays a rightful claim to public attention--last but not least because following the years of military service there is no other such organized opportunity for educating young men. We asked Comrade Major General Istvan Horvath about this problem.

[Question] Comrade Major General, please acquaint us with the causes and widespreadness of the phenomenon of alcoholism and with the impact of measures taken against it.

[Answer] Excessive alcohol consumption, as a detrimental social phenomenon, is also noticeable in the army. This is a natural consequence of the fact that an overwhelming part of the manpower fulfills its duty on the basis of compulsory military service, and a great proportion of Hungarian youth serve as regular soldiers for shorter or longer periods.

For the most part, those who are called up for service as regular soldiers arrive with already developed habits, tradition and scale of values. This is why we take special care to see to it that the young man who was a nondrinker before callup does not become an alcohol consumer in the army and that we moderate and curb the consumption of those in whom some degree of alcohol dependency is demonstrable. Nor can we avoid treating and curing those in need of help in accordance with our possibilities.

Our experience concurs with the fact that in the last 20 years the number of habitual consumers of alcohol has risen significantly in our country. A rise of such a nature is likewise perceptible among those liable to callup.

The dispersal is fairly great. There is the occasional drinker and the one in whom alcohol dependency has already developed. According to our assessments and analyses, nearly half the conscripts are alcohol consumers at the time of induction. However, a certain proportion of them--5 to 10 percent--drink too much on occasion; they do not know reasonable limits.

Immoderate consumption of alcohol in the army also plays a role in the appearance of observable forms of deviant behavior and in accidents with more serious consequences.

Concerning alcohol consumption and the army's situation, our standpoint is unambiguous: the consumption of alcoholic beverages is forbidden in the barracks, on military posts, during training and rifle maneuvers. Under given circumstances, the mere fact of alcohol consumption is a felony. So from our viewpoint complete abstinence from drink would be ideal. Sticking to reality, however, this can hardly be achieved. What can be achieved is that the soldiers clearly see that the consumption of alcoholic beverages is forbidden during military activity. This serves the joint interest of the army and the individual.

Only sober, levelheaded, healthy men who are mentally tough and in faultless physical condition can direct and operate the army's up-to-date technology, modern weapons, combat and motor vehicles. The intoxicated soldier causes many conflicts in interpersonal contacts, particularly in subordinative relations. There is no question that the slightest error, compromise, concession or indifference linked to alcohol consumption involve grave consequences.

We do not lose sight of what is expected of us: the soldiers must return home to civilian life healthy and richer in moral values. Our well-organized, purposeful and coordinated informational and educational work extends to all personnel. As a result of our measures, alcohol consumption within the barracks has gradually decreased in recent years and today can be regarded as minimal.

[Question] In recent years, many things have happened to modify this deplorable phenomenon in the people's army. A separate antialcoholism committee has been formed within the framework of the Health Protection and Education Council. Please say something about it.

[Answer] The army considers immoderate consumption of alcohol alien in its spirit and its nature alike. It is unfortunate that up until now we have scarcely been able to influence the behavior and carousing of soldiers outside the barracks. To restrain and prevent it, we have developed the institutional framework for an antialcoholism campaign, we have increased informational work, and we have issued normative rules where there was a possibility for them.

In order to work out specific methods for an antialcoholism campaign in the people's army and in order to coordinate the measures, the Health Protection and Education Council of the Hungarian People's Army was set up in 1981.

The leadership of the Defense Ministry makes a regular appraisal of the links between unwholesome consumption of alcohol and military discipline. We unearth the circumstances, causes and interconnections which lead to the soldiers' consumption of alcohol, and we determine the tasks of the commanding staff.

In the antialcoholism campaign, we devote a lot of attention to consciousness raising, to strengthening the general public's unfavorable opinion, to increasing the mutual feeling of responsibility, to developing a culture of soldierly conduct, and to introducing and popularizing high-level forms of entertainment.

To this end, we continually enrich the wherewithal for agitation and propaganda work against alcohol. The military press, the Zrinyi Publishing House of Books and Periodicals, sponsors a yearly essay contest and puts out a number of research papers and articles. Previously in the columns of our popular periodical IGAZ SZO, for example, we conducted a discussion on the causes of excessive alcohol consumption and the possibilities for prevention. The Military Film Studio has treated the topic in several documentary and feature films.

We regularly provide the troops with guidelines and publications on methodology; when the conscripts are inducted, we hold individual and group conversations and discussions. At the educational institutes, we prepare the commissioned and noncommissioned officer students for the most important issues in preventive work. The directors and coworkers of military judicial agencies offer regular assistance by delivering several hundred lectures a year and by demonstrating the connections between alcohol consumption and criminal acts.

It is worth mentioning that recently at one of our institutes the Health Protection and Education Council of the Hungarian People's Army held a health education conference in cooperation with well-known specialists--physicians, psychologists, experts on alcoholism, military judges and lawyers. At it, we took stock of the work we have performed so far and outlined the things to be done in the future.

Several measures to restrain and prevent excessive consumption of alcohol were introduced.

The Military Regulations issued for the Armed Forces of the Hungarian People's Republic prohibit the introduction, distribution and consumption of alcoholic beverages in barracks and on other military property. It is worth mentioning that alcoholic beverages may not be kept, even for official state purposes, on any military property where conscripts serve.

In collaboration with the Ministry of Domestic Trade, we have declared numerous public entertainment units and places which sell liquor off-limits to members of the armed forces. During major mobilization maneuvers, police and local agencies in the areas affected institute bans on the sale and consumption of alcohol.

We have extended the systematic breath-analysis checks to all military activity. We have made it one of the primary tasks of military police surveillance to

supervise and control the conduct of soldiers at the capital's railway terminals and on the most important railway lines and to prevent inebriation and scandalous behavior by soldiers.

We encourage commanding officers, political workers and health-care agencies to keep a close eye--beginning at induction--on those who regularly consume excessive amounts of alcohol and, if necessary, to intervene with administrative measures, including holding the person responsible and initiation or prescription of detoxification treatment.

[Question] How is the antialcoholism activity within the army linked to similar efforts by society? Are there experiences of cooperation?

[Answer] Although moderation and a clearheaded outlook on--and management of--one's life characterize a decisive majority of the personnel, the people's army naturally strives to do its share in the nationwide task of preventing the consumption of alcohol in unbeneficial amounts. The reasons for excessive consumption of alcohol in the army largely coincide with the universal reasons, but certain specific features of military life also contribute. I will mention a few of them.

Military service and the consumption of alcohol have been closely linked to each other for a historically long period. Consumption of alcohol has been a symbol of manliness and soldierly prowess in war and in peace, and this pernicious tradition also exists in communities of men today. In the closed military lifestyle, we often notice group pressure and incitement toward the consumption of alcohol. The decisive thing in this regard is what kind of attitude the soldiers in the subunits have and who the trendsetters are.

As it is customary in civilian life to celebrate the name day, the birthday, the birth of a child and practically every significant event with alcohol, there are also special occasions for it in the army, of course: a promotion, a special honor, advancement to a higher grade, completion of schooling as commissioned or noncommissioned officer, etc.

Parents are also frequently instrumental in the heavy drinking of conscripts. On the one hand, they provide a significant proportion of the conscripts with pocket money which exceeds their needs; on the other hand, parents, relatives and friends have a penchant for filling soldiers on leave or vacation with liquor, and certainly these soldiers often return to their military posts drunk and late.

Also to be found in the army is the viewpoint which justifies alcohol consumption by stating that the intense physical and mental stress borne by soldiers is unthinkable without alcohol. I believe it is unnecessary for me to deal with and refute the untenability of this notion.

The judgment can thus be made about the situation in its entirety: work performed in the interest of preventing excessive consumption of alcohol should embrace all personnel and should be suitably organized and purposeful; its effectiveness will increase gradually. According to our observations, the number of regular consumers of alcohol does not increase during military service, and alcohol consumption

generally declines. We regard it as an important task that the soldiers take a personal interest in not consuming alcohol at all or as moderately as possible and conscientiously comply with restrictive measures concerning military posts.

In the interest of promoting informational and educational work, we are planning further studies, appraisals and steps. Parallel with this, we are taking part in civilian research programs which help to uncover the reasons for unhealthy consumption of alcohol and make an effort to develop a system of preventive measures.

What we aim at is for our soldiers to return to civilian life with the proper moral toughness and with the personality traits characteristic of the socialist man. The period of military service has become shorter, but we do not thereby abandon the idea that our conscripts recognize and accept the need for a clear-headed, civilized and wholesome lifestyle and live in accordance with it as reservists.

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CSO: 2500/178

POLAND

GROWING ROLE OF CHURCH AS CENTER OF CULTURAL LIFE

Past, Present Accomplishments

Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 52-53, 23-30 Dec 84 p 11

[Article by Bozena Kulczynska: "Tenth Week of Christian Culture in Warsaw"]

[Text] The 10th Week of Christian Culture in Warsaw was extended to 2 weeks and lasted from 17 to 30 November. There was no way to schedule 100 events within the 7 days called for by the name (this is how many events appeared on the printed schedule; actually, there were many more due to the initiative of individual churches on whose premises the week was held). Despite this extension, the common concern of the audience was to make a selection from among the events simultaneously occurring in many locations. The week, suspended at a certain moment by the question of whether it should not be canceled as a sign of mourning following the tragic death of Father Jerzy Popieluszko, totally took over the windy November with the motto "Overcome evil by good" precisely because of this mourning. These words of the Apostle Paul were the program of Father Popieluszko. Therefore, our participation was not only a message sent to him, but also a reaffirmation of this particular position.

From the outset of the Week in the year 1975, it has traveled a very difficult path. Its early days were associated with the Church of St Ann and thus with pastoral work in academia. Prelate Tadeusz Uszynski was the "coordinator" at the time. It was then that Father Wieslaw Al. Nieweglowski sponsored the first evening of literary readings. Today he is the national minister of the artistic communities, which owe much to his multifaceted activities. Later came meetings "in the tower" at the Church of St Ann, where artists congregated in great numbers. This is how it has come about. The Week of Christian Culture is not only an event weaving into a cohesive entity various creative endeavors of recent times, but also tangible proof of the reinforcement in the entire sphere of culture which draws inspiration from religion. The ranks of its artists are growing stronger, the audience is increasingly numerous. The action takes place in the church and in adjacent areas. In 1977, during the Third Week of Christian Culture, the Primate of the Millenium [Cardinal Wyszynski] said: "My beloved, there will be enough room in the temple of God both for the gospel and for your creativity which will enrich the life of the nation. May God reward you." The factors responsible for more and more new people coming here merit a separate discussion.

Several significant features of the last Week should be stressed. First of all, what strikes one is the spanning of the entire breadth and width of culture. This yields an extraordinary variety of topics and forms. Along with the annual meetings with writers and poets and theatrical events with the participation of most outstanding actors, formal and chamber concerts of both classical and modern music were organized, as well as screenings of movies on religious topics preceded by a report by Tadeusz Sobolewski on "Cinema and Religion" (the movies were Polish and foreign, from Zanussi to Pasolini), a scientific session in the museum of the archdiocese [of Warsaw] devoted to the Apocalypse in the Bible and various art forms, the cycle of "Historic Meetings" (with professors Henryk Samsonowicz and Tadeusz Wasilewski, among others), and many exhibitions of sculpture.

A solemn inauguration was held on 19 November in the Church of the Virgin Mary. The mass was celebrated by the patron of the Week, Bishop Wladyslaw Miziolek, the homily was read by the parish priest, Father W. Al. Nieweglowski. The primate of Poland, Cardinal Glemp, said the pastoral word after poetry readings (here is a long list of those in attendance: Gustaw Holoubek, Maria Homerska, Barbara Horawianka, Mirosław Konarowski, Aleksandra Dmochowska, Stanisław Gorka, Jan Englert, Krystyna Krolukiewicz, Maja Komorowska, Andrzej Lapicki, Daniel Olbrychski, Andrzej Szczepkowski, Aleksandra Slaska, Anna Nehrebecka, Mieczysław Voit, and Zbigniew Zapasiewicz). I do not know the details, because I was not able to elbow my way into the church from which the crowd was streaming into the adjacent square [----][Law of 31 July 1981 on the control of publications and public events, article 2, point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, item 99, amended DZIENNIK USTAW 1983, No 44, item 204)]. The Week of Christian Culture allowed me to breathe freely, though it naturally came to me through only a handful of selected evenings.

Here are some "images" of the Week:

Poetry readings by Zbigniew Herbert, clearly recognized to be the king of poets. It is necessary to move from the small curia chamber surrounded by a huge crowd to the church. We crowd tightly around the graying poet. He recites his new poems, along which Mr Cogito strolls. We listen attentively to the poem about old oaks standing in the midst of a millenium-old forest and dropping acorns. Asked about history, Herbert responds that "it provides an opportunity to transcend your own woes and to 'commune' with those who have passed away"; that it trains the imagination to be a permanent champion of endangered values. With his back against the wall he lets out that "contempt is sublimated hatred" and adds with his peculiar sense of humor: "Contempt is an ugly feeling... However, I would not know whether it is a forbidden one."

Another evening in the Church of St Stanislaus Kostka at Zoliborz, next to which Father Popieluszko's tomb is permanently covered with fresh flowers. A meeting with Wiktor Woroszyński follows the evening mass, which is crowded as usual. Besides young people, there are many elderly persons who are visibly tired; they are the usual everyday mass-goers. Woroszyński's reading is exceptionally beautiful. It seems that the verbs dormant in his poems multiply their strength through this surging, rhythmic and marching-like reading.

Yet another evening: on Sunday, in the Church of the Holy Spirit with a family of poets: mother Barbara Eysymont, daughter Ewa Eysymont-Zdanowicz and her husband Eugeniusz Zdanowicz [----][Law of 31 July 1981 on the control of publications and public events, article 2, point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, item 99, amended DZIENNIK USTAW 1983, No 44, item 204)]. However, common people do expect something of contemporary poetry. The mood is intimate, it is easier to establish contact.

We can paint many such pictures. Each meeting with Ernest Bryll, Jacek Bochenski, Mieczyslaw Buczkowna, Jerzy Ficowski, Tomasz Jastrun, Anna Kamienska, Andrzej Kijowski, Zygmunt Kubiak, Marek Nowakowski, Anna Pogonowska, Leszek Prorok, Barbara Sadowska, Julian Strykowski, Father Jan Twardowski and Piotr Wojciechowski was different from the rest. Besides, I did not even mention some of the meetings. The variety of topics, moods and scenery is tremendous. Some churches (and not only churches; for example, also the Museum of the Archdiocese of Warsaw, which is a co-sponsor of the Week) reaffirmed their role as promoters of culture. Others have just put themselves on the map. The activities of peripheral churches in areas such as Praga and in new subdivisions (for example, the Church of the Holy Family in the bedroom community of Ursynow) are especially gratifying.

A decade later, this year's Week of Christian Culture testifies to the victory of this culture in Poland. It is becoming universal in that it appeals to extraordinarily varied audiences and unites an increasing number of artists. Its character is a man with opportunities and prospects. This creative activity must be gratifying. After all, creativity is the psychological denial of devastation and a work of art is not only an embellishment but an expression of a deep-seated human instinct which commands man to transcend himself and not only allows but requires that his independence be preserved.

Provocative Topics Discussed

Warsaw LAD in Polish No 50, 16 Dec 84 p 2

[Article by (AN): "Scientific Discussion on the Apocalypse"]

[Text] The Museum of the Archdiocese of Warsaw invited guests to a three-part scientific discussion on "The Apocalypse" (18, 21, and 25 November). The purpose of the discussion was to follow the threads of the Apocalypse in various spheres of creative activity. The very high level of reports provoked a lively discussion.

Two splendid reports by Prof Andrzej Wiercinski were devoted to the semantic analysis of the Revelation of St John: "The Great Whore in the Revelation of St John" and "The Beginning and the End. Semantic Cohesion of the Revelation." Father Michal Czajkowski devoted his report to the same topic, analyzing the Apocalypse of St John from a different, in this instance more theological point of view.

The remainder of reports dwelled on the role of apocalyptic topics and motives in art, culture and social life. Prof Bohdan Korzeniewski addressed the threads

and motives of the apocalypse in the theater, pointing out in particular the cases of Jerzy Grotowski ("Acropolis") and Tadeusz Kantor ("Wielopole, Wielopole..."). Nevertheless, he came to the conclusion that in our country the time is not yet right to show apocalyptic visions of national and social annihilation; for us, the point of reference is too close, being reality rather than metaphor.

In discussing the apocalypse in the cinema, Rafal Marszalek drew attention to the apocalyptic and catastrophic trend in modern cinema. This trend is a reflection of the world in which not only particular values but entire cultures become extinct. He gave examples of various pictures and artists who display this thinking with regard to the apocalypse--annihilation: Visconti's "Leopard," Ferreri's "Great Dub," "The Empire of Senses" of the Japanese Oshima, Tarkovski's "Rublov," Bunuel, Antonioni ("The Eclipse," "Zabriskie Point"), Fellini, Pasolini ("Salo, or 120 days of Sodom") and science-fiction pictures (Kubrick).

Andrzej Drawicz presented the apocalyptic vision of the world by Bulgakov ("The Vulgarly of Evil in Bulgakov's Works"). Andrzej Werner, proceeding from literature (Tadeusz Borowski, "The Land of Ulro" by Milosz, (...) Orwell) presented the Polish experience (...) in the light of the Apocalypse, dwelling in detail on the operation of totalitarianism (equated with the Devil) on Polish soil.

The moderator of the discussion, Krzysztof Klopotowski, also devoted his report ("The Role of Sanctity in the Polish Public Life of Recent Years") to the issue of apocalyptic interpretations in social life (the struggle of good and evil, the role of celebration and rites).

In summation, the discussants noted that apocalyptic thinking and literature proliferates with particular exuberance in difficult times, because in essence hope is sought for in the Apocalypse--and it is found as a result.

Politicization of Catholic Culture

Krakow ZYCIE LITERACKIE in Polish No 2, 13 Jan 85 p 3

[Article by Pawel Krzyzan: "Culture and the Church"]

[Text] Catholic churches are becoming centers of cultural activity on an unprecedented scale. This phenomenon calls for a careful analysis. In this new cultural auditorium, the believers meet with writers, scientists, journalists, actors, theater and cinema directors, attend artists' exhibitions and listen to the recitals of singers and musicians. The schedule of the Week of Christian Culture is so overloaded with events that the last week in Warsaw lasted 14 days (from 17 to 30 November), and the believers turned out in such force that there was not enough room even for the observers from the Catholic press (see TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY No 52-53).

The presence of believers in the churches cannot surprise anyone; this is where they belong. Neither is there anything new about the striving of the Catholic Church to rally the creative intelligentsia around it. The bishops outlined and organized work in the intellectual community through their subordinate

clergy long ago, though the harvest in this field was rather mediocre despite the rich sowing. As early as 1952 Stefan [Cardinal] Wyszyński wrote in a letter to the editor of TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY: "How much fondness for and advocacy of the Truth, service to the Truth and in the Truth is needed in order to make up for the centuries-long neglect by our intellectuals, who are so honest in many fields of cultural life but so incapable of objectivity toward the church, so inclined to sermonize to the church and suggest reforms, despite the sometime failure to learn catechism" (see TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY 1952, No 45). Lo and behold, after a quarter of a century the primate of Poland greeted the scientists and artists assembled in the church of St Ann with other words: "Know that you belong here. There will be enough room and bread in the temples of God both for the gospel and for the creative work with which you are enriching the life of the nation" (quoted after M. Jagiello: "The Cultural Program of TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY (1945-1953)" in PRZEGLĄD POWSZECHNY 1983, No 4). A mere 4 years later, Father Janusz St. Pasierb stated: "The presence of the delegation of the Episcopate at the Congress of Polish Culture is simply a return visit paid to the artistic community. I think that this is a family visit."

"The meeting has thus come about"--triumphantly trumpets Michał Jagiello, one of those who, after all, have been given the sign; it could be said metaphorically in the words of the gospel that this has been the "sign of the prophet Jonas" (Matthew 12:39) if we tactlessly point out to Mr Jagiello his professional political past. However, he is undoubtedly right, though he does not explain the cognitive and religious dimensions of this movement of a segment of Polish intellectuals toward the church vestibule. This is an essential issue if we are not to simplify this phenomenon and reduce it to simplistically treated consequences of periodical and sociopolitical crises. Besides, otherwise it would be made needlessly and overly easy for the intellectuals to resort to the traditional right to forego the need to rationalize their own experience and justify the changes occurring in their worldview attitudes. The intellectuals are used to invoking in times of trouble a device removing responsibility for one's own behavior and exempting them from justifying their worldview decisions. In the history of Polish culture, we come across earlier religious movements which drew the masses of the gentry away from the Catholic Church toward various reformed denominations, whereas towards the end of the century an equally massive return of those who had gone astray took place under the pressure of post-Tridentine propaganda. "They have left as thoughtlessly as they came," commented an observer of that time.

Similarly, the influx of artistic intelligentsia into the ranks of the Marxists in the post-war period occurred due to considerations of an emotional rather than intellectual nature (search for safety as a result of surviving the end of culture in the fascist period). The worldview conversion at the October [1956] turning point also occurred in that same extrarational sphere. Therefore, today as well one should inquire about the reasons for which so many "laborers" have come forward for the harvest in culture and whether "they themselves" discern "what is right" in the evangelical sense of the word (Luke 12:27).

We are not putting this question to those who have affirmed their bond with Catholic culture through deeds, philosophical affiliation, or political activity. It would be thoughtless and tactless to request such pronouncements from

Jan Dobraczynski, Marek Skwarnicki, Zygmunt Lichniak, Stanislaw Stomm, Jerzy Turowicz, Jacek Wozniakowski, and others. However, we are justified in putting forward a demand to identify itself to a body which has been forming in the church or close to the church for several years. This body accounts for the numerical strength of the phenomenon which was mentioned above. Our justified right to do so follows from our concern with the identity of Polish culture, of which Catholic culture has long been an essential component and which can now be unsettled from an unexpected direction, hurting everyone in the process. After all, those who are in charge of the processes of in-depth bastardization of Polish culture must also suffer certain moral and psychological damage. They must create various substitutes of religious culture compensating for or even camouflaging their true intentions and designs, operating with the cunning of foxes who prowl in "the lord's vineyard." This always comes at a high moral price.

The Catholic press has reported (LAD No 50) that a scientific discussion on the subject of the Apocalypse of St John was held during the Week of Christian Culture. It was on this, but also on other occasions that a process of peculiar cultural Pythianism became apparent: on the one hand, the entirely legitimate scientific problem of apocalyptic threads in culture, and on the other attempts at exploiting it in the ideological and political context: cinema as testimony to the annihilation of values or culture (Rafal Marszalek), Bulgakov's prose as the apocalypse of "the vulgarity of evil" (Andrzej Drawicz), apocalyptic experience of Polish history as a manifestation of Satan's actions, whose essence Andrzej Drawicz identifies with totalitarianism, whereas Bohdan Korzeniewski thinks that apocalyptic metaphors in our theater are impossible because our reality is, simply put, apocalyptic. The presentism of such thinking which supposedly is scientific by definition is apparent and does not merit additional comment.

Actors recited poetry in the churches of Warsaw; Hanna Skarzanka has been organizing performances of a rhapsodic theater in the Museum of the Archdiocese of Warsaw since 1982 (see LAD No 51-52). This year's revelation is the program "Lord, Let Us Not Lose Ourselves," in which Danuta Rin and Krzysztof Kolberger sing "new lyrics by Ernest Bryll written especially for this program"; "This is an entirely 'new' Bryll," writes a LAD journalist. However, he does not explain why Bryll is now new and how this transformation of an ivy-clad moralist of the 1970's fits into the developmental logic of his poetry. It seems, however, that Aleksander Nebelski does not understand too much or else wants to say much when he writes that the rhapsodic form of theater at the museum takes after "the Rhapsodic Theater of Mieczyslaw Kotlarczyk operating in Krakow in the years of Hitlerite occupation." As God is my witness, I saw the performances of that theater in the early 1950's. Even those who make up this theater today can only follow this pattern because it is the only one available through their experience.

First and foremost, at issue is the degree to which the works of art presented in the church are of a religious nature, the way in which they open the metaphysical perspective before a contemporary Catholic and bind him to Catholic humanism. In one word, how do Ernest Bryll and Jacek Bochenski, Marek Nowakowski and Wiktor Woroszyński, Leszek Prorok and Andrzej Kijowski, Julian

Strykowski and Jerzy Ficowski and so on fit into the Catholic concept of culture and how do they affirm their presence in the Catholic culture through their works? What quantification should be used in order to fit into the religious eschatology the poems of Zbigniew Herbert, for example from the underground volume "18 Poems," given their rationalism and manifested attachment to things worldly ("Eschatological Premonitions of Mr Cogito")? Is everything that Holoubek, Zapasiewicz, Nehrebecka, Skarzanka, Szczepkowski, Jan Englert, Celinska and many others are reciting in churches indeed the flood of facts foretold in 1945 by Jerzy Turowicz, the "external and quantitative results" which were to come as if by themselves as "the consequence of in-depth work" (TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY 1945, No 11)?

This may be doubtful, if it is recalled and stressed that placing the audience in the place of worship does not by itself render culture religious. It can also be hypothesized that performances organized in special conditions during which the verses by Slowacki or Norwid, Illakowiczowna or Baczynski or others are recited (however, from legally published editions) are organized in lieu of something and that they create the appearance that the same will not be allowed legally. This is a very meaningful appearance for both the politician and the theorist of culture. Also, it can be hypothesized that, as was the case in the Apocalypse discussion, the purpose is to impart content having to do not with performing arts but rather with the quite apparent anti-Soviet, antisocialist and anticommunist politics. This would be proof that a certain group of intellectuals has managed to force through in practice the concept set forth in "The Untapped Talks" (Paris, 1983) which boils down to a collective entry into the church as a structure affording protection and enabling the activists of the illegal Solidarity to engage in the political game. In that event, the relationship between the church and culture acquires quite a different profile.

Regardless of the nostalgia or the regrets of a philosopher of history with which one looks at the broken elm of Polish reformation, at the beginning of the history of intolerance marked by the exile of the Aryans, political disenfranchisement of the non-Catholic gentry, persecution of Lutheran townsfolk which caused the political opinion of Europe to equate the Pole with a Catholic knight from the order of Ecclesia militans--regardless of all that, the art of the epoch of counterreformation, the art and especially the architecture of the post-Tridentine time left to us splendid church architecture and music. The converts Sep-Szarzynski and Sebastian Grabowiecki left their poems; Mr Pasek, who dipped his hands in "the Lutheran blood" with relish, left us diaries which are an unequalled narration, and so on. What will our time of great cultural enlivening leave behind--in the architecture of hastily erected churches, in theater, in prose, in poetry, in journalism? The playwrighting of Karol Wojtyla? The poetry of Father Jan Twardowski and Marek Skwarnicki? The prose of Jan Dobraczynski and Jan Jozef Szczepanski? The journalism of Turowicz, Stomm, Wozniakowski? The critiques of Zygmunt Lichniak? But those and many others have already spoken--what will the new ones contribute? The only thing certain is that Ernest Bryll, an acoustic poet, will strike a timely chord. But what about the others--will they help in building Polish Catholic culture in depth or rather find a place under other signs at the opportune moment? The future of Catholic culture cannot be built in an auditorium which

is an outlet for oppositional convictions, though a dialogue with the lay culture certainly does not rule out an argument. Time will reveal and will pass judgment on which of the "laborers" set out for genuine harvesting and which ones only pretended to be eager for it.

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CSO: 2600/472

POLAND

INDEPENDENT, CENSORED ACCOUNT OF POPIELUSZKO MURDER TRIAL PUBLISHED

Katowice GOSC NIEDZIELNY in Polish No 2, 13 Jan 85 pp 1,4,5

[Account based on a report from Torun by Jacek Ambroziak, special emissary of the Press Office of the Secretariat of the Episcopate of Poland: "The Trial of the Killers of the Rev Jerzy Popieluszko"]

[Text] On 27 December 1984 in Torun began the trial of Grzegorz Piotrowski Leszek Pekala, Waldemar Chmielewski and Adam Pietruszka, accused of slaying the Rev Jerzy Popieluszko.

To enter Room 40 of the Province Court in Torun one has to undergo twice a check of admission cards and identity papers. Those entering are subjected to a body search by a special unit of the so-called Antiterrorist Brigade. The small courtroom of the Torun Court is completely filled by the public. The ecclesiastical press is represented only by a reporter from PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI and the emissary of the Press Office of the Episcopate of Poland. The audience includes five priests: three representatives of the Metropolitan Curia in Warsaw and one each of the Curia of the Chelm Diocese and the Curia of the Wloclawek Diocese. There also are representatives of the foreign press (15, of whom six from the West) and the domestic press, as well as a large number of other persons having the right to enter the courtroom. Altogether, about 90 persons.

The trial is presided over by Province Court Justice Artur Kujawa, Presiding Judge of the Province Court in Torun, along with the Province Court justices J. Maciejewski (adviser) and W. Debkiewicz (standby judge). The jurors are: M. Kaczmarek, J. Koscinski, W. Targanski and, as an additional juror, A. Kwasniewski. The prosecutors: Prosecutor Leszek Pietrasinski from the Procurature General and Deputy Prosecutor Zygmunt Kolacki from the Torun Province Procurature. The parents of the Rev Jerzy Popieluszko are represented as the injured parties by the following auxiliary attorneys for the prosecution: Andrzej Grabinski and Jan Olszewski. The brother of the Rev Popieluszko and Waldemar Chrostowski are represented by the attorneys Edward

Wende and Krzysztof Piesiewicz, who on 27 December 12 1984 submitted his credentials as the representative of these injured parties. The attorney for the defense of Grzegorz Piotrkowski is Janusz Ilasz of Wloclawek; the defendant Leszek Pekala is represented by Eugeniusz Graczyk of Grudziadz; for the defendant Waldemar Chmielewski the attorney is Zigmunt Pubanc of Chelmo-on-the-Vistula; and for the defendant Adam Pietruszka the attorneys are Barbara Marczuk of Torun and Jerzy Kwietnicki of Torun. The Court verified the personal data on the defendants and other participants in the trial. The defendant Piotrkowski asked to introduce a correction to the effect that he did not own any car himself. Thereafter the Court read a letter from the Metropolitan Curia in Warsaw requesting that it be admitted to the trial in the capacity of an additional accuser. In response, Prosecutor Kolacki asked that the Curia's request be declined and read in court a letter of 18 December 1984 to the Curia from the Province Procurature, denying it the right to consider itself an injured party. The Court recessed for a conference, after which it announced its decision to reject the Curia's request, on the grounds that the provisions of the penal law code require that the interests of the injured party be directly affected, which was not the case as regards the Curia, and furthermore provisions relating to the labor law code are not applicable to this situation.

Following these procedural actions, the Court declared the trial open. Prosecutor Kolacki read the bill of indictment together with its justification.

The accused:

--Grzegorz Piotrowski, born 23 May 1951 in Lodz, of intelligentsia origin, Polish citizen, married, two children 6 and 8 years old, higher education, mathematician, recipient of the Silver Cross of Merit and ministerial awards, owner of a Fiat 132 passenger car. Last employment: department chief at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, no previous record of convictions;

--Leszek Pekala, born 30 May 1952 in Zlotoryja, of intelligentsia origin, Polish citizen, bachelor, childless, higher education, electronics expert, recipient of the Bronze Cross of Merit and a ministerial award. Last employment: inspector at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, no previous record of convictions;

--Waldemar Marek Chmielewski, born 28 February 1955 in Wroclaw, of intelligentsia origin, Polish citizen, married, one child 1 year and 6 months old, higher education, political scientist, recipient of the Bronze Cross of Merit and a ministerial award. Last employment: inspector at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, no previous record of convictions.

They are accused of having, on acting in concert and mutual understanding with the intent of depriving Jerzy Popieluszko of his life, on the night between 19 and 20 October 1984, in Gorsk, Torun Province, criminally stopped Jerzy Popieluszko while he was traveling in a Volkswagen-Golf, rendered him unconscious by beating him with fists and a wooden truncheon, gagged him, tied his hands and feet with cord, placed him in the trunk of a Fiat 125p and driven him to Torun and subsequently on the highway in the direction of

Wloclawek. In connection with Jerzy Popieluszko's attempts to free himself and escape, they also are accused of having again beaten him with a wooden truncheon and fists, gagged his mouth, tied his hands and feet with cord, and lastly looped a cord around his neck, tied a sack with stones to his feet and, after transporting him to a dam at Zalew Wislany [Vistula Floodplain] near Wloclawek, thrown him into the water, thus causing, in the aforementioned manner, his death through strangulation/suffocation [the Polish term means both]. I.e., they are accused of a crime covered by Article 148, Paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, and Article 165, Paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, in conjunction with Article 10, Paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.

Further, they are accused of having, on acting in concert and mutual understanding, on the night between 19 and 20 October 1984, at Gorsk, Torun Province, criminally stopped on the highway Waldemar Chrostowski, the chauffeur of the Volkswagen-Golf, manacled him, gagged his mouth, and abducted him in a Fiat 125p with the intent of depriving him of his life. However, they did not perpetrate the intended deed, because Waldemar Chrostowski jumped out of the car in the locality of Przysiek and escaped. I.e., they are accused of the crime covered by Article 11, Paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, in conjunction with Article 148, Paragraph 1, of the Penal Code.

All three defendants were moreover accused of having organized and carried out on 13 October 1984, on the Ostroda-Olsztynek Highway in Olsztyn Province, in accordance with an agreed-upon division of labor, and with the intent of depriving Jerzy Popieluszko, Waldemar Chrostowski and Seweryn Jaworski of their lives, an attempt to cause a road accident to a Volkswagen-Golf in which the abovementioned persons were traveling from Gdansk to Warsaw. However, they did not carry out the intended deed, because the car's driver, Waldemar Chrostowski, aimed the car in the direction of Grzegorz Piotrowski just as the latter was aiming to hurl a stone; hurled under these conditions, the stone did not hit the car's windshield. I. e., the defendants are accused of the crime covered by Article 11, Paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, in conjunction with Article 148, Paragraph 1, of the Penal Code.

The fourth of the accused is Adam Pietruszka, born on 19 July 1938 in Kutno, of peasant origin, Polish citizen, married, with one adult offspring, higher education, lawyer, recipient of the Cavalier's Cross of the Order of Poland's Rebirth, the Gold Cross of Merit, the Silver Cross of Merit, and ministerial awards. Last employment: deputy department director at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, no record of previous convictions. He is accused of having exploited his position as deputy department director at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and as the official superior of the Ministry's functionaries Grzegorz Piotrowski, Leszek Pekala and Waldemar Chmielewski to prompt them to perpetrate the particularly harassing deed of abducting Jerzy Popieluszko and depriving him of his life, as well as to assist them in perpetrating that deed by assigning to the abovementioned persons an official car for traveling to Gdansk on 13 October 1984 and providing them in this connection with a pass exempting the car from road checks by the militia, as well as with assurances that the fact of their perpetrating that deed would not be made public. He is further accused of having, following the perpetration of that deed by them, taken steps to complicate the identification of the perpetrators, i.e., of

having committed a crime covered by Article 18, Paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Penal Code, in conjunction with Article 148, Paragraph 11, of the Penal Code, and Article 165, Paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.

During the trial the prosecutor presented an extensive narration of the principal points in the bill of indictment, on referring to evidence collected during the pretrial investigation.

The reading of the bill of indictment lasted about 2 hours. That lengthy document is altogether 70 pages long. It contains a list of the persons summoned for the trial, including two experts, Prof Dr Maria Byrdy and Dr Tadeusz Jozwik of the Forensic Medicine Center in Bialystok, and 22 witnesses. In addition, the prosecutor's office requested that depositions by 62 witnesses be read at the trial, and the documents were complemented by a number of expert opinions and expertises from the Criminology Center and the Polish Automobile Association, as well as by various material evidence and other documents. Furthermore, the prosecutor's office submitted to the Court audio and video cassette records of the activities performed in the course of the pretrial investigation. Altogether, the material evidence is 16 volumes thick.

Testimony of the Defendant Leszek Pekala

Next, the presiding judge asked the defendant Leszek Pekala whether he pleaded guilty and understood the bill of indictment. The defendant declared that he understood the bill of indictment but did not plead guilty. He admitted taking part in the preparations but did not admit the intention to kill anyone. Subsequent cross-examination was performed by Judge Maciejewski. Pekala briefly presented his vita. He graduated from an elementary school and a mechanical-electrical technikum in Rzeszow and subsequently attended the Warsaw Polytechnic, where he graduated with a major in electronics. Following his studies, he started working at the Wroclaw Province Militia Headquarters, and subsequently at the Tarnow Province Militia Headquarters, from which, 2 or 3 years later, he transferred to work at the Ministry of Interior Affairs. For the last 2 years he had been working under Piotrowski's command. The director of the department where he worked was Gen Platek, while the supervision of their activities was exercised by deputy department director Adam Pietruszka. L. Pekala declared that he received his instructions from Piotrowski, and on minor matters from A. Pietruszka.

The Preparations

Pekala and Chmielewski were to select the site for the priest's abduction, purchase the gear needed for the kidnapping, and keep Piotrowski posted. Chmielewski told Pekala that he knew of a place (a bunker in a forest) where the Rev Popieluszko could be kept. That bunker was not suitable for keeping Popieluszko over any lengthy period of time, but he could be taken there and frightened. They wanted to threaten him, frighten him and obtain from him information on underground structures and people working in them. They also wanted to extract from the priest a pledge that he would not engage in political activity.

Piotrowski said that Pekala and Chmielewski were to find the spot and then he would himself have a talk with Popieluszko, either in the car or in the bunker. They planned to leave Popieluszko for a moment in that bunker, so that he would sense that he could stay there unassisted. They were going to leave him there in a tied-up position. After they reached the vicinity of the bunker, Pekala told Chmielewski that there was a bridge across the Vistula on the route from Warsaw to Gdansk, and they resolved to inspect it. They drove there, inspected the place and took measurements. Pekala believed that Popieluszko could not be kept long in the bunker and, in order to give him a good fright, they were to threaten him with throwing him into the Vistula.

They contacted Piotrowski the next day. That was in the afternoon. They told him everything. Piotrowski expressed the desire to drive over and personally inspect both the bunkers and the bridge. They drove there, probably on the same day. He arrived at the bunker and approved of it, and then he wanted to see the bridge. Before leaving for the bridge, they placed large oval stones in the car. Their combined weight, according to Pekala, was about 50 kg. There were altogether 10 stones.

Later they began observations of the environs of the rectory to determine whether the abduction could be accomplished in Warsaw. This did not happen, and Piotrowski informed them of Popieluszko's intention to take a trip to Gdansk. He also admitted the possibility of the priest's death. He declared that Pekala and Chmielewski would merely be his assistants while he Piotrowski himself was in favor of causing the priest's death, of the possibility of his death. Piotrowski was to talk with Popieluszko. Pekala believed that the priest's death was only a possibility.

Piotrowski told them, and several times at that, that the plan for the abduction, including [the priest's] death as well, was approved, and by the higher superiors at that. Pekala is not certain whether Piotrowski named any names, but probably no specific names were mentioned. He, Pekala, learned of the trip to Gdansk a day before.

The First Attempt, 13 October 1984

They took along everything, including the stones and sacks, for the Gdansk trip. They departed on 13 October at 0600 hours. Before the departure Piotrowski gave them 5,000 zlotys apiece. But he does not remember exactly whether this was on 13 or 19 October. That money was to be for the travel expenses, purchases and as an advance part payment. Piotrowski said that he got the department to concur that money would be no problem in this case and that all expenditures would be refunded.

They arrived at St Brigid's Church in Gdansk. Chmielewski and Piotrowski entered the church to look for Popieluszko. Pekala waited in the car. They returned and said that Popieluszko was inside the church. Next, they drove to Sopot and had dinner at the Grand Hotel. Piotrowski paid the bill, which was 3,000-4,000 zlotys. Pekala was somewhat surprised by that, but Piotrowski declared that it was an important case and money was no problem. Pekala drank

beer and 50 grams of vodka; the others drank more, probably 100 grams of vodka each.

Earlier, while en route to Gdansk, Piotrowski offered them various suggestions concerning, e.g., the possibility of shooting Popieluszko with a service weapon, upon first frightening him, or halting the car and causing an accident by breaking the windshield with a rock. The rock was to be hurled by Piotrowski. Pekala and Chmielewski were to observe the consequences of the accident. Piotrowski said that if he hit the target with the rock then the car could be set afire. They had on hand 20-liter canisters of gasoline. They did not decide on who was to do this. Pekala does not remember whether they considered the question of what to do in the event that all those riding with Popieluszko were to die or in the event that some would survive.

They selected the spot, halted, and tested the possibilities for [radio] communication. This took a long time. The highway at that spot sloped downward and curved quite sharply to the right. During the test, Chmielewski and Piotrowski stood at the edge of the forest, several meters ahead of the curve. They were 100 meters distant from Pekala. It was then that they agreed that, on returning, Pekala would let them get off just ahead of the curve and then turn around and take a position in the forest in order to advise them of Popieluszko's coming. It was precisely at that spot that Piotrowski was to assault the priest's car with stones.

They left Gdansk between 2100 and 2200 hours. Their car at the time bore CZK tags. They followed the Golf, had problems in overtaking it but finally succeeded. While in Gdansk they saw that three persons were in the car. (At the time the Rev Popieluszko and Chrostowski had been accompanied by Seweryn Jaworski.) Pekala overtook the priest's car. They halted at the preselected spot. Chmielewski and Piotrowski ran toward the curve while Pekala concealed the car in the forest. They established communication. While still in the car, they had put on "kominiarki" [knitted headgear covering the whole head and leaving only the face bare]. When the Golf appeared, Pekala radioed the information and waited for Piotrowski and Chmielewski. After the Golf passed him, Pekala returned to his car. It was then that he heard the squeal of tires. There were no other sounds. Pekala kept waiting in the car. He received no signals from Piotrowski and Chmielewski. They appeared only after some time. Piotrowski said that they had failed. He had leaped onto the highway and the car was approaching, but its driver made an abrupt turn. Piotrowski hurled the stone, but it flew over the car. In Piotrowski's judgment the driver kept calm and mastered the situation.

The Second Attempt, 19 October 1984

On 19 October Pekala and Chmielewski were instructed by Piotrowski to keep watch over the church area starting in the morning, and especially to look out for the Rev Popieluszko's departure.

Piotrowski said that a decision was taken [by Popieluszko] to go to Bydgoszcz. Pekala does not know just when did Piotrowski receive the trip permit and the "W" passes, but he had them already on hand while still in the

garage. A "W" pass exempted its bearer from road checks and authorized him to drive into the Ministry area.

Variants

L. Pekala testified: "We considered different variants, one being the breaking of the windshield and the other, the one that actually took place. We discussed these variants en route. Even earlier we had agreed that [sand-filled] socks are no good as a bludgeoning instrument and decided to take along some kind of truncheons. We found some poles serving as protection against snow." Pekala broke off two segments measuring 30-40 cm in length and about 4 cm in diameter, although his figures may err. These truncheons were to stun the driver and the passenger into unconsciousness. Practice exercises with the truncheons were performed during the drive to Bydgoszcz. "I didn't join in them." Piotrowski made a gesture [presumably of contempt].

They had reached Bydgoszcz at 1700 hours or later. They drove to the Province Office of Internal Affairs. Piotrowski had to telephone Warsaw. Then they drove to gas up, and subsequently to the church in Wyzyny, where they determined that the Rev Popieluszko was in the rectory.

They had not seen the Rev Popieluszko's car before its departure. At about 2200 hours the Golf stopped at the rectory and, after some time, the Rev Popieluszko emerged from the rectory, bade goodbye to others, and entered the car.

Second Day of the Trial, 28 December 1984

The trial commenced after a delay of 1 1/2 hours owing to a blackout in the building of the Province Court. After the electricity was restored, the trial began. In lieu of Attorney Pubanc, Attorney Zbigniew Sroda appeared as the defense attorney for the defendant Chmielewski. The trial continued to be conducted by Judge Maciejewski, who cross-examined the defendant Pekala.

The defendant testified on the further course of events on 19 October.

He had replaced the WAB-series tags with KZC-series tags. They wrapped the truncheons in undershirts tied with a string. Then they returned to the environs of the rectory. That was between 2100 and 2200 hours. That also was when the Golf had arrived. The defendant did not personally see the Rev Popieluszko enter the car, but he did see him bid goodbye in front of the rectory. The defendant did not identify in his mind the car's chauffeur as Chrostowski. Some time later, a red sports Fiat departed rapidly, followed by the Golf. Earlier, Piotrowski and Pekala had agreed on following the Golf cautiously. This was what happened. At a certain moment the red Fiat turned left and returned to the city, while they kept following the Golf. They also tried to catch up with and overtake it, but just then they were passing through a small town and Piotrowski ordered them to slow down. Only after passing through the town they decided to overtake the Golf and signal it with their lights. It took awhile but finally they caught up with it. They flashed their lights and the Golf stopped, as did they. Before stopping, Chmielewski

was ordered by Piotrowski to put on a uniform. Chmielewski probably donned a militiaman's white cap, but Pekala could not remember it exactly. He, Pekala, stayed with the car, sitting behind the steering wheel, and turned off the headlights, while keeping the parking lights on. Chmielewski and Piotrowski approached the Golf. He, Pekala, remembers that they approached it from the driver's side and engaged in a brief conversation which he did not hear. Chrostowski got out and approached the other car together with Piotrowski, who ordered Chrostowski to sit down in the front seat with Pekala. Chmielewski remained standing all that time near the Golf. The driver entered the car without resisting. Piotrowski sat down in the rear seat behind him.

Piotrowski said that this was a sobriety check, and at the same time he handed Pekala handcuffs and ordered him to manacle Chrostowski, which he did. Piotrowski told Chrostowski: "Waldus, open your mouth" and placed a previously prepared gag in it.

At first Chrostowski remained silent on being gagged, but a moment later he began to emit rattling sounds. Then Pekala turned on the radio to silence him. He received a pistol from Piotrowski, who, on leaving the car, told him: "The safety catch is off. Guard him."

Piotrowski left the car, but Pekala does not know whether he picked up anything from the car. He does not know either whether Chmielewski had a truncheon on him, but he rather thinks not since the latter was acting in the guise of a militiaman. He did not see what Piotrowski and Chmielewski were doing, because he was watching Chrostowski, but he did notice that they were standing near the Golf on the Rev Popieluszko's side. He heard some loud conversation but could not apprehend its meaning. He then saw Piotrowski lead the Rev Popieluszko to the rear of their car. Chmielewski still kept standing for awhile near the Golf. There was some kind of conversation with the Rev Popieluszko leaning on their car and saying something, but Pekala could not catch its drift, because Chrostowski was making that rattling noise. Later, an instant later, he noticed Chmielewski approach rapidly the rear of the car. He had the impression that all three, including the priest, entered the forest, about 1 or 2 meters inside. He heard what seemed to be moans and the sounds of a tussle, or perhaps the sounds of blows, but he could not be certain. Of a certainty, though, he did hear one moan and he believes that it came from the Rev Popieluszko. Then at once he realized that this moan was due to a blow. That tussle lasted for about a quarter of a minute, but at the time he had thought that it lasted a minute or two. Chmielewski emerged from the rear, approached Pekala and told him to open the trunk door, which he did on gesturing to Chmielewski to be silent, since the latter addressed him by name. He opened the trunk lid and sensed that some large burden was being placed there. He realized that it was the Rev Popieluszko. They closed the trunk. Chmielewski and Piotrowski reentered the car.

They drove off. He drove at a speed of about 80 km per hour. At a certain moment he noticed that the door opened and Chrostowski jumped out of the car. Even before Chrostowski's jump Pekala was ordered to drive more rapidly and turn into the first forest road en route.

Earlier they had agreed that the chauffeur was to be bludgeoned, tied up and placed on the rear seat. That was why that tarpaulin had been purchased. It was Pekala's understanding that they were going to drive into the forest in order to tie up Chrostowski there, but he cannot say whether this meant that Chrostowski was to be beaten up or slain.

Following Chrostowski's escape Piotrowski ordered that they drive on. Pekala cannot say whether there was any traffic on the road; at most, it was light traffic. He did not see anybody on the roadside, although he did see some car driving in front of him. He does not remember whether there was a horse-drawn cart. They did not stop but kept driving until Torun. In Torun they stopped at a hotel parking lot on the bank of the Vistula.

Earlier, Chmielewski said that the priest was moving inside the trunk. That happened at the same time as knocking in the engine. While on the parking lot, Pekala wanted to check out the car. He thought that the priest would be tied up more tightly so as to prevent his movements. It seemed to him that the priest was moving inside the trunk. They all got out. It seems to him that what happened next was rapid and that Piotrowski ordered the trunk to be opened. He then saw the priest run away, while he himself had stood in front of the car. Piotrowski shouted: "Catch him!" Pekala raced behind the priest. The first to catch up with the Rev Popieluszko was Piotrowski. Pekala does not remember whether Piotrowski was holding anything in his hand. He remembers that he himself had caught up with and restrained the priest. As he was leaning over him, it seemed to him that Piotrowski struck the priest, apparently dealing him a blow with a truncheon. All this was so sudden and violent that he does not remember whether the Rev Popieluszko fell, but he remembers having seen him lie on the ground. The priest had run for a distance of about 10 meters from the car while crying, "Help! People, spare my life!" Pekala remembers that he took part in restraining the Rev. Popieluszko, and he also vaguely remembers that the cord may have been brought either by Piotrowski or perhaps by himself. He remembers that two people tied up the Rev Popieluszko: "Either I and Piotrowski or I and Chmielewski." Of a certainty they tied the priest's hands and also put aright the gag in his mouth. He tied a plastic line around the priest's head. They did not use tape. It was probably he himself that, either with Chmielewski or with Piotrowski, carried the Rev Popieluszko to the car.

It is difficult for Pekala to say whether the Rev Popieluszko was conscious. Of a certainty, he was stunned by the blows. He offered no resistance when they placed him in the car trunk. They drove out of the parking lot and Piotrowski ordered Pekala to turn left. Pekala is unaware of whether they crossed a bridge en route. Chmielewski was ordered by Piotrowski to watch the trunk.

After some time Popieluszko again began to move inside the trunk. They looked for a forest but saw a gasoline station and decided to buy oil. "We stopped about 20 or 30 or perhaps more meters from the station and Piotrowski ran to buy oil. They did not approach the station any closer because the Rev Popieluszko was moving inside the trunk and they did not want to be discovered."

At one moment, Pekala and Chmielewski sat down on the trunk. The Rev Popieluszko was quiet during that time. Before they had reached the dam, they stopped twice. They drove to a distance of 500 meters from the station and turned to the right into some bushes. They proceeded about 20-30 meters on the highway. During that time the Rev Popieluszko moved inside the trunk. Pekala was ordered to drive slowly, while Chmielewski and Piotrowski left the car and walked alongside it. They held down the trunk lid with their hands, or one of them even sat down on the lid.

He stopped the car and opened the trunk. Piotrowski and Chmielewski got off. It seems that the Rev Popieluszko was then beaten with a truncheon by Piotrowski, even while he still was inside the trunk. Once Piotrowski missed and struck the trunk lid; Pekala heard this. He does not know how many blows Piotrowski struck with the truncheon, because he was sitting inside the car, but they were several blows. Chmielewski ordered Pekala to take out the tarpaulin and spread it out on the grass. Pekala cannot say who removed the priest from the trunk; perhaps he too did it. He placed the priest on the tarpaulin. It seems to him that the Rev Popieluszko was moving but not saying anything. He cannot say whether the priest was conscious. It seems that Piotrowski struck him once more. He, Pekala, cannot say whether the blow was dealt by hand or with the truncheon. The rope on the feet and hands was tightened. Pekala tightened the rope on the hands as well as the rear knot holding the gag in place. One of the other two defendants helped him in this, but he cannot say which one. He tried to reconstruct that situation, but he cannot say who helped him tighten the rope. Throughout that time Piotrowski kept saying that he would kill the priest, that he would strangle him with his own hands.

Next, they returned to the highway and drove in the direction of Wloclawek. Chmielewski said that they should look for a forest, because that was Piotrowski's wish. Chmielewski asked whether they were going there in order to release the Rev Popieluszko. Pekala does not remember Piotrowski's answer. He is not certain whether he also commented on this subject. After a few minutes they drove into a forest to a distance of 300 meters. It may be that the Rev Popieluszko showed signs of life, but Pekala did not hear anything. However, Chmielewski said he thought so.

Together with Chmielewski, they removed the Rev Popieluszko from the trunk. They placed him on the ground. Piotrowski left the car. They considered what to do next. Piotrowski said that a sack with stones should be tied to the priest. He said: "[Tie the sack with] stones to his feet." Pekala says: "This was not in any way on my initiative." While he was tying up the priest he asked for the stones to be handed to him, but he was merely fulfilling Piotrowski's orders.

The judge asked: "What did that order imply?"

Pekala answered: "I understood it to mean that, as Piotrowski said earlier, the Rev Popieluszko must die and may be thrown into water. I associated this precisely with that earlier comment by Piotrowski. I was aware that I had to

carry out the chief's order. I feared this possibility but had hoped that the outcome might be different. However, I was aware that the outcome might be death. I carried out that order, because I was aware that I must execute my superior's command."

The Rev Popieluszko was unconscious while the stones were tied to his body. Pekala does not know whether he was showing signs of life. He tied on the sack with stones together with Chmielewski. "Piotrowski stood over us and looked on. I think he was supervising us. At that time I passed a loop around the neck of the Rev Popieluszko, while Chmielewski was tying up the feet. The cord ran along the spine from the neck to the feet and hands. The feet were doubled up in the back. Were the priest to move his feet, the loop would tighten around his neck. We looped that cord in such a manner that the priest would be unable any more to try pushing up the trunk lid."

The final decision on the fate of the Rev Popieluszko was taken after they had driven out of that forest. They were driving in the direction of Wloclawek. Pekala claims that they tried to convince Piotrowski that the Rev Popieluszko should not die. Pekala said that the priest was already beaten up and sufficiently frightened, and besides there was a witness in the person of Chrostowski who might identify him. They suggested that the priest be released in the forest because he would of a certainty abandon his extrareligious activities. Chmielewski said that Chrostowski could identify Pekala, who would then "be sacrificed." It seems to Pekala that at one moment Piotrowski said, "Well then, let's think about it." But after these suggestions were voiced, Piotrowski said, "Water only." This was to imply drowning.

The Dam

They reached the dam on the Zalew near Wloclawek, and stopped twice. The first time, they found that they could not throw out the priest's body owing to the presence of concrete abutments. They turned the car around and drove back looking for another spot. Pekala was the last to approach the trunk, and he had the impression that the Rev Popieluszko was not alive. All three removed the priest's body from the trunk and threw it across the guardrail into the river. "I heard a splash."

On being thrown, the body did not snag on anything, except that the cassock snagged on the trunk lock as they were removing the body from the trunk. While carrying the body, Chmielewski lost his watch, but Pekala found it and returned it to him.

They had encountered their first road check in Wloclawek before reaching the dam and used their "W" pass. Pekala said that "A thorough inspection would then have uncovered the body of the Rev Popieluszko. Without that pass we would not have, besides, dared to carry out such a deed and such an operation.

"Even then this whole thing had seemed senseless to me. I remember that Piotrowski calmed us. He said that if the body is not found, everything will be all right. He also told us that we should never and under no circumstances

disclose the whereabouts of the body. We were aware that we committed a murder. Piotrowski said that he accepted the entire responsibility. I was afraid of fingerprints that might be taken, but Piotrowski told me not to worry, because the criminologists are our men. Moreover, in the course of another conversation, Piotrowski declared that another person already took part in a similar terror act but nothing of it came to light...."

Pekala further said that on the return trip they drank half a liter of vodka. They encountered another road check once back in Warsaw, with the patrol car catching up with them. But once they showed the pass, they were let go. Afterward, there were two more road checks, because by then he, Pekala, was driving his own car. But each time they showed the "W" pass and that was the end of it.

Obliterating the Traces

On returning to Warsaw, the same night, they got rid of the objects and gear used to commit the crime.

The next day Pekala was to report at the Ministry [of Internal Affairs] about gasoline consumption. He did it on the second day. He demonstrated on a road map that they had been to Krakow, as per their previous agreement. On Saturday October 20 Chmielewski visited Pekala at home and asked him to report for work. That was at about 1600 hours. Chmielewski had arrived by taxi and left at once, while Pekala drove to the Ministry. In the morning he had seen Piotrowski briefly, and only later, in the afternoon, Piotrowski told him that things were okay, because Chrostowski's testimony was error-ridden, confusing the details, confusing Pekala with Chmielewski, and because Chrostowski could not identify either man and did not remember the car's license plate number. Piotrowski said that the first report on this event was to appear only on the evening TV news program that day. Pekala cannot recall whether Piotrowski had said that day that he discussed the subject with someone. But the next day in the evening, at 2200 hours, Piotrowski did say to them [Pekala and Chmielewski] that he had been repeatedly asked whether the body would be found, and that such questions amused and bored him. He regarded the matter as trivial. Perhaps he did mention a name. It seems to Pekala that Piotrowski then named Pietruszka. On Sunday at 1000 or 1200 hours, in the vicinity of the Ministry, Pekala met Chmielewski and later Piotrowski, and all three went to a coffeehouse near the Moskwa Cinema. Piotrowski told them that he was going to spread disinformation and make a telephone call to the ecclesiastical authorities. He knew what he was going to say, but Pekala is uncertain as to whether it was written down on paper. Of a certainty, he had written down several ecclesiastical telephone numbers. At that time the question of whether the license plate number of their car was known had not yet been considered. But it was then, too, perhaps, that Grzegorz Piotrowski said for the first time that the KZC license plate number was known. Piotrowski telephoned some bishop, Pekala does not know which one, perhaps Bishop Romaniuk, and declared that he was calling in the matter of the Rev Popieluszko, who was safe, and that a ransom of US\$50,000 was to be readied. Further information would be provided in a church in Kalisz.

The next day, according to Pekala, he was detained and arrested. Earlier, Piotrowski said that unnecessary meetings should be avoided and the subject not mentioned during performance of regular duties. Piotrowski claimed that he received a written note informing him that their offices might be bugged. Besides, he had also mentioned this possibility earlier. Pekala told the judge that he was aware of the formation of a commission on the Popieluszko affair within the Ministry; Piotrowski had informed him and Chmielewski of this and commented that personally he was pleased by the make-up of the membership of that commission. That was on Sunday, while Piotrowski talked with them in the same hallway. He named all the four or five members of the commission. Pekala recalls the name of Jablonski, and also that of Director Platek, but as to whether Piotrowski mentioned Pietruszka, Pekala cannot recall. It seemed to him that this news becalmed Piotrowski.

Findings of Pretrial Investigation

Next, in view of the partial contradictions in the testimony, and considering that the defendant could not recall many details, the Court decided to make public the depositions made by Pekala during the pretrial examination. This concerned in particular the impression which, in the words of Chmielewski and Pekala, G. Piotrowski tried to produce on these two defendants. He allegedly stressed repeatedly that the "action" against the Rev Popieluszko was approved by his superiors.

The Court made public an excerpt in which Pekala was quoted as testifying that Chrostowski knew him and that his fingerprints were on the handcuffs, whereupon Piotrowski answered that "The criminologists are our men and I should not worry, as nothing would happen to me. Piotrowski said that a decision was made concerning Popieluszko, and that it was a political decision. Piotrowski said that the matter would be triply concealed; some steps would be taken by the Department of the Office of Internal Affairs for the Nation's Capital, some certainly by our department under the direction of Deputy Chief Drozd, and some by us three ourselves, with the proviso that our actions would be of an anticipatory nature and that no one would know about us. [At first] only Popieluszko's abduction was considered and Piotrowski said that no decision was taken as to whether he should live or die. I viewed this as an important point in my life, as it might decide my further career. On the second day, Piotrowski said that two possibilities existed: either abduction with intent to frighten or disappearance, which does not preclude death. He said that some other people, such as the Rev Jankowski of Gdansk, also were being considered. He announced that he obtained tacit consent to a week off duty for us, and that the possibilities were unlimited."

In reply to the Court's question as to whether Pekala confirmed this deposition, he answered: "I probably expressed myself too sharply. I did not say that death would be involved, and Piotrowski did not say that it had to happen, but he said there might be risk to life. We discussed Jankowski in Gdansk as another troublemaker, and during that conversation the name of the Rev Malkowski of Warsaw was probably also mentioned. Piotrowski did mention Malkowski but proposed that the action be directed against Popieluszko, and he

added that it was not necessary for us to know too much, because he was responsible for us and the rest should be 'of no interest' to us."

In view of the continuing contradictions, the Court made public another excerpt from the pretrial deposition of Pekala: "I'm unable to answer the question of whether Piotrowski acted on his own or worked out a plan with somebody else. In me he instilled the conviction that such a plan had been approved very high up, even if it did not preclude the priest's death... [-----] [Article 2, Point 1, of the Decree of 31 July 1981 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment (DZIENNIK USTAW, No 20, Item 99); revised in 1983 (DZIENNIK USTAW, No 44, Item 204)] [i.e., censored (translator's note)]. I had the impression that this was agreed upon with somebody else, that this idea did not originate with Piotrowski.... Grzegorz Piotrowski gave us to understand that, if the body is not found, we could expect in the future extremely substantial official rewards."

Answering the Court's question, Pekala confirmed the authenticity of his pretrial deposition, declaring, "I had been convinced of the rightness of that action until the Rev Popieluszko was maltreated and we actively assaulted him. Afterward I acted without thinking or out of cowardice. Besides, during the pretrial investigation I had fantasies about a broader plan and great tasks. I wanted to find some logic to it all while making depositions such as the one just cited here. I had fantasies that I was under the influence of various counterintelligence services, that a world war had broken out. When that operation took place I considered it as something significant."

The Court continued to make public other excerpts from the pretrial deposition of Pekala, in which he was quoted as saying that, upon reaching Bydgoszcz, he had learned that these actions were approved higher up and that the corresponding decisions were taken higher up. It was his understanding that such a decision was taken at the level of a deputy minister. It seemed to him that Piotrowski was in favor of the Rev Popieluszko's death and that, following that death, there would be talks with the Church, which would have to make concessions. The decision taken was to kill the Rev Malkowski, but later Popieluszko was chosen as the target. Piotrowski regarded him as better-fitted. Besides, as Pekala had explained during the pretrial investigation, the Office of Internal Affairs for the Nation's Capital was supposed to participate in that action. Pekala linked this to a fire at Chrostowski's home. Besides, a deputy to Chief Drozdz, Piotrowski's deputy, made trips concerning such matters. Drozdz received information that Popieluszko was under constant surveillance by the Office of Internal Affairs for the Nation's Capital. Drozdz provided the information that Popieluszko was going to travel to Gdansk, but then at some higher-up level he was informed that this was untrue.

Upon the Court's asking whether he confirmed this deposition, Pekala answered: "I don't confirm this deposition. Piotrowski did not literally say that the decision in favor of death was taken. What he said was that he had obtained approval for the operation, even at the risk of the Rev Popieluszko's life."

The judge-adviser continued his cross-examination on quoting a sentence from the pretrial deposition: "Piotrowski was decisively in favor of the Rev Popieluszko's death, but others were still hesitating--so Piotrowski said."

Pekala: "I don't confirm this."

The Court next cited the following passage from the pretrial deposition: "Piotrowski named to me one of the deputy ministers; he did not name any other names." Pekala answered: "It was my understanding that such actions are initiated at the deputy-minister level and that Piotrowski named one such name."

The presiding judge addressed the defendant, accusing him of inconsistency, inasmuch as in his pretrial deposition Pekala at one time had named Pietruszka as the person who approved Popieluszko's slaying, while at another time he declared that Piotrowski mentioned the name of one of the deputy ministers. The judge asked that this contradiction be cleared up.

Pekala answered: "Aside from these two, he did not mention any other names. I deny that Piotrowski told me that one of the deputy ministers gave his approval. Actually, in connection with the operation against Popieluszko, he mentioned the name of one of the deputy ministers while we were driving, and I misunderstood his meaning. I'd also like to rectify my deposition in the place where it says that Pietruszka was in favor of causing Popieluszko's death."

The presiding judge asked Pekala whether that may have concerned some other matters relating to the Rev Popieluszko, considering that the dossiers of this case show that proceedings against the priest had been under way.

Pekala declared: "Piotrowski did mention the name of a deputy minister, but it may have been in some context relating to the necessity of counteracting Popieluszko's activities in some way. But at the time I had misunderstood him, thinking that he was referring to some lawless action, whereas actually some legal action might have been meant and I may have misunderstood Piotrowski. But Piotrowski did indeed mention Pietruszka's name, declaring that the latter had given his approval to the operation. The wording of Piotrowski's comments as given in my pretrial deposition is inaccurate."

Next, the Court made public other excerpts from Pekala's pretrial deposition: "Piotrowski mentioned to me that, should [a road] accident occur, Popieluszko should be checked for signs of life, and if he remains alive, gasoline should be poured over the car so as to immolate him. On 19 October, too, the alternative of the death of Popieluszko and his chauffeur was presumed. Piotrowski personally told me that he was ready to strangle Popieluszko with his own hands. The priest was to be buried in a [forest] bunker. Should it turn out that Popieluszko would change his parish, betray underground structures and promise to cease his political activities, his life might be spared."

On being asked by the Court whether he confirms this deposition, Pekala answered: "Such was my deposition. Piotrowski did not say so explicitly that

the Rev Popieluszko had to die. Nor did he say so of Chrostowski. I'm tired...."

In view of the fatigue of the defendant Pekala, the Court declared a recess until 2 January at 0900 hours.

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CSO: 2600/489

POLAND

CATHOLIC WEEKLY CONTINUES CENSORED COVERAGE OF TORUN TRIAL

Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 3, 20 Jan 85 pp 5,6

[Highlights of an account of the trial by Jacek Ambroziak, representing the Press Office of the Episcopate of Poland, second in a series of articles: "The Trial of the Murder of the Rev Jerzy Popieluszko"]

[Text] The presiding judge addressed the defendant, accusing him of lack of consistency, inasmuch as in his pretrial deposition Pekala at one time mentioned only the name of Pietruszka as the person who approved Popieluszko's slaying, while at another time he had declared that Piotrowski mentioned the name of a deputy minister. The judge asked that this contradiction be cleared up.

Pekala answered: "Aside from these two, I gave no other names. I deny that Piotrowski told me that one of the deputy ministers gave his approval. Actually, in connection with the operation against Popieluszko, he mentioned the name of one of the deputy ministers while we were driving, and I misunderstood his meaning. I also wish to rectify my deposition stating that Pietruszka was in favor of causing Popieluszko's death."

The presiding judge asked Pekala whether that may have concerned other matters relating to Popieluszko, because the dossiers of the case revealed that proceedings against the priest had been under way.

Pekala declared: "Piotrowski did mention the name of one of the deputy ministers, but that may have been in another context, relating to the necessity of counteracting in some way Popieluszko's activities. But at the time I had misunderstood this and thought this meant some lawless action, whereas actually legal action might have been meant. But Piotrowski did indeed mention the name of Pietruszka, declaring that he had given his approval to the action. The wording of Piotrowski's comments, as given in my pretrial deposition, is inaccurate."

The Court then read other excerpts from Pekala's pretrial deposition:
"Piotrowski mentioned to me that, should [a car] accident occur, Popieluszko should be checked for signs of life and, if he were still to be alive, gasoline should be poured over the car so as to immolate him. On 19 October, too, the possibility of the death of Popieluszko and his chauffeur was presumed. Piotrowski told me that he was ready to strangle Popieluszko with his own hands. The priest was to be buried in a [forest] bunker. Should it turn out that Popieluszko would change his parish, betray underground structures and promise to abandon his political activities, his life might be spared."

Answering the Court's question whether he was confirming his deposition, Pekala said: "Such was my deposition. Piotrowski did not say clearly that the Rev Popieluszko had to die. Nor did he say so about Chrostowski. I'm tired....."

In view of the fatigue of the defendant Pekala, the Court declared a recess until 2 January at 0900 hours.

2 January 1985, Third Day of the Trial

The Court continued to make public additional excerpts from Pekala's pretrial deposition, referring to the various topics of conversation while en route to Bydgoszcz. He and Chmielewski were aware that "the higher-ups" knew about the operation, but they did not specifically question Piotrowski about their identities. He himself did not question Piotrowski, if only considering that the operation was to be carried out in secret. Piotrowski merely told them that he had been coordinating and reporting on their activities someplace "at the top." He mentioned three names, two of which Pekala declined to mention as he is uncertain of the context in which they were mentioned. Of a certainty, Piotrowski named Pietruszka. When asked whether the body might not be found, Piotrowski named Pietruszka and told them that such questions amuse him.

The defendant Pekala confirmed this part of his deposition, except that he added that the wording was not exact. Piotrowski said that Adam [Pietruszka] asked him whether [the body of] Popieluszko could be recovered, and then he declared that such questions amuse him.

Judge Maciejewski asked the defendant whether this precisely was one reason why he had become convinced that the operation was known to "the top."

Defendant Pekala: "This is how I understood it."

Judge: "Was that 'top' understood by you to refer to deputy director Pietruszka?"

The defendant answered that he was defining this expression more precisely by stating that he understood 'the top' to mean that the operation was known to deputy director Pietruszka.

The judge next asked whether the statement that Piotrowski reported to "the top" referred precisely to Pietruszka.

Defendant Pekala: "I was convinced that this meant Pietruszka. The appearances created by Piotrowski [also] seemed to mean that this was known to some deputy minister."

Presiding Judge Kujawa asked whether the defendant used the term "appearances."

Pekala clarified: "He did not state so directly, but this ensued from the context of the conversation, and that was above all how I interpreted it."

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The Court continued to make public additional excerpts from Pekala's pretrial deposition, relating to the time when he had driven into the bushes, where the trunk was opened and the priest removed and placed on the grass. Pekala was then tying up the priest and adjusting the gag, and he was aware that Popieluszko was being beaten. Later they again drove into a forest, where they again removed the priest from the trunk. According to Pekala, by then the priest was unconscious and they tightened the cord with himself and Chmielewski adjusting the gag. It was then that Piotrowski declared, "[Tie the sack of] stones to the feet!" and afterward they drove out of the forest.

Pekala: "Yes, I confirm this. We tightened the cords and knotted them into a single rope. I cannot say exactly just when the gag fell out of the priest's mouth the first time. Before the departure from Torun the gag was of a certainty in the priest's mouth. If I recall correctly, a tape was affixed while we had parked in the forest and were attaching the sack with stones. Previously I hadn't seen the priest's mouth taped."

The Court also made public the excerpt from Pekala's deposition relating to his hearing the sounds of a tussle and dull blows after the priest's car had been stopped. Pekala thought that Piotrowski and Chmielewski were then beating the priest with a truncheon.

Defendant Pekala: "Yes, it was then that I heard the sounds of a tussle and moans, and also what sounded like blows being struck. I cannot be sure whether they both or one of them were beating the priest. I personally didn't see Chmielewski hit the priest with a truncheon. At the time I felt certain that Piotrowski had taken along a truncheon after detaining Chrostowski and placing him in the car with me. Chmielewski apparently did not take along a truncheon, but I cannot recall exactly."

Next, the Court made public another excerpt in which Pekala described the lot on which they had parked their car in Torun (in the space he indicated on being taken there under escort). He stated that he was unaware of what the others were doing, because he was checking out the car, feeling nervous. He does not remember whether the priest in the trunk was being beaten with a truncheon by Piotrowski and Chmielewski.

The defendant continued to adhere to his statement that he could not confirm whether the Rev Popieluszko had been beaten while inside the car trunk in Torun.

The Court revealed yet another excerpt from Pekala's pretrial deposition, in which the defendant said that the Rev Popieluszko ran past him. Piotrowski then had shouted, "Catch him!" The defendant then saw priest being struck by Piotrowski with a truncheon and fall.

At the trial the defendant declared: "Yes, after the priest's escape from the trunk, Piotrowski beat him with a truncheon, I don't know how many times. It seems to me that the priest was standing sideways while Piotrowski struck him with the truncheon. Insofar as I recall, I had restrained the priest's hands while he was lying on the ground. I don't recall just at what moment did the priest fall onto the ground. I remember that I had to bring lengths of cord and we were tying him up.

The judge made public another passage from the defendant's deposition, in which Pekala stated that after leaving Torun their car had stopped three or perhaps four times. The first stop was made near the gasoline station.

The defendant declared at the trial: "I adhere to my testimony of today."

The Court continued to make public additional passages in which the defendant stated that, following the departure from the gasoline station, Chmielewski continually kept watch over the Rev Popieluszko's efforts to push the trunk lid open and kept the others informed of them. They left the car and pressed the lid down. Even before the priest was removed from the trunk after they parked, he was beaten. It seemed to the defendant that the priest was beaten by Piotrowski. Later during that stop the defendant and Chmielewski tightened the bonds; it was then also that the gag was replaced in the priest's mouth.

The defendant declared at the trial: "We looped the cord around the neck at the same time as we were attaching the stones. Tape also was put on while in the forest. At our previous stops we tightened the bonds and the gag but had not yet applied tape and looped the cord around the neck. During one stop the cord was tied and knotted to the cord binding the feet; that may have been during the stop in the thicket."

The judge asked: "Was the Rev Popieluszko conscious during the last stop?" The accused: "I can't say, but I can state that he was unconscious when we were tying him up and attaching the sack with stones."

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The Court again read yet another excerpt from Pekala's deposition, stating that, while they had parked in Torun, Piotrowski felled the priest onto the asphalt pavement with a strong blow of the hand to his head, and that he, Pekala, and Chmielewski restrained the priest's feet. It seemed at the time to him, Pekala, that Piotrowski was kneeling on the priest.

The defendant declared at the trial: "I confirm this deposition, except that I'm not certain whether Piotrowski did kneel on Popieluszko, but he did lean over him. I didn't see him choke the priest. I don't know what part of the head of the Rev Popieluszko was struck by Piotrowski."

The Court read another passage from Pekala's deposition stating that the gag was fashioned from a terrycloth towel bearing the inscription "Orbis" and was fastened with a string. That deposition also stated that, when his feet were being tied, the priest begged that his life be spared.

The defendant declared at the trial: "The gag was prepared even before the departure for Gdansk. I had prepared it together with Chmielewski, and Piotrowski knew of it."

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Auxiliary Prosecuting Attorney Olszewski asked: "During your discussions, was a mention made, or was it given to understand, that an order for the death of the Rev Popieluszko had been issued?"

Defendant Pekala: "Piotrowski said that the priest was to disappear, but he did not specifically mention the existence of any such order."

Attorney Olszewski: "In what way and why did the defendant believe in the existence of such an order?"

Defendant Pekala: "I had assumed its existence."

Attorney Olszewski: "The defendant stated that it was his understanding that the Rev Popieluszko was to be left in the forest. If that is so, let the defendant explain why did you tie him up in such a manner."

Defendant: "I thought that, once we were to abandon him, we could loosen those bonds. I believed and it was my understanding that the Rev Popieluszko was to be left in the forest. After discussion, however, it was decided to throw him into the water."

Attorney Olszewski: "The defendant had deposed that Piotrowski stated explicitly that he favored death for the Rev Popieluszko. At the time when Piotrowski made that statement, did the defendant--who admits he obeyed orders--agree with that statement?"

Pekala: "That was what was said. As for me, I undertook to carry out his orders."

Attorney Olszewski: "If the defendant was in disagreement with the idea of killing the Rev Popieluszko, why did the defendant execute Piotrowski's orders to that effect? How can the defendant explain this?"

Pekala: "I kept believing that it would merely end with a scare. It was only after the comment about water was made that I realized that death was likely."

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Attorney Prosecuting Attorney Wende: "The defendant stated that at a certain moment he began to feel deceived. It appears that he stated so on 25 October."

Pekala: "I stated so because, first of all, a man had died, because Piotrowski did not lead us till the end and fabricated the myth of approval by someone [higher up], and led us to believe that the operation could be concealed and also because he created the appearances that our safety would be guaranteed and said that no one would interrogate us, that he would accept all responsibility and that I could change my name and address."

Attorney Wende: "What did the defendant do at Popieluszko's home when it was being searched?"

Defendant: "I was instructed by the directorate to be present and inform the Department quickly, because that was a matter for the Office of Internal Affairs for the Nation's Capital."

Attorney Wende: "When was the body thrown into the water?"

Pekala: "At about midnight. Altogether, the entire sequence from the abduction till the drowning lasted some 2 hours."

Attorney Wende: "Was the defendant afraid of Piotrowski?"

Pekala: "I became afraid only in the forest, when the stones were mentioned. I realized that I had been obedient too long, but also that I must continue to obey. I became frightened by Piotrowski's violence."

Auxiliary Prosecuting Attorney Pisiewicz: "At what moment did the defendant realize that the Rev Popieluszko was no longer alive?"

Pekala: "When I was placing Popieluszko in the trunk while in the forest, and for the second time, on the dam, after the priest was removed from the trunk."

Attorney Wende: "Was there intent to kill Chrostowski, and if so, when did it arise?"

Pekala: "Killing Chrostowski was not mentioned."

Attorney Wende requested a reading of the passages of the pretrial deposition in which Pekala had stated that at first the idea of killing Chrostowski was not raised, but that it arose en route to Gdansk.

Pekala: "Yes, I confirm that except that his death was mentioned as a possibility. Causing his death was considered as a possibility."

The Court asked the defense attorneys for Pekala whether they had any questions for the defendant.

Pekala's defense attorney Graczyk asked him: "At the moment when Chrostowski jumped out, was the car functioning properly?"

Pekala: "We found the car to be in a bad shape already when we were leaving the church, and we definitely worried about it at the moment when the engine knocking, which happened in Torun. Besides, the engine was quite slow to accelerate, e.g., when we were overtaking the Golf. Kilometer after kilometer, something was always happening to that car."

Attorney Graczyk: "At the moment when Chrostowski jumped out, was the car rolling at full speed?"

Defendant: "It seems not."

Attorney Graczyk, Pekala's defense attorney: "How does the defendant view his behavior and conduct now? Has he thought it over?"

Pekala: "I feel terribly guilty when I realized [tense mix-up as published] that the priest had to die and that I was a coward and did not even escape, which might have changed the outcome."

Attorney Graczyk: "The defendant personally wrote down his confession. What did the defendant want to say in it?"

Pekala: "When I realized that a human being died, I became terrified. That terror sheds a bad light on me. This whole thing struck me so hard that I had to confess. Our deed has caused so much damage that this chain had to be broken. There is no excuse for it, nor even for the abduction."

Attorney Graczyk: "Does the defendant repent what he has done?"

Pekala: Yes, I repent it. I also regret it that I sobered up too late. I was used to perform a deed resulting in a man's death. Unfortunately, what has happened is irreversible."

Attorney Pubanc, Chmielewski's defense attorney: "You said that a number of aspects of this matter remains unclear. Are there any unclear things that the defendant might wish to clear up now?"

Pekala: "By 'unclear aspects' I meant that many things beyond our ken were happening, even though previously we had been made privy to everything such as the details of the trip to Poznan or to Nowy Sacz. All this began to happen after October 20. Besides, earlier we had planned to sink the material evidence [in the river], whereas in reality it was thrown out [of the car] en route. This seems strange."

Attorney Marczuk, the defense attorney for Pietruszka: "Does the defendant remember what happened after the body was thrown [into the river], with regard to evaluating what would happen subsequently? The defendant stated that he was awaiting an [official] sign confirming that the operation was carried out in the line of duty."

Defendant Pekala: "I didn't say so while in the car. It was only later that I discussed that topic."

At this moment the Court read further excerpts from Pekala's pretrial deposition, in which he stated that on Tuesday, following an English reading class, he reported for work at about 1030 hours. At the office the atmosphere tense. He saw Chmielewski and they agreed that matters looked bad and that he did not know what was behind it all. He was disturbed by this situation because, first, Piotrowski was absent and, second, he had no alibi because he was awaiting a sign that someone knew about it, that someone was looking out for their interests from behind Piotrowski's shoulders.

Attorney Marczuk: "What was your personal and official attitude toward Piotrowski?"

Pekala: "I regarded him as a very good boss who was getting quick promotions owing to his daring, deliberation and boldness of ideas. He knew how to talk with his superiors, and he knew human nature well. His is a very strong personality. Piotrowski is of a certainty an important individual. I have been greatly influenced by him."

Attorney Marczuk: "Were any plans put down in writing before your trip?"

Defendant: "I didn't see any."

Attorney Marczuk: "Was the possibility of Chrostowski's escape considered?"

Pekala: "This wasn't discussed. We probably were improvising depending on the situation."

Attorney Marczuk: "Did other persons too use those special passes [exemptions from road checks]?"

Pekala: "Yes. I saw such a pass on my other service trips with the director."

Attorney Kwietnicki, defense attorney for Pietruszka: "The defendant visited Pietruszka's home. Who opened the door?"

Pekala: "The director. No one else was there then. That was my impression."

Attorney Kwietnicki: "What was the meaning of the word 'success,' uttered by Pietruszka?"

Pekala: "At the time I interpreted it as meaning approval, because the director didn't usually wish the chauffeur 'success.'"

Judge Debkiewicz: "What was the purpose of the chain?"

Pekala: "It was to chain the priest while keeping him hidden somewhere. It seems to me that we didn't buy the chain, and when going to Torun we didn't take along the lock."

Judge Debkiewicz: "You stopped in Gorsk. Why did you detain the priest there?"

Pekala: "Because it was already decided that we would, more or less, do it in those environs."

Judge Debkiewicz: "During normal road checks, when militiamen stopped you, were you asked to open the trunk?"

Pekala: "This has never happened to me, except once during the martial law period."

Judge Debkiewicz: "Are traveling orders issued on precisely itemized forms?"

Pekala: "Apparently not, because our department office also had such forms."

Juror: "Why did you need two bottles of vodka?"

Pekala: "Because the priest was eventually to be made drunk and abandoned."

Testimony of the Defendant Waldemar Chmielewski

Next, the Court began to listen to the testimony of the defendant Waldemar Chmielewski.

Throughout the trial the defendant Chmielewski displayed a nervous tic of the right check. He testified haltingly and often showed extreme nervousness.

The presiding judge asked: "Does the defendant understand the bill of indictment, and does he admit committing the deeds of which he is accused in the bill of indictment?"

Defendant Waldemar Chmielewski: "Yes, I understood. I don't admit the entire scope of the accusations. I admit having abducted the Rev Popieluszko and Waldemar Chrostowski, and I admit that in the course of these activities the Rev Popieluszko lost his life. I admit having taken part in the attempt to cause the road accident. I don't admit the intent to kill anyone. I don't admit either any special harassment."

The presiding judge asked Chmielewski: "Has the defendant's speech defect been longstanding, or has this defect been only recently acquired?"

Defendant Chmielewski: "My speech defect appeared after all this happened and I was arrested."

Presiding judge: "Does the defendant prefer to testify spontaneously or to answer questions?"

Defendant Chmielewski: "I prefer to make my testimony spontaneously. If the need arises, Your Honors, please ask me questions."

Defendant Chmielewski testifies: "Sometime in late September or early October we were summoned by Piotrowski. At any rate, it was then that he breached the matter to us in a manner that made us think that the right atmosphere exists, that approval has been given or even a decision to do something to frighten the Rev Popieluszko has been taken. There was justification for doing so. We had several such talks. The reasons he offered were that despite the generosity of the amnesty the Rev Popieluszko continued to engage in activities inconsonant with a clergyman's frock. He also spoke of some fruitless warnings given to the Rev Popieluszko concerning his further activities. He further declared that it was decided to suit the tactics to the enemy. During these talks specific proposals were offered for, e.g., kidnapping the priest directly in Warsaw, from a street, or during a trip. At first we couldn't see it as possible, because we knew that the Rev Popieluszko practically never went out alone. In sum, the kidnapping was to reduce to detaining the Rev Popieluszko alone, and the object was to extract information from him and frighten him into ceasing his activities, and to extract from him information on underground structures as well. Piotrowski said that to this end it was necessary to find a suitable spot for detaining, keeping and interrogating the priest. He said that it could be some barracks or, too, that the Rev Popieluszko could be taken to a forest, tied to a tree, and then reasoned with. He awaited our suggestions. He said: 'Think about it and give me your suggestions as to how it should be done.'

"One day Piotrowski came in looking upset, summoned us to his office and said that it was time for us to get started. He said that one suggestion was even that the Rev Popieluszko should be pushed out of a moving train, and he characterized it as absurd. We ourselves had not considered this possibility. He himself said that such a suggestion was idiotic. He did not name the author or authors of that suggestion.

"In other talks, Piotrowski said that he is in regular contact with the directorate and that the decisions were taken. It was then that I had suggested using the bunkers in the Kampinos Forest, near Cybulice, immediately in the rear of Kazun Polski, to frighten the Rev Popieluszko. I had explored these bunkers last year while in a scout camp on so-called maneuvers. During my stay there I saw that no one entered them, not even in search of mushrooms. That place seemed deserted to me. So I proposed that we should drive there and look the spot over. Piotrowski agreed. During another talk, Piotrowski asked us what would happen if the Rev Popieluszko were to die of a heart attack. He said that he has to consult someone about this possibility, because then the decision would not be up to him. So then, in our presence [i.e., in the presence of Chmielewski and Pekala--J.A.], he telephoned the secretariat of the directorate and asked to speak with Director Pietruszka, who was not in, as he told us. In a moment he left the office--I believe he left it twice--and

then returned without an answer, saying that the director was not there. It was just then that the name of Director Pietruszka was mentioned.

"Similarly, a week before 13 October Piotrowski informed us that a so-called tacit leave was granted to us. I and Leszek agreed upon the preparations for the operation and drew up a schedule of our activities for the week ahead. That was the time for so-called surveillance. In order to carry out the operation, Piotrowski said, we had to obtain auxiliary equipment. He also said that money was no object and we should spare no expense and buy whatever we needed. He named several items to be bought and relied on us to take care of them. It was then also that vodka was suggested among the items to buy. That was linked to the idea of getting the Rev Popieluszko drunk and abandoning him in some compromising spot. All these actions were to compromise the priest not only in the eyes of the society. This also concerned sowing confusion within the antisocialist community rallied round the Stanislaw Kostka Church and among the persons rallied round the Rev Popieluszko. I understood this to mean impairing the credibility of the Rev Popieluszko as a clergyman and a person linked to the opposition.

"Piotrowski said that he discussed with Director Pietruszka the possibility of the death of the Rev Popieluszko due to a heart attack and, prior to our trip to Kazun, he declared that the decision taken was that in that event the priest's body was to be gotten rid of. He commented on the lengthy amount of time needed to reach an understanding with the higher-ups. [-----] [Decree of 31 July 1981 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW, No 44, Item 204)] [Censored--Translator's note]. He said that this decision was taken with regard to disposing of the body.

"I was unfamiliar with the state of health of the Rev Popieluszko. From my official contacts with the Office of Internal Affairs for the Nation's Capital I learned that the people there believed that the Rev Popieluszko was simulating poor health in order to avoid having to appear in response to summonses.

"Several days prior to 13 October we drove to Kazun. On reaching the bunkers we found them to be dark and decided that they should be seen in the presence of the chief. The first time we were in Kazun, we didn't take any sacks along. Were the Rev Popieluszko to die, the only solution would be to throw him into the water, and Leszek said that we should drive across the bridge, which we did, whereupon we returned to our unit.

"We left the car parked and, about a day or two later, contacted Piotrowski. It's possible that during that period we made another trip to the bunkers, this time with flashlights and sacks, on carrying all our equipment in satchels--I can't explain why we took it along. We inspected thoroughly one of the bunkers and Piotrowski declared it to be a good spot. We wanted to give a good scare to Popieluszko there, and to this end we decided to wedge him into a niche and camouflage the spot. At the time I pointed to a particular niche. We took along a score or so of stones to camouflage that niche. At first we tried to put all these stones into one sack, but there was

not enough room, so we used two sacks. Later Piotrowski said that he wanted to see the bridge. We drove across the bridge. He said that it was a good spot. I told Pekala and Piotrkowski to save their enthusiasm, because the bridge was illuminated and there was heavy traffic going on it, with many troops around. I said that was something we didn't need. We turned around and again drove across the bridge, stopped, and all three of us got out of the car. When I observed that it would be absurd to stop on the bridge, Leszek said that we could fake a car breakdown, while Piotrowski approached the guardrail and said that he liked that spot. Then we returned to Warsaw. I realized that Piotrowski liked the bridge because, were Popieluszko to die, he could be thrown into the water. Frightening with the stones was also mentioned, but only while in the bunker."

3 January 1985, Fourth Day of the Trial

The testimony of the defendant Chmielewski continued. As before, his cheek kept twitching and he was nervous and spoke falteringly.

Defendant Chmielewski: "Yesterday when I stopped my testimony I was describing the trip to Gdansk. After refueling at a ministry gas station we drove near the church where, as Piotrowski said, the Rev. Popieluszko was to arrive. It was St. Brigid's Church. We walked toward the church. We didn't see the priest's car. Piotrowski entered the courtyard of the rectory but didn't see that car. Chief Piotrowski said that we should drive someplace for a bite to eat and declared that we could afford a dinner at the Grand Hotel because, as he said, he had at his disposal unlimited funds. Over there, we had a sumptuous dinner. I don't recall whether we drank vodka, but we did drink beer and even took along several bottles of beer when leaving. I believe the bill came to 4,000 zlotys. Piotrowski paid. It seems to me that it was only after we had left for Bydgoszcz that Pekala and I received 5,000 zlotys apiece to reimburse us for past and current expenses.

"From Grand Hotel we drove to Oliwa; I'm not familiar with Gdansk. In Oliwa we changed our license tags. I changed the tag in the rear and Pekala in the front while the chief acted as a lookout. We replaced WAB tags with CZK tags. After affixing the new tags we drove back to the church. That was at about 1800 hours. I conclude so from the fact that the church seemed to be empty at that time although it was scheduled to host some activity with the participation of the Rev. Popieluszko. After we had returned near the church, Piotrowski saw the Rev. Popieluszko's car, a green Golf. I and Piotrowski entered the church. I gazed at its interior which I even found quite interesting. We returned to the car, where Pekala was waiting for us. When the mass began, I and Piotrowski reentered the church to make sure whether the priest was there. In practice, our stay in the church reduced to waiting. Following that ceremony, a procession emerged from the church, and it seemed then that we would recognize the Rev. Popieluszko. Some time later, that is, about half an hour after the procession ended, Piotrowski left the car, without saying anything, to check whether the priest was leaving. Half an hour later, at about 2100 hours, the Golf left. I didn't see who entered it. I believe that Piotrowski said that he saw Chrostowski near the car. We followed the Golf.

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"Leszek Pekala had pretensions toward Piotrowski for missing [the windshield of the Golf, with a rock]. He said that at such a distance the target couldn't be missed by a calm thrower. Over there, on the parking lot, Pekala demonstrated the art of throwing, saying that no special stance was required and it was enough to hurl the stone lightly in the direction of the car. Piotrowski laughed at Pekala and demonstrated how he threw the rock by making a semi-circular gesture in the air. He claimed that he did throw that rock and suggested that we take a beer break. We all three together emptied that one beer bottle. We changed the front and rear tags.

"We arrived in Warsaw, in front of the ministry building, after midnight and removed all objects from the car and placed them in a cabinet in Pekala's office. Afterward I drove home. As we were driving, we discussed the operation. This concerned causing a road accident. One possibility we discussed was that the car might stop after being damaged by the stone, and then we would try kidnapping the priest. When a stone breaks the windshield the effects may vary. I asked Piotrowski, 'What if the persons inside get wounded?' Piotrowski answered: 'We would try to help them and take care of the priest.' I interpreted this as meaning that the priest would be abducted. As for the other persons in the car, they were of no interest to us and we didn't discuss them."

At this point the presiding judge asked: "Were you previously aware of instances in which objects such as rocks are thrown against moving vehicles, and did you have any idea of the dangerous consequences, and also are you aware of the fact that this is a serious criminal offense?"

Chmielewski answered: "In practice, I encountered such situations only after my arrest. I had been familiar only with the provisions of the Penal Code, as I was studying law.

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"I would like to clarify two things. Yesterday I said that Piotrowski was with a delegation, but that happened not before 13 October but before 19 October, and at the time I looked for him but he was in Lublin. I also stated that Pekala brought an undershirt before 13 October, but in reality he did that later, before 19 October. It was then that Pekala and Piotrowski told me that the chief's sand-filled socks were no good for anything. He claimed that wooden truncheons were better-suited for the purpose of overcoming resistance. I said that the truncheons should be wrapped in some cloth as they might cripple the subject, so Leszek [Pekala] brought some undershirts and tore them up. We kept all these things in Leszek's cabinet.

"At the beginning of the week Piotrowski said that handcuffs would come in useful. He wondered how to get them. I said that I've a friend who would lend them to me. Piotrowski told me to attend to this. I asked my colleague Chojnacki, and he agreed to the loan, a day or so before the trip. I didn't

test the handcuffs, except that I inspected the meshing and shifted the position of the moving parts. Chojnacki did not say whether they worked or not, but he did ask that I return them in their original condition. When I brought these handcuffs, Leszek began to toy with them, while Piotrowski asked whether I could obtain one more pair of handcuffs. I telephoned Chojnacki, but he said that he was not in the handcuff-selling business and that I could buy them myself in a bazaar. I don't know why Piotrowski didn't obtain handcuffs by issuing an official requisition when he could do so. I recall that a day before our trip Piotrowski informed us that Popieluszko was going to Bydgosz and that we would follow him in our car.

"On the day on which Piotrowski said that he had submitted a report, he commented that Chief Drozdz was rebuked by Director Pietruszka for shoving his nose into what was not his business. Piotrowski said that Pietruszka didn't have to act so nervous [-----] [Decree of 31 July 1981 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW, No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204)], and that, at any rate, Director Pietruszka spoke in a sharp tone of voice to Drozdz, asking him to stop his foolish talk because the Rev Popieluszko was in Warsaw, not in Gdansk.

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I and Leszek sewed two sacks even before our trip. It was then that Pekala suggested that the Rev Popieluszko might eventually be placed in one of these sacks. We didn't discuss that again. The tarpaulin was for the purpose of concealing the priest after he would be pushed into the car. The sacks were to cover the heads of the priest and Chrostowski; that was Pekala's idea. I don't know why his account of these things is now different. We assumed the possibility of bludgeoning the priest and perhaps also Chrostowski, were they to resist. As to what we were to do with them, that depended on the unfolding situation.

"Piotrowski said one day that the discovery of traces and pursuit could be complicated by setting the car afire after first abducting the Rev Popieluszko. At the time, no mention was made of Chrostowski and of the need to get rid of him in order to prevent his movements. As regards the idea of burning the car, Leszek was against it, saying that it was senseless and that eventually this car could be driven, or even driven away, and later even utilized by repainting it, changing its license tags or breaking it up into parts and selling them. Piotrowski agreed to the suggestion that the car be not burned. I didn't fear Chrostowski, because I expected that either a sack would be placed over his head or he would be bludgeoned into unconsciousness. We didn't consider this question any further.

"After some time--which to me seemed endless; I was shaking uncontrollably--Piotrowski approached the Golf and told the Rev Popieluszko to get out. I followed him and asked the Rev Popieluszko to alight from the vehicle. When Piotrowski strode in my direction I saw that the chief was carrying a truncheon in his hand. I was stunned. To me, that was a very stupid situation. For the first time I put on a militiaman's uniform and detained someone in

that capacity. I lost the ability to look at the situation critically. The Rev Popieluszko asked what was the matter. Piotrowski approached more closely and, leaning over, said that it was an identity check. The window rolled down. I recall the moment when Piotrowski grabbed the door handle. The door opened. The priest unfastened his safety belt, left the car and, together with the chief, walked in the direction of our car. Piotrowski ordered that I turn off the Golf's lights. I got into the Golf to do so. I wanted to get out, but couldn't find the door handle. Finally, I opened the window and opened the door from outside in order to get out. I don't know who had the keys and what happened to them.

"On getting out of the car I heard the chief's voice: 'Waldek, come here. He doesn't want to get in.' We had previously agreed that the priest would get into the car's rear, as I already told the Court. I approached them. They were standing to the rear of our car, on the roadway side. I saw Piotrowski hold up the priest by placing his left hand on the cassock near the shoulderblade. I approached the priest and asked him, 'Reverend, why don't you want to get in?' Then I heard the priest say, 'But where are you taking me?' Until then I saw no one make any abrupt movements, but now I saw Piotrowski grab Popieluszko and shove him toward the trunk. I also saw Piotrowski strike with a truncheon the priest in the head and upper part of the body. Of a certainty, there was more than one blow, though I can't tell how many. If I recall correctly, the first blow was struck from the rear, at, rather, the upper part of the body. I saw the first blow being dealt and rather heard the others. I saw the priest fall after was grabbed. I remember that moment, because I felt terrified and ran toward the priest, who was lying prone. I wanted to lift him, and I carried him with Piotrowski to a side. He didn't resist. I did witness the first blow being struck and the priest fall. As to what happened on the roadside, near the bushes, I don't know about that. Of a certainty, I didn't enter the forest. That was happening on the edge of the forest, near the bushes. Piotrowski and I dragged the priest, by pulling at his arms, near the bushes. The chief ordered me to bring some strings to tie the priest up. Then he ordered me to transfer the contents of the trunk to the car. I handed the string to Piotrowski and emptied the contents of the trunk--two satchels and I don't remember what else--and placed them inside the car. I don't think that I had helped to tie the priest up, but I may be wrong. I believe that the priest was gagged, but I'm not certain. Pekala was sitting in the car. I remember next that Piotrowski said, 'Let's load him in.' I also remember that, before emptying the trunk, I approached Leszek in the car and addressed him, but he gave me a sign to be quiet. Of a certainty we together placed the priest in the trunk. We placed him sideways, just like that. We simply placed him inside. It could be said that we were in a hurry, because I saw the lights of an approaching car. At the time the priest was inert."

4 January 1985, Fifth Day of the Trial

The testimony of the defendant Chmielewski continued:

"I recall hearing a loud splash. I entered the car. We had thrown the body down in a horizontal position by simply pushing it across the guardrail and after a while letting it go as if in unison. No special signal was given. I

carried the sack with stones separately. When removing the priest from the trunk, I grasped his feet and, since that sack with stones was impeding me, I held it with the other hand. We made a U-turn on the dam and drove to Warsaw. I remember one detail from the route near the checkpoint barrier; a signpost saying 'Lipno 18 km.' It seems to me that the route to Warsaw was determined by Piotrowski, because he held the map in his hand. I remember that we met with only one road check, ahead of the barrier. When we stopped, I felt scared and so probably did Leszek. We told Piotrowski that in such a situation we were bound to go to jail, that we would not evade the responsibility. That was basically what we said anyhow. I recall that we were speaking of Chrostowski, and of fingerprints. At any rate, such was the sense of the remarks voiced by myself and Pekala. Besides, Leszek said that he would be identified at any time, because he had left his fingerprints. Pekala calmed us down, saying that we should not fear that the priest would be found, and that even if we were to be questioned we should say that we knew nothing about the matter. He said that no one would permit us to be interrogated or fingerprinted or show us to anyone. That was the gist of his remarks; I don't remember in what order they were made."

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"On Monday 22 October I came to the chief's office, looking for him. he was absent. Finally, I met him and asked him what to do, as I was scared. He said that there was nothing to fear and, of course, everything was all right. He said that the team investigating the matter consisted of regular guys and I had no reason to worry. The chief named Gen Platek and Director Jablonski as such regular guys, the right people on that team.

"Then the chief asked me to telephone a number which he wrote down for me on a piece of paper. I said that I couldn't do that because I was being shadowed. Later the chief summoned me, showed me the [car] registration number WAE 8031, and asked me to prepare, along with other coworkers, various possible permutations of that number to facilitate changing rapidly the number on the license tags which, he said, had been seen in Bydgoszcz. I and several other coworkers wrote down more than 100 such permutations. In accordance with the chief's order, we drove to the Motor Vehicle Department to check on the owners of these numbers. Leszek didn't come with us because, as agreed upon before, he left for Poznan whence he was to send an anonymous letter. We returned from the MVD and gave our findings to the chief. He left work at 1800 hours.

"In the morning of 23 October I reported for work. I had some outside assignments to attend to in the city and didn't contact Piotrowski. A deputy chief said he had an assignment for me. I returned before noon, and then all employees were summoned to see Director Platek at the office of Director Pietruszka, who was absent. Chief Piotrowski also was absent. We all were asked to write down our explanations concerning 19 October, which we did. I felt panicked because neither Piotrowski nor Pietruszka was present to advise me what to do. I thought that the chief disappeared somewhere and was trying to hurt Pekala and me in order to evade responsibility himself. Pekala and I left the office feeling nervous. I was irritated and told him something to the

effect that I was sick and he should do what he liked. I performed my regular duties expecting to be arrested at any instant. The next day I was arrested."

Judge: "During the initial interrogation the defendant presented his version of the events only until the moment of abandonment in the forest, without as yet saying anything about the drowning. Did you agree with the others on what to say in this connection?"

Chmielewski: "We did not discuss that point and did not agree upon some common version. The fact that during the initial interrogation I testified that the Rev Popieluszko was abandoned in the forest, was dictated by fear. I feared that if I were to say something on the subject, Piotrowski or someone higher up conversant with the matter might take steps to harm us. In particular, I had felt convinced, up until the moment of signing my deposition, that the chief fled and would try to do something against me. It was only on 25 October, when I learned that Piotrowski was arrested, that I decided to tell the truth. Even the officer receiving my testimony ordered me to memorize the date and the hour, about 1240 hours, on which I explicitly stated that we threw the priest into the Vistula when he was no longer alive--no longer alive because I could not imagine anybody survive so many blows on the head. My confession was tape-recorded."

Judge: "What were the defendant's motives in identifying the spot at which the Rev Popieluszko was drowned?"

Chmielewski: "I answered affirmatively the very first question asked of me during the interrogation, namely, whether I wanted to help find the priest. I was present during the searches in the forest by the militia. I tried to identify every spot which I associated with these events. I feared that I might be named the sole perpetrator. I tried to identify all the spots and objects, in order to prove that I was not alone, that others were there with me. To this end I pointed to the tire marks left the last time the car had stopped, and I also pointed to the fact that Chief Piotrowski discarded the bottle after buying oil and pouring it into the engine. I wanted to prove that I was not alone. Until the first communique I was too scared to confess what had really happened. In the end I had to confess, because I couldn't live with my conscience. That was a horrible and monstrous event. No rational being could keep its knowledge to himself; that would be beyond human capacity. I was besides convinced that sooner or later the truth would come to light. I felt trapped, deceived, exploited. I had believed in my superior more than in my father, although the latter was employed by the same institution. Knowing Piotrowski, I had no reason to believe that it had to end like that. I, too, have a family, which I have practically lost; I too had a life of my own. I realize that the priest too had a family of his own--people who suffer, and that this couldn't be concealed any longer." (While making the above statements the defendant's speech became increasingly halting; he was moved and wept.)

Judge: "Please describe your education and job."

Chmielewski: "I graduated from an elementary school in Warsaw in 1969 and a high school, also in Warsaw, in 1973. Afterward, I enrolled at a one-year business school for high school graduates, which I completed in 1974. In the same year, I started professional work at Bank Handlowy, Ltd., where I worked as a specialist in foreign-exchange accounts. On 29 March 1975 I started my military service in the ZOMO [riot police] formations. After serving there for a year and half, I was assigned for an admission examination to the Higher Officer School of the Militia in Szczytno. I completed that school on 24 June 1980, and as of 1 August 1980 I started working for the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs], where I stayed in the same unit until my arrest. In the intervening time, I worked under several immediate superiors who included Pietruszka, Jablonski and, most recently, Chief Piotrowski. At first he had been deputy chief, but later, after a hiatus, he became chief. He had been supervising my work practically ever since he was deputy chief, and since then I had regarded him as an excellent boss. Whatever the situation, he always provided either aid or explanations. Whenever I turned to him for help, he gave it to me. Thanks to him, my performance was evaluated as good; I was rewarded. I regarded him as a man of very strong character who could cope with any situation, an alert and astute fellow. By this I meant the purity [as published] of his thoughts and decisions. I always respected him. At one time when he was transferred from one unit to another, I asked him to take me along. It seems to me that Chief Piotrowski, on his part, bestowed on me his confidence and trust. We never became buddies. I was raised to show respect for my superiors, and that's how I conducted myself. I never provided any grounds for him to think badly of me. Our association was purely official, except that in a couple of cases Chief Piotrowski asked me for personal favors such as picking up his wife and children and driving them someplace. I entered into matrimony on 1 March 1981. I own no property except that, thanks to the help of my parents and the efforts of my parents-in-law as well as my own efforts, I have saved up a certain amount of money for buying a car. I've one child. My wife is currently in her eighth month of pregnancy. (While making this testimony defendant Chmielewski was clearly moved, while defendant Piotrowski listened with his head bowed.)

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Next, Prof Byrdy asked defendant Chmielewski to explain in more detail how the gag was taped to the mouth of the Rev Popieluszko.

Chmielewski: "I gradually unwound the roll of tape while Leszek affixed one end to the knot and wound the tape twice around the priest's head. Then Pekala tore off the roll of tape and handed it to me. That roll looked like part of it had been used up previously. Leszek ripped the tape in two with his teeth and handed me the roll."

Prof Byrdy: "That rattling noise while you were affixing the tape, what did it sound like?"

Chmielewski: "I can't say. I'm not an expert. It was emitted from the throat and nose. That happened in the dark, in the absence of illumination."

Prof Byrdy: "While on the bridge, how did the defendant grab the Rev Popieluszko's feet and the sack with stones?"

Chmielewski: "With my left hand I grasped first the boot and then the ankle above the boot. I wanted to grab the other foot with my other hand, but the sack with stones lay there and so I had to lift it. It seems to me that the legs were stretched out rather than bent. I had problems pulling the legs out. Only after the upper part of the body was removed from the trunk was I able to remove the legs as well."

Prof Byrdy: On what side was the Rev Popieluszko lying?"

Chmielewski: "I had the impression that he was lying on his left side. The right foot of the Rev Popieluszko was atop the left. I grasped that uppermost foot with my left hand, while lifting the sack with my right, and that was the position in which the Rev Popieluszko was thrown into the water. It was then that I heard a loud splash."

Dr. Jozwik: "The defendant stated that he heard more than one blow. Can it be assumed that eight to 12 such blows were struck?"

Chmielewski: "It appears so."

Dr. Jozwik: "Was it only the nose that was grabbed, or was also pressure exerted on the eyeballs?"

Chmielewski: "All I saw was one gesture of grabbing the nose."

(To be continued in the next issue.)

1386

CSO: 2600/515

ROMANIA

ROUNDTABLE ON COMPLETE UNITY OF FOREIGN, DOMESTIC POLICIES

Bucharest ERA SOCIALISTA in Romanian No 20, 25 Oct, No 21, 10 Nov 84

/Discussion by Univ Prof Dr Constantin Vlad, Ion Mitran, Univ Prof Dr A. D. Albu, Vasile Buga, Univ Reader Dr Aculin Cazacu, Univ Reader Dr Aculin Cazacu, Constantin Ene, Constantin Florea, Dr Traian Grozea, Univ Reader George Marin, Univ Prof Dr Mircea Nicolaescu, Dr Ioan-Mircea Pascu, Univ Reader Dr Vasile Secares, Brig Gen Dr Corneliu Soare and Dr Marin Nedelea/

/No 20, 25 Oct 84 pp 20-28/

/Text/ Nicolae Ceausescu said, "There is a close dialectical unity between Romania's domestic and foreign policies, and the two are interdependent and interacting. The success of the great programs for economic and social development that we have undertaken heavily depends upon a policy of peace, security and extensive collaboration with all peoples of the world. Accordingly Romania is taking an active part in international affairs and in the efforts of the progressive forces to secure a climate of peace, confidence and security in the world."

The four decades since the August 1944 revolution have been strongly characterized by radical innovations both in Romania's internal affairs and in its international activity. In those years of magnificent achievements, especially in the period inaugurated by the Ninth Party Congress, the most successful period in all Romanian history, the inseparable bond and complete unity between the task of socialist construction in Romania and the party's and state's foreign policy were firmly consolidated.

Nicolae Ceausescu's tireless and outstanding activity, performed with revolutionary zeal and a high sense of patriotic communist responsibility, lent a powerful and unprecedented vitality to Romania's economic, social and political development and to the whole process of building the new order. It also opened up new horizons for the party's and state's international policy, giving it foresight, stability and firmness. The party secretary general's innovating policies, suggestions, initiatives and actions brought Romania's foreign policy widespread recognition and worldwide esteem as Romania distinguished itself more and more emphatically as a champion of a policy of peace and disarmament, understanding and collaboration with all states, national independence, democracy and progress. Accordingly the correlation between the party's and state's domestic and foreign policies acquired new proportions and attained a qualitatively higher stage.

Events have fully borne out the correctness of the conclusions drawn in the RCP Program and the policies set by the the 12th Party Congress and the National Party Conference of 1982 concerning international affairs, as socialist Romania's foreign activity fully serves the Romanian people's interests, the basic requirements of socialist construction in Romania, and the vital interests of the peoples everywhere.

The new period that the 13th RCP Congress will mark in socialist Romania's growing development will lend a new creative impetus to all of Romania's internal and international activity. Fulfillment of the aims set in the Draft Directives and, in general, of the decisions that will be approved by the congress will bring about some new and important successes in the nation's socialist development, growth of its material strength, and consolidation of its national sovereignty and independence, as well as its greater contribution to the promotion of a new policy and new relations in international affairs and its increasingly active participation in the solution of mankind's problems today on the fundamental principles that govern its domestic and foreign activities as a whole.

The discussion of the above-mentioned subject was intended to contribute to in-depth study of some theoretical points and to the determination of some specific manifestations of the complete and inherent unity between the party's and state's domestic and foreign policies.

Dialectical Relationship Between Domestic and Foreign Conditions

CONSTANTIN VLAD: To begin with, I should like to make some general comments on the unity of Romania's domestic and foreign policies.

In the first place, both policies originate in the nature of Romania's social-political system. This provides the objective basis of the unity of the two components of the RCP policy, and this objective basis means, to spell it out, the convergence of their ideals, values and objectives to the point of identity, the interdependence of the domestic and foreign tasks, etc. Of course no generally valid principle of the unity of any state's domestic and foreign policies under any circumstances can be formulated on this basis. A country's social system is reflected in certain internal and international policies and its nature may determine general trends that a state's domestic and foreign policies have in common and may, in fact, make them two aspects of the same kind of policy. But such an identification does not occur automatically under any circumstances. Not a few instances are known of substantive differences between states' domestic and foreign policies, as well as discrepancies or even contradictions and oppositions between the two aspects. Of course it is only by specific analysis of each state's policy that it can be determined how uniform or not that policy is in its domestic and foreign forms.

In the case of socialist Romania such an analysis brings out a complete unity in nature between the party's and state's domestic and foreign policies. I would stress just one point here that I consider highly important, namely that the Romanian people's great progress under the leadership of the party and its secretary general in the years since the Ninth Party Congress in national economic and social development as a whole, as well as implementation of the aims and tasks to be set by the 13th Party Congress for 1986-1990 and on to 2000, provide

a firm foundation for the increasingly close correlation of socialist Romania's domestic and foreign policies and for its increasingly active presence in international affairs and in the struggle for understanding, collaboration and peace, for a better and a more just world, and for the independence and progress of the nations and peoples everywhere.

CONSTANTIN FLOREA: As we well know, thanks to the policies set by the Ninth Party Congress and the subsequent party congresses and national conferences, the party's and state's foreign policy (in close connection with gradual improvement of the entire effort to build the new order and with the great innovations in national socioeconomic development) has shown in its turn a receptiveness, a vitality and a consistency unprecedented in the nation's history both in its content and trends and in its courses of action, as radical changes are made that can lend it new and better qualities. Romania's international status as well as its role and position in the world concert of nations have been essentially changed, and its authority and prestige in world public opinion have grown steadily. The main policies, initiatives, proposals and actions of Romania and its president, Nicolae Ceausescu, have brought Romania increasingly wide international recognition and esteem.

We definitely owe these great changes to the creative, enterprising thought and militant revolutionary action of President Nicolae Ceausescu, founder of the Romanian foreign policy of peace and international collaboration and a tireless fighter for the people's vital rights and for the triumph of the cause of socialism, progress and peace, as well as a brilliant promoter of new and truly democratic relations among all states of the world.

His original and far-reaching dialectical view of internal and international development, of the nature of national and international phenomena, and of the interconnections among them; his scientific, independent and balanced analysis of developments in the world balance of power and in the international situation; his clear and profound understanding of the causes and effects of the complex and contradictory events on the world scene and of the serious problems facing mankind today; the realism of his proposals to solve those problems in accordance with all peoples' aspirations to freedom, independence and progress; his notable ability to discern the new and progressive phenomena and trends in historical development and to formulate the ways and means of fulfilling all nations' ideals of peace, freedom and progress; his highly principled, consistent and firm determination and promotion of Romania's main domestic and foreign policies; and his unflagging confidence in the victory of the general cause of socialism, progress and peace and in the decisive role and power of the peoples and the masses -- those are only a few of the characteristics of Nicolae Ceausescu's conception and activity, and they are making a telling contribution to the complete correlation of socialist Romania's domestic and foreign policies and forming a firm foundation for Romania's increasingly effective emergence as an active supporter of the peoples' efforts to build a new, better and more just world of peace and collaboration on our planet.

Accordingly, once they are created and consolidated in the course of revolutionary social reform the objective requirements for the unity of the domestic and foreign policies and the decisive role in realizing that possibility belong to the subjective factor, meaning both the social-political institutions and bodies

and the personalities who head them, the party and state leaders, et al. Romania's experience in the last 20 years bears out this conclusion entirely.

VASILE SECAREFS: One of the most theoretically and politically valuable contributions of the RCP and its secretary general to the development of the Marxist theory, to the particular promotion of the innovating, antidogmatic spirit and to reinvigoration of revolutionary social-political thought about the dialectical relationship between internal and international conditions in the task of building the new order and in correlating the domestic and foreign policies. The RCP's theories on this subject directly reflect a whole process of theoretical consideration and reconsideration based upon constant coordination with social-historical experience and upon careful study of current economic, social and political phenomena.

The party's and state's foreign policy is a vital component of the effort to construct socialist and communist society in Romania. There is an interaction and a close dialectical unity between the domestic policy of building the fully developed socialist society and the foreign policy in its many aspects.

In this connection I would also stress the previously mentioned idea that implementation of the plan for socioeconomic development for 1986-1980 and the long-range provisions up to 2000, which are included in the Draft Directives of the 13th Party Congress, will consolidate the results obtained in building the new society, will make it possible to bring Romania up to a higher level of historical development and to strengthen its material and intellectual power as well as its national independence and sovereignty, and will also further enhance Romania's contribution to the policy of collaboration, security and peace and to the general progress of mankind. From the high rostrum of the Solemn Session on the Anniversary of the Revolutionary Act of 23 August 1944 Nicolae Ceausescu emphatically reaffirmed "the firm will and resolve of socialist Romania and its entire people to collaborate actively with all European states and all countries on behalf of collaboration and peace, a better and more just world, freedom and the independence of all nations on our planet!"

Moreover the great changes to be made by fulfillment of the objectives to be set by the 13th Party Congress for the next stage, the consolidation of Romania's position as a medium developed socialist country, and its transition to the higher stage of a developed socialist country directly depend upon implementation of certain objectives of foreign policy, especially in cooperation with other states, in accordance with the requirements of the national interests and a climate of peace and security throughout the world.

Unity of Conception, Aims and Fundamental Principles

I think two great basic processes characteristic of the contemporary world must be considered in analyzing the relationship between internal and international conditions and the unity of the domestic and foreign policies. They are the growing emergence of the nation, sovereign states and national interests and the continuing intensification of interdependences of various kinds among nations and states. I believe the development of world interdependences is due to the development of each society and each country, which has been generating a greater need of foreign connections and international activities, while it also reflects the intensive development of the contemporary scientific revolution.

Every nation has to establish relations with other nations because of the varied socioeconomic, technical-scientific and political requirements for the progress of the respective community.

The RCP's policy is based upon a clear understanding of the fact that no one can undertake any development today apart from the international conditions and that every nation's progress is closely correlated with the state of the whole world. And it is also true that the changes taking place in the world affect every people and every state. Accordingly many effects of the international system appear in the parameters of the various societies' internal development, and a whole series of internal developments tend to take on international significance.

Therefore I feel the internal evolutions of the various societies must be discussed in connection not only with the internal conditions resulting from their own histories but also with their relations with other nations, with their particular positions in the international system, and with world problems. In specifically delineating the picture of the international realities and the present "economic, political and military storms and hurricanes," Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out at the National Party Conference of 1982 that it is only in this light that we can understand "the difficulties under which the activity has been conducted in the years since the 12th Party Congress" and can properly determine "what action we are to take in the next few years" in order to mitigate the effect of the world crisis and the negative phenomena occurring in the world.

CONSTANTIN FLOREA: I think the close unity of the domestic and foreign aspects of the RCP's general policy is a complex concept with many meanings, among which I would note the following:

First comes the unity of conception, thought, major essential aims, and fundamental guidelines and principles that was achieved under the leadership of the RCP and its secretary general. This unity stems from the existence and action of a series of socioeconomic, political-ideological, cultural, national and other factors, from the radical revolutionary changes in all areas of Romanian society during the years since 23 August 1944 and primarily since the Ninth Party Congress, and from Romania's whole development on the course of all-around progress and socialist and communist construction.

Second, there is the unity of characteristics that objectively earmark the process of forming as well as implementing the RCP policy in all its forms and aspects. Among these characteristics in common I would mention the comprehensive scientific substantiation of all objectives and measures on the national as well as the international level by the Marxist dialectical method; the creative, radically innovating, revolutionary spirit; high communist integrity, foreign to any circumstantial measures; firmly consistent promotion of the established guidelines; close correlation of national with international interests and of socialist revolutionary patriotism with militant international solidarity; realistic quality of the analyses, estimates and decisions adopted; and the dynamic, constructive, democratic and humanistic character of the RCP's domestic and foreign policies as a whole.

Third are the interaction and dialectical interdependence between Romania's objectives and activity on the national as well as the world level. The content

and aims of Romania's foreign policy are determined by the nature of its socio-economic system and political power and by other factors as well. In its turn foreign policy and international activity have an important effect upon the course of domestic policy and its aims and tasks.

It is clear that the success of the internal development programs further enhances Romania's capacity to assert itself more and more effectively as an active factor in the struggle for peace and international collaboration, to participate more and more extensively in the world circulation of material and cultural values, and to benefit by the results of international cooperation. Moreover expanded and intensified collaboration with other countries and consolidation of peace and security throughout the world are major aids and essential requirements for the progress of Romania's internal construction.

It should be pointed out here that the vast task of construction in which the entire people are now engaged, the inspiring prospects offered the nation by the Draft Directives of the 13th Party Congress, the consolidation of Romania's positions as a medium developed socialist country and its transition to the new and higher stage of a developed socialist country, as well as the consolidation of the economic and social power of Romanian society and the Romanian socialist state, will even further enhance Romania's contribution to the formation and consolidation of an international climate of detente, peace and security, collaboration and good will favoring every nation's and every people's free and independent development with no outside interference.

And in the fourth place there is the regular presence of the RCP's leadership in drafting as well as implementing the domestic and foreign policies as a whole and in all social activity. As it does in domestic affairs, the RCP sets the guidelines as well as the main tasks and objectives of the state's foreign policy and guides Romania's entire international activity. Management by the party ensures the unity of Romania's internal and international policies as a whole and consistent implementation of the general objectives on both the national and world levels, and it promotes the two main components of the RCP's overall policy as a uniform, inseparable whole. Further strengthening of the party's political leadership and its advancement as the vital center of all Romanian society are the sure guarantees of a complete unity of socialist Romania's domestic and foreign policies in the future as well.

CONSTANTIN ENȚE: I think the Romanian people's mentality, determined by the circumstances of our development as a nation and our continuity in these regions, which have always been ours, is one of the factors determining the close interdependences of Romania's domestic and foreign policies. Perhaps it is a less specific factor, but it is a highly important one, for when we speak of a principled, constant and considered Romanian foreign policy based on objective analysis of the facts of the contemporary world we cannot help thinking of some characteristics of the Romanian's nature that Nicolae Iorga found in "... the canny consideration with which he expresses himself and correlates his facts, with no hasty decisions or emotional judgments but honestly, honorably, with an ancient dignity, with words of an inimitable and uncommon grandeur, and with consideration in all things." And in speaking of socialist Romania's foreign policy as a policy of peace, collaboration and understanding with all nations, we are reminded of the Romanian people's culture, which has been strong enough

to maintain a live dialogue with other cultures over the centuries, coexisting with them, giving and receiving, and also to preserve and perfect its identity. And like Romanian culture, Romanian foreign policy reflects the vital national interests and it is also, in my opinion, the result of interaction and cooperation with other nations and not of isolation or of any claims to superiority.

VICTOR DUCULESCU: I think the relationship between the Romanian state's domestic and foreign policies is best understood in the light of the unity and indivisibility of the concept of sovereignty. Unique and indivisible sovereignty is the basis of two decades of exercise of the Romanian state's domestic and foreign policies, which are actually not two different policies but two aspects of one and the same policy serving the entire people's interests. As we know, the Romanian Constitution expressly states that the entire power belongs to the people and defines Romania as a "sovereign, independent and unified" state.

The Romanian people's unity of aims, aspirations and interests calls for a single option both at home and abroad. Socialist Romania's domestic and foreign policies are in fact the outcome of the same sovereign option for a new order, which option is reflected abroad in the efforts to promote equal rights for all nations and to eliminate all traces of the policy of domination and exploitation. The great ideas upon which Romania's whole domestic policy is based and the effort to perfect the new social relations, to extend democracy and to apply some new principles of ethics and justice recur on the international level in Romania's consistent efforts toward abolition of force in international relations, toward peace and disarmament, toward respect for all states' independence and sovereignty, and toward a new economic order and a new international policy. As Nicolae Ceausescu says, "There is a close dialectical unity between Romania's domestic effort to implement the RCP Program and its international activity. When we perform the tasks of socialist construction and national development well, we make an important contribution to the general cause of socialism and progress, but also to the cause of peace and international collaboration. And when we develop an extensive international activity and further strengthen international relations and collaboration in the peace effort throughout the world, we also provide for the climate essential to the efficiency both of Romania's domestic activity and of that of other countries as well."

VASILE SECARES: Fulfillment of the great aims of national development and construction of the new order is a vital contribution to the cause of socialism, progress, peace and international collaboration. Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out, "We are specially emphasizing the best possible solutions of the many problems arising in the course of Romania's progress in socialist construction. In doing so we are primarily fulfilling our main obligation to our own people, but what we are doing in Romania is also a contribution to the general cause of socialism and the anti-imperialist struggle for peace throughout the world. Therefore our activity is meeting both our national and our international obligations, and there is a close dialectical unity between them."

Romania's foreign policy is a direct and natural continuation of its domestic activity on behalf of the policy of building the fully developed socialist society. Romania has raised its relations with other states of the world to exemplary levels, consistently militating for the establishment of a radically innovating view of international relations and for a new and democratic policy based

on the principles of full equality of rights, respect for national sovereignty and independence, noninterference in internal affairs, mutual benefit and abstention from use or threat of force. Revolutionary in thought and conception, Romania's foreign policy is also revolutionary in action, boldly investigating all opportunities to serve peace and progress.

CONSTANTIN ENNE: It is indeed important to observe, in connection with the subject of our discussion, the direct way in which the tasks and aims of the party's and state's domestic policy are reflected in Romania's international activity and positions. The internal efforts to build the fully developed socialist society, emphasizing economic and social development according to Romania's own conditions, mobilization of all the nation's material and human resources, further improvement of social and production relations, development of the system of workers revolutionary democracy, etc., correspond to the main points in Romanian foreign policy, which are based upon the continuing effort to assure the Romanian people of an international climate of peace, quiet and security favoring the constructive work Romania is doing. These main points in Romanian foreign policy include the consistent effort to enforce every people's right to self-determination in international affairs and to protection from any outside interference; firm promotion of a policy of peace, disarmament, collaboration and good will among nations; the tireless endeavor to eliminate force from international affairs and to settle all disputes among states solely by peaceful means; the unremitting effort to democratize international relations and to allow all states, and especially the small and medium countries, to share on an equal basis in the solution of the contemporary world's major problems; the sustained, persevering efforts to do away with underdevelopment and establish a new world economic order based upon equality and justice that will ensure all states' economic progress and especially that of the developing countries; regular emphasis upon the critical role of the masses and the peoples in settling world problems in their interest; and consistent promotion of a policy of strengthening the collaboration and solidarity with and among all social and political forces that can help to advance the ideals of peace, disarmament, security, collaboration and socioeconomic progress of all nations.

It is not difficult to see in these main features of Romania's foreign policy the essential values of Romania's internal socialist structures and of the conception and practice of the society we are building. These values place Romania's foreign policy on the main course of historical progress and lend it the vitality characteristic of Romanian society.

ACULIN CAZACU: The RCP and its secretary general have developed and implemented a uniform conception of the problems, processes and trends appearing in the world of today. The place and role of socialism in the world have been defined in this context, as well as the particular contribution that each experience in building the new society makes to the development of the worldwide revolutionary process. Both aspects are very consistently reflected in Romania's political options and actions abroad. Therefore when we make the point that Romania's foreign policy originates in the Romanian socialist system itself we mean both the appearance of socialism as a regular necessity of historical development and the characteristic, original way Romania's own revolutionary experience is reflected in contemporary social-historical practice as a whole.

Furthermore I think international affairs as a whole and the new processes they are generating indicate a "supplementary interaction" between the transition to socialism and other contemporary revolutionary processes. Therefore by militating in its foreign policy for the vital interests of socialism the Romanian state is integrating in its activity the whole wealth of those processes, which also lend that activity flexibility, adaptability, a cooperative spirit, continuity, ability to restructure options, etc. It is accordingly clear that the foreign policy cannot be treated as a mere "extension" of the domestic policy. It is primarily a characteristic of socialism's inherent capacity to express itself politically by integrating the diverse contemporary processes in a uniform, dynamic and dialectical conceptual model.

CONSTANTIN ENE: I think it is important to point out that the inherent tie between the party's and state's domestic and foreign policies lends consistency to both of them. Romanian foreign policy is deeply rooted in Romania's internal realities and draws strength from those realities. Therefore it has a permanent character and does not vary with the international situation, while Romania's international presence is objectively determined by the above-mentioned factors. This determination reflects the great truth that Romanian foreign policy completely serves the Romanian people's vital interests, lending it independence, originality and vision in its treatment of contemporary problems.

IOAN-MIROREA PASCU: There is unquestionably a dialectical interdependence between a state's domestic and foreign policies. The reason for it is cogent even if we consider only that both come from the same group of decision-makers and mainly reflect the vital interests of the leading class in any country. But I do not believe any state's foreign policy, even under the above circumstances, can be entirely explained and even less understood solely in terms of its domestic policy, because foreign policy is deeply rooted in the inner structure of the respective society even, I believe, down to the depths of the national psychological determinations, but it is nevertheless subject to the constant action of the factors peculiar to the international environment that continually affect both its objectives and its means of attaining them.

Therefore I think a state's foreign policy has determinations that directly pertain to its domestic policy and, in a broader sense, to the given type of social, political and economic system, but it also has determinations that do not pertain to those perennial conditions, so to speak, and both are closely involved. To absolutize either of the two aspects would be an error with consequences on many levels. For instance there are many examples demonstrating that states' social-political evolution has not led to the disappearance of any foreign-policy aims stemming from their geographic position, for example. To be sure the means to those ends may be changed more or less, although sometimes not even they change, but the objectives remain and are sometimes pursued just as before.

CORNELIU SOARE: In connection with the theoretical aspects of the subject under discussion, I think some methodological considerations concerning the content and significance of the concepts we are using are also needed. There may be a connection between a state's domestic and foreign policies that does not necessarily mean unity. Its conditioning, continuity or discontinuity may be discussed, and the relationships may be and actually are expressed in different ways in order to bring out the variety of the particular situations.

When we speak of the complete unity of socialist Romania's foreign policy we have a much richer and deeper content in mind than the mere connection between the two aspects of a state's policy. I feel this content may be seen in a few basic characteristics such as (a) consistent promotion of the principles that necessarily follow from construction and development of the socialist order, its economic base, and its social structures and revolutionary ideology; (b) consistent observance of its own principles and approved political guidelines and complete agreement between theory and practice and between program and action, creatively combining the general truths of scientific socialism with the particular conditions of Romania's development and with the historical traditions and vital interests of the Romanian people; and (c) a continuing interaction between socialist construction on the internal level and the conditions essential to it on the international level, the latter depending upon and possibly influenced to some extent by Romania's foreign policy.

A dialectical unity between different aspects of the same process is also to be considered. Naturally there are certain differences between the domestic and foreign policies in the problems treated, the environment wherein they operate, the forms, methods and courses of action, etc., that have been mentioned before. Therefore the unity of the two aspects is not accomplished automatically by any exclusive determinism of class or social system or by a mere "continuation" of the domestic policy abroad. A purposeful, well-founded and persevering effort is needed, taking account of the entirety of factors operative in the given situation, in order to find viable solutions to the problems with which the realities of the present period confront us.

Nor do I think that the situation in domestic policy is simple enough to believe that a social class or a state can pursue a policy that is always unequivocally determined under any circumstances or in any matter by a given socioeconomic structure. Actually, various factors pertaining to the superstructure intervene, as well as subjective elements and a particular way of interpreting the economic and political interests. The situations in international policy are even more complicated when there are more "actors" and the conflicts of interests are more acute.

Complete unity of domestic and foreign policies is also reflected in observance of certain principles, in Romania's case the principles of scientific socialism and those of international relations that are clearly formulated in the RCP's program documents and in Nicolae Ceausescu's explanations and speeches. As he pointed out in his speech at the Solemn Session on the Anniversary of the Revolutionary Act of 23 August 1944, "We base all international relations with other states firmly on the principles of full equality of rights, respect for national sovereignty and independence, noninterference in internal affairs, mutual benefit and abstention from the use or threat of force. We firmly declare for observance of every people's right to choose the course of socioeconomic development that they wish with no outside interference and to develop in freedom and independence."

I would add that the circumstantial aspect plays a role in international evolution that cannot be ignored. Events often succeed each other rapidly, while unforeseen and very complicated events and situations frequently occur and contradictions, conflicts and crises arise. Unity of domestic and foreign policies is also confronted with such problems, and solutions must be found for them.

CONSTANTIN VLAD: Solutions to be based, of course, upon the fundamental principles of Romanian foreign policy.

CORNELIU SOARE: To be sure the principles form a point of departure and provide the general orientation, but they have no ready-made solutions to offer. The solutions still have to be found, and it is not always easy to find the best ones. It requires flexibility, a very good knowledge of the situations, and the ability to discuss and correctly interpret the existing viewpoints, trends and interests and to find points of contact and possibilities of constructive solution of the thorniest problems at a given time. We take profound satisfaction in noting that those qualities abound in the party's and state's policy, and they to a great extent explain the worldwide prestige Romania and President Nicolae Ceausescu enjoy today.

Note also that the conflicting forces in international affairs differ from those confronting each other on the internal level (social classes, groups and categories). In international affairs sovereign states act in their national-state interests. Even if class interests figure on the international level, they do not do so in their "pure" form but usually in the form of national-state expression or representation.

And finally, I do not think we can overlook the role and importance of the geopolitical factor in relations among states, wherein geographic considerations play an important part, especially in antagonistic situations. It seems that in conflicts in the "third world" the geopolitical factor is often primarily involved. We are not discussing the reasons for this now, but I think those questions have a real importance. Every state has its interests in connection with territorial integrity, national sovereignty and unity, and the security of its borders, and in international affairs the peoples' natural, legitimate rights cannot be ignored. Attempts to resolve such problems by force of arms only aggravate the conflicts, so that real solutions must be found solely by the peaceful political means of negotiations between the parties concerned.

Correlations Between the Internal and External Factors

MARTIN NEDEJKA: As we know, regardless of the form it takes or its stage of development, the state represents a particular system of social organization for purposes of promoting certain interests and certain concepts in connection with the problems that are subject to state regulations or state policy to some extent in one way or another. But the unity of the state's policy does not imply that it is coherent within in each and every case or that there are no contradictions among its various aspects or, among other things, between its domestic and foreign aspects viewed synchronically or in their evolution. This phenomenon has various determinations but I think the main ones in the contemporary capitalist states are some parties' alternation in power, shifts in the balances of power among the ruling classes or between the latter and the popular forces, and the readjustments or reorientations that are made for various reasons in the policies of government parties.

In addition to these general causes, which are largely reflected in the capitalist state's policy as a whole, particular phenomena or circumstances pertaining to one aspect or another of the situation affect some area of that policy.

I would cite as an example the phenomenon of a relative stability in the foreign-policy objectives, due among other things to the fact that on this level the ruling classes' interests, when compared en bloc with those of the ruling classes in the other capitalist countries, tend to be expressed uniformly and to be promoted with united forces in order to increase their chances of success. Moreover the contributory effect of the objective process whereby any state's foreign policy reflects (in varying degrees of course) its general-national interests operates in the same direction.

Sometimes international circumstances have a telling effect upon a state's foreign policy, causing its internal forces to take a united stand on the respective foreign phenomenon or problem. That is true, for example, of the formation of a uniform national policy against fascist aggression during World War II, or of the present promotion by more and more countries of a foreign policy focused on the ideas of peace, security and cessation of the armaments race. As a general rule, the connection between a state's domestic and foreign policies (which, whatever their nature, are always components of that state's unified policy) is directly correlated with the political and class balance of power in the respective country and with its evolution.

I believe the aims or methods of a state's foreign policy change mainly in one of the following situations: a superficial change in the internal balance of power that does not radically change the foreign policy or the grounds for it but partly changes some of its aspects, objectives or working methods; a radical shift of this balance of power (or of the class or classes in power and the political regime), which usually makes radical changes in the foreign policy as well (although in this case there is also a certain continuity reflecting the continuity of the real national interests); changes in the international balance of power and the appearance of new situations or problems or an appreciable change in the previous ones; the evolution of the process of making or reviewing foreign policy as a whole or some of its aims and methods.

I think the process of making foreign policy contains in itself the seeds of its partial or quasi-general conflict either with the real national interests or with certain interests of the class or classes in power or some fractions of them. The extent of this discrepancy generally indicates how far the interests of the ruling class or classes in a state conflict or agree with the entire nation's interests. The extreme case is that of a foreign policy critically influenced by foreign interests outside the nation, in periods or states wherein national independence is seriously impaired by an outside dependence.

In my opinion the historical situations characterized by a temporary balance of conflicting political and class power and in fact by a divided exercise of state power are unquestionably the sources of simultaneous promotion of contradictory aims and methods in the respective state's domestic and foreign policies. Situations of this kind arise on the eve of revolutionary upheavals or immediately after less radical revolutions, or when national states are facing grave danger from without as, for example in the above-mentioned case of the capitalist countries in the period of the antifascist war.

The present and prospective shift in the international balance of power in favor of the forces of peace and international cooperation is another special situation, warranting the conclusion strikingly expressed by Romania and President Nicolae Ceausescu that it is actually possible, through the concerted efforts of the

peoples and the masses, to assert a policy of disarmament and respect for the states' independence and sovereignty, a new international economic and political order, and acceptance and observance of them under the pressure of the new balance of power even by the forces or states that are now originating the armaments race and the aggravated danger of war.

CONSTANTIN VLAD: In connection with the foregoing considerations I would comment that even when a state's domestic and foreign policies are uniform in nature they are pursued under different conditions and by different means. Internally, that state exercises all the prerogatives of its national sovereignty. It decides all questions of its socioeconomic development with no outside interference. Of course that does not mean isolation or autocracy. That state's domestic policy is conducted in the presence of its foreign relations and the contemporary development of interdependence among states and peoples and of the role of international law as a body of principles and standards of conduct in world relations. Accordingly the state in question takes measures allowing of course for the growing interdependence between its internal development and that of the international situation and the world balance of power. Moreover that state is the one that takes measures, as an expression of its sovereignty, that will provide for fulfillment on the internal level of the commitments it has made in its relations with other states, etc.

But in international affairs the respective state is only one of the protagonists. To be sure its foreign activity also expresses its national sovereignty and independence, and determination of both domestic and foreign policy is accordingly the inalienable attribute of every sovereign and independent state and of every people. But its right of decision does not extend to all international relations, but only to its behavior in those relations. Of course the aims and actions of foreign policy must allow primarily for the interests of the respective people, nation and state, but they must also allow for the vital interests of the peoples of the world and the principles of international law. To be sure the relationships between national and international law are more complex than they appear in this general and concise formulation, but I think the above-mentioned distinction is brought out rather than invalidated by any "case" analysis. I am convinced that intensive study of the problems of these relationships would once again strikingly illustrate the close, inherent and also dialectical unity of socialist Romania's domestic and foreign policies.

TRAIAN GROZEA: Every social system makes certain determinations of the respective state's domestic and foreign policies. Those determinations are not uniform but they are reinforced by others of very different kinds (economic, geographic-regional, historical, cultural, demographic etc.). The structural factors (social, economic, political, ideological etc.) generated by the socialist system lend the domestic and foreign policies their particular forms and also bring about a dialectical unity between them.

The structural factors are of a regular, objective nature but they are reflected in both the domestic and foreign policies indirectly, through the action of the subjective factor, or in Romanian society through the activity of the RCP, the leading political force, as well as that of the socialist state. The subjective factor analyzes and interprets many data on the situation and works out courses of conduct, programs and decisions. All these stages of the process are affected

by the subjective factor's ability to determine the message and the meanings of the signals sent by the objective factors and to act according to the ensuing requirements. Accordingly socialist society has the objective prerequisites for a complete unity of its domestic and foreign policies, but that unity is achieved only through the activity of the Communist Party as the leading political force and only if that activity is scientific and creative and fully reflects the respective people's aspirations.

MARIN NEDELEA: In a state of the socialist type, the objective and subjective factors essential to the unity and harmony of the two aspects of the state's policy are far more effective and stable than they are in the above-mentioned situations. The role of the working class in the socialist nation, the alliance of the working class with the peasants and other workers, the political leadership of the communist and workers parties, and their ideology and programs are the objective basis for the fullest possible reflection of the national interests in the foreign policy of the respective state and for the dialectical unity of its domestic and foreign policies.

In the socialist countries as well the nature of foreign policy (as an exercise of sovereignty by a state vis-a-vis other states) makes essential differences in the ways and means of implementation compared with those used in domestic policy. Proper understanding of that fact occasions the opposition to methods of force and dictation in international affairs, which seriously conflict with the principle of sovereign equality of states, which principle, as the RCP and its secretary general keep pointing out, demands absolutely rational solution of international problems solely on the basis of consensus, peaceful agreement, and negotiations.

But I do not think the socialist countries' foreign policies are or can be the same for each and every country. Promotion of general principles in common certainly does not justify deliberately impoverishing each country's specific initiatives and actions or its original contribution to the general cause of peace and international cooperation. Differences of that kind in the socialist countries' foreign policies help to generally enrich their contributions to the assertion of sovereign equality of states and to the worldwide promotion of a favorable image of the role of socialism and of relations among the socialist countries. Moreover the fact is well known and recognized on the theoretical level that the fundamental unity of the socialist countries' basic interests does not mean that there are no differences of interests in the relations among them or in their international relations in general. This is especially true of some differences of opinion, emphasis or judgment in some particular matters or circumstances. I think an attempt to ignore such differences or to present standardization of political actions on the international level as an expression of the socialist countries' unity would be a voluntarist departure from all reality and a superficial action with counterproductive results. Meanwhile distorting the significance of such differences, as some circles in the West and many bourgeois publications do in their desire to see in them a basic discrepancy between some socialist countries' domestic and foreign policies, merely indicates the intention of those circles to undermine the socialist countries' unity and their underlying hostility to the policy of socialist construction.

CONSTANTIN FLOREA: Actually, in the socialist states' foreign policies just as in their domestic policies there can be and indeed are differences, distinctions

and differentiations of varying degrees from one country to another in their analysis and evaluation of international trends and processes, as well as various interpretations of events, different approaches to phenomena, and distinctive initiatives and actions in one matter or another within their basic aims and objectives in common and their active cooperation in the effort to resolve the great contemporary problems. That is inevitable and quite natural when we consider the great and increasingly pronounced diversity of the economic, social and national conditions under which the new order is being built and the distinctive political, economic, military or other status of any given country within the international system, its historical traditions, etc. and also, on another level, the extreme complexity of international relations, the uncommonly rapid succession of events, etc.

Of course these objective facts make any "single strategy" of foreign policy inconceivable, or any "common general line" throughout the world or enforcement of identical positions and actions on all international problems and in all situations. Attempts to justify such a "single strategy" while impugning the importance of an independent foreign policy and of each state's own initiatives and efforts come in conflict with the inalienable right of every party and every country to determine its domestic and foreign policies independently, and also with the urgent need of resuming the course toward detente, peace and collaboration and the necessity of every states greater help in overcoming the serious world situation and preserving peace in Europe and the world.

As historical experience and our own ventures tell us, independence, autonomy and active assertion of every people's personality and identity not only do not conflict with unity, collaboration, solidarity and cooperation on the great problems of today but, on the contrary, they contribute to the more effective advancement of the great common aims and vital general interests by lending the positions and initiatives of the forces of socialism, progress and peace greater prestige and authority and a greater power to influence events for the good of all people's of the world.

Of course none of these by any means excludes the necessity of ever closer collaboration and cooperation among the socialist countries or, for that matter, among all peace-loving countries in the effort toward disarmament, security, international understanding, prevention of a nuclear catastrophe, freedom and national independence. On the contrary, the united, concerted efforts of all countries constructing the new society and of all revolutionary, progressive and advanced social and political forces and consolidation of unity and solidarity among them and among all peoples and nations are most urgent necessities indispensable to the success of the effort to solve the urgent problems facing mankind today.

As we know socialist Romania under President Nicolae Ceausescu's leadership is consistently pursuing an independent foreign policy, understanding how to promote its own identity and interests, which are in harmony with the vital interests of all countries and peoples, how to advance constructive suggestions, and what action to take to carry them out. Meanwhile it is making a continuing effort to strengthen its friendship, collaboration and solidarity with the socialist countries and the developing and unaligned countries and expanding its connections with the developed capitalist countries and all states of the world, regardless of social order, on the fundamental principles of the new international

relations and strict observance of every people's right to develop in freedom and independence, to choose its own course of development, and to determine its future in sovereign fashion. Close and regular correlation of the determined and unremitting effort to protect and advance the national interests, sovereignty and independence with the active and continuous effort to further develop international collaboration with all countries and peoples of the world and to further enhance Romania's contribution to the solution of the contemporary world's problems is one of the main characteristics of the party's and state's foreign policy, and it is also a striking expression of the inherent unity of socialist Romania's domestic and foreign objectives.

Full Accord with Romanian and All Peoples' Aspirations

ACULIN CAZACU: In analyzing the "domestic-foreign" relationship I think we must bear in mind that the political options that determine it are based, in Romanian society, upon objective analysis of the factual data. The party documents and Nicolae Ceausescu's speeches contain in-depth analyses of the processes in the contemporary world and in the stage we have reached in building the new society. Those analyses, which ultimately determine courses of political action, exclude any voluntarism or subjectivism in general in the domestic and foreign aspects alike. Therefore we can say that the scientific basis of the domestic and foreign political decisions is solid ground for establishing their complete unity.

TRATAN GROZEA: Actually the activity of the RCP and its secretary general provide a scientific basis for the processes of analysis, decision and scheduling, so that the policies in various activities are the objectively necessary procedures and courses of conduct under the given circumstances, and the complete dialectical unity of Romania's domestic and foreign policies is assured as well. We all know building the fully developed socialist society and Romania's advance toward communism are Romania's main strategic objectives in the present period. But this process goes on in an external environment with a number of particular parameters and a particular evolution as well.

Because of the interdependences in the world system the internal processes, which are caused and motivated in their own societies, are affected by the external environment and have their effects upon it in return. Accordingly, while the RCP is organizing and implementing the national efforts to attain the goals of socialist Romania's all-around development it makes an intensive effort on the international level to favorably affect the evolution of world relationships.

The external procedure is clearly of the same peaceful and constructive nature as the internal one. Socialist Romania and its president are militating in the international arena to promote the values that will secure the Romanian people's unrestricted development as well as that of all peoples, to eliminate the threat of war, and to bring about equal security and peace for all nations. There is clearly a complete dialectical unity between the domestic policy of building the new society and the efforts to influence the external environment constructively and favorably for all peoples. Those efforts reflect the great moral and humanitarian values generated by socialism that have molded the external environment more and more consistently as the processes of internal construction have reached ever higher parameters. In describing the sharply rising evolution of Romania's whole socialist society that will be achieved by attaining the great goals set by

the party for the next 15 years, Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out in his speech at the Solemn Session on 22 August 1984 that it will "even further strengthen the Romanian socialist state, the socioeconomic power of Romanian society, and the independence and sovereignty of socialist Romania. It will also intensify Romania's collaboration and cooperation with other countries and peoples of the world and even further enhance its participation in the international division of labor, in the world exchange of material and cultural values, and in the efforts to create a world of peace, understanding and collaboration without wars or weapons."

ACULIN CAZACU: It is noteworthy that some derogatory stands on socialism and Romania are often based upon the assumption of a so-called discrepancy between domestic and foreign policy. In the first place the "arguments" cited to this effect revolve around some essentially different criteria, making them unconvincing from the start. The advocates of such views "forget" that in noting Romania's sovereign and independent international policy they are also and actually noting an inalienable attribute of the internal process of socialist construction, unintentionally, of course. This "amnesia" then changes the criteria for evaluation as soon as consideration is given to the system of foreign-policy options. Then the decisions themselves that we make are attacked with "arguments" essentially invoking elements of the capitalist model of development, such as competition, private initiative, profits of private origin, etc. This disguises an unwarranted interference in Romania's internal affairs and an illegitimate attack upon those attributes of sovereignty and independence that are distinguished, through a forced separation of levels, in the international arena only. The "discrepancy" spoken of by some circles engaged in reactionary, antisocialist and anticommunist propaganda proves to be a logical-historical libel for obvious political purposes.

I should also like to stress the point here that the Romanian socialist state is quite consistently promoting its interests not at the expense of other states' interests but, on the contrary, in a principled, constructive atmosphere of consideration for the interests of all other states and peoples, collaboration and determination of the most equitable solutions to the problems arising in any given sector. From this viewpoint, the "domestic-foreign" unity of Romania's policy lies in unfailing observance of all states' independence and sovereignty and in a constant search for the right ways of promoting Romania's national interests in a broad framework of international cooperation.

VASILE SECARES: In reference to the environment in which the effort to build the fully developed socialist society in Romania is being made and to the system of determinations upon which the party's and state's general political policy is based, Nicolae Ceausescu has repeatedly pointed out that we must consider both the internal and external conditions and the entire interaction of the internal and external factors. The RCP's view excludes absolute analytical dissociation of the internal from the international and the national socioeconomic and political structure from international relations. We cannot ignore the fact that every society's evolution, and especially that of its international position and activity, ultimately depends upon the internal conditions. In one way or another the internal factors are decisive because the ways of determining the international interactions always depend upon the internal system of interactions.

To be sure the role of the external factors cannot be overlooked, especially in view of the increasingly close contacts among states and nations, and the actual correlation between the internal and external determinations (due to the international system) must always be considered. But the external conditions and factors usually operate in connection with and through the internal conditions and factors.

In this connection, the RCP has emphatically pointed out that the new socialist order is based upon Romania's historical, social and national conditions. Nicolae Ceausescu said, "It is adjustment to the national conditions that guarantees the success of the socialist principles," and therefore "Any truly realistic and scientific policy must take account of the particular conditions, differing from country to country, and it must accord them every attention." In particular, "The different levels of the productive forces in different countries create a wide diversity of particular ways of building the new social order." For its part, the RCP consistently bases its domestic and foreign policies upon in-depth study of the facts in Romania and the specific conditions determined by the level of Romanian society's socioeconomic and political development.

These points of the party secretary general's are naturally supplemented by pointing out the internal origin of socialist reform of a society. Socialist construction is a problem of each people and each nation. Socialism cannot be imposed or imported from outside nor, in the last analysis, can the start of construction of the new society be stopped by any outside force. Therefore the RCP, in pursuing its foreign policy and in developing its international relations, has always maintained the necessity of observing every people's sacred right to free determination of the course of their development with no outside interference.

In Nicolae Ceausescu's view the particular approach to this problem also involves another highly important aspect, namely the operation of the external factors through the intermediary of the internal conditions. It is a matter of pointing out the fact that the present crisis of the international system and existing world order and the world economic crisis are having their bad effects upon the various societies because they point up and aggravate those societies' own contradictions. Of course this relationship throws a new light upon and further explains the reasons for the RCP's consistent effort to analyze the contradictions that arise in various sectors of Romanian society and to take firm measures to eliminate them rapidly, while providing for more and more complete harmony between the productive forces and production relations and among the various socioeconomic activities. Solution of the various problems presented by socialist construction and continued development of the nation's economic, political and social strength are essential to consolidation of Romania's independence and sovereignty and to its more active participation in international affairs.

VICTOR DUCULESCU: While it may be quite rightly said that the domestic aspect is still foremost in the "domestic-foreign" relationship and essentially determines the foreign-policy options, nevertheless I think the complexity of world relations in the present period actually makes the foreign aspect occasionally predominant, as it certainly acquires a certain temporary priority. There are, for example, the contemporary world's very pressing problems in connection with

the necessity of uniting all the rational and realistic political forces to make it possible to prevent a devastating nuclear war that would actually affect the existence of our world and all civilization. As Nicolae Ceausescu said in his speech on the anniversary of the Romanian revolution in August 1944, the unprecedented proportions of the problem of war and peace, which has become the main problem of the contemporary world, require us, "regardless of different social systems... of different political and philosophical conceptions and regardless even of disagreements or disputes between some states, to overlook all these and place the interests of every people and of mankind in general above all things and to take the most resolute action to meet the expectations of the peoples and of mankind as a whole!"

Priority treatment of this major point in foreign policy is accordingly necessary because all nations and all peoples are vitally interested in precluding the danger of a nuclear war, and no people's and no state's internal political and social development is conceivable without the assurance of world peace and security. In this connection, an American author says in a recent study that "Once the planet was encircled by the systems for waging war, security itself became indivisible and a common good in its own right. The common security ceased to be Utopian and pointless and became both possible and necessary." (Daniel Deudny, "Whole Earth Security [sic]: A Geopolitics of Peace. Worldwatch Paper 55," July 1983, Washington, p 6)

I would also note the fact that the new proportions of the worldwide economic problems make it difficult to draw a hard and fast distinction between internal and external. Elimination of the scourge of underdevelopment calls for domestic policies emphasizing progress of national economies but also abolition of outdated and biased international structures and mechanisms that propagate wealth at one pole and poverty at the other. However intensive some developing countries' own efforts may be, and however capable their political leaders may be of promoting a domestic policy in the interest of their own nations, it is clear that no spectacular results will be obtained until the international mechanisms and structures and the international economic order are in harmony not with the interests of a limited group of nations but with the interests of all peoples and especially those of the developing countries. As Nicolae Ceausescu said, "One of the most alarming facts of this period is the aggravation of the developing countries' position resulting from the unfair relations between them and the wealthy countries, the financial and credit policies, and the extremely high interest rates charged by the United States especially. It may be said that the position of the developing countries is itself a bomb with very serious social effects. Of course its detonation will not destroy the living conditions on earth, but it may result in abolition of relations based on inequality, oppression and exploitation and it may open the way to a world based on democratic relations of equality, a better and more just world on our planet."

The world interdependences call for an adjustment of national policies to the new situations, which require the international cooperation of all states as well as concentration of their efforts to facilitate the solution of problems that concern both any individual state and the entire community of nations. Poverty must be eradicated both internally in many countries and internationally. Moreover protection of the living environment is important to each people but also to our planet as a whole, etc. As some authors conclude, "There is a phenomenon of 'general interdependence' among states and peoples in the economic

area especially, but it is also expanding more and more into the ecological system, essential to life, and into the biospheric system." (Goldon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, "Force and Statecraft. Diplomatic Problems of Our Time," New York, Oxford University Press, 1983, p 170) Certain it is that some global objectives require not only effective national policies that are correctly oriented and implemented in accordance with the peoples' vital aspirations but also international cooperative measures adopted with all states' participation.

[No 21, 10 Nov 84 pp 39-48]

[Text] Nicolae Ceausescu said, "Socialist Romania will also do all in its power in the future to make an active contribution to the triumph of reason, collaboration and peace in the world. Once again we reaffirm our resolve, while emphasizing Romania's socioeconomic development and improvement of the people's general welfare, to strengthen collaboration with all peoples of the world, to make every effort to banish wars from our planet forever, and to bring about a world of collaboration, peace and friendship!"

VASILE SECARES: In constantly stressing the point that the party's and state's activity in both domestic and foreign policy is based upon the Romanian people's national interests, Nicolae Ceausescu has also defined the real standards of their structuring. Rejecting the simplistic, reductionist and dogmatic theories about the content of national interests, the party secretary general has brought out the need of a comprehensive view including all the determinations on this subject. In the RCP's view, the national interests reflect all the requirements for a nation's independent existence and development, the characteristic features of the national environment, and the entirety of economic, social, political, cultural and other characteristics resulting from the respective society's historical development.

To be sure a nation's socioeconomic structure, the nature of its system, and the interests of the class in power in the state play a key role in determining the national objectives, as has already been said here. But those factors cannot be viewed abstractly or in isolation, nor can they be contrasted with the factors pertaining to the national characteristics or to such basic values as national unity, defense of the national state's freedom, independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. Accordingly I think the class determinations must be considered in the context of the effects of all the other variables and in close connection with the diverse interests formed by the requirements of national development and the position of the nation and its state. I think it is clear in this light that ideas to the effect that the national interests of the countries building the new order are socialist in content and national only in form of expression have no scientific basis. The respective attributes refer at the same time to both the content and the particular form of expression of the national interests.

VICTOR DUCULESCU: The relationship between the states' domestic policies and their international actions is also directly affected by their historical traditions, geographic position, size, strength, economic potential, their qualification as great powers or small or medium countries, etc. For example, it is vital to an industrialized country with inadequate energy resources to procure

petroleum, even over great distances, in order to meet some domestic demands, and that gives rise to certain positions and actions in connection with its foreign policy. Similarly a small country that is insufficiently developed industrially is vitally interested in expanding its international economic cooperation on a fully equal and equitable basis along with the effort to create an industrial base of its own, in order to attain the goals of its own development.

On another level, for some great powers installing more or less remote military bases of their own on other states' territories or sending their navies into distant waters are means of promoting a so-called "national interest" of theirs, meaning of course the dominant structures and mechanisms operative within the respective states that are reflected in their foreign policies. Although the technical literature distinguishes between "national interest" and "national power" in recognition of the objective nature of the existence of some interests of every country, the conclusions drawn from that are not always correct. A number of technical works maintain, for example, that "Political power is the ability of a government to control events. Both at home and abroad, that is vital to any nation's existence." (Wallace Irwin Jr, "America in the World. A Guide to U.S. Foreign Policy," published for the Foreign Policy Association by Praeger Publishers, New York, 1983, p 8) But it is clear in the first place that the concept of "national interest" itself has various meanings because "national power" has various components (economic strength, military potential, technological capacity, wealth, resources etc.). Therefore it is clear that there are a great many elements and influences that may enter into determination of any state's foreign policy in addition to the social or class reasons, which of course are still basic to the domestic-foreign relationship.

A Widely Receptive Policy of Consolidating Relations with All Countries

AGULIN CAZACU: I would stress the fact here that in approaching the subject of our discussion, we have a "field of concepts" reflecting the profoundly dialectical nature of the relationships that we have in mind, such as domestic-foreign, national-international, particular-general, endogenous-exogenous et al. The deterministic view that defines the revolutionary conception of the world calls for perception, within a specific-historical framework, of a multitude of aspects of the realities designated by those concepts. Furthermore the treatment of the political character of the relationships designated by those concepts requires analysis of the role of the subjective factors and the way they reflect interests (class and national, permanent and temporary, long-range and immediate, etc.).

Accordingly, by virtue of its subject matter today's discussion is focused upon one of the most complex problems of major theoretical, practical, moral and operational importance. In order to explain the complete unity of the Romanian state's domestic and foreign policies, I think it is essential to present the determinations and evolution of the interests that enter into this picture.

It might also be appropriate to take notice of the unity of the political in general in socialism. It accounts for the fact the "domestic-foreign" distinction indicates only one aspect of that unity, alongside others that may be defined according to various criteria (economic, cultural, psychosocial, military, organizational etc.). Therefore the theoretical frame of reference of the

discussion is very broad, and the "analytical clipping" of the "domestic-foreign" segment of the uniform implementation of the whole party and state policy, despite its particular distinguishing characteristics, requires basic references to this overall theoretical framework.

VICTOR DUCULESCU: I would like to comment further that the influence of the various classes and of some groups and social categories upon a given state's foreign policy or particular foreign-policy actions is not always direct and easy to detect. In practice there are situations where economic and political interests do not always influence the "domestic-foreign" relationship directly but by indirect means. In the capitalist countries the so-called pressure groups, which are actually temporary associations of interests to accomplish a controlling objective, are formed in order to carry out certain domestic-policy purposes that affect international relations. They may take the form of "lobbies," which are real technical or profitable forms of organization serving to express the pressure groups' policy. Of course these groups can have a more or less powerful effect upon political decision-making, and it is often hard to tell whether such groups, organizations or forces reflect a domestic or foreign-policy interest.

Whereas the familiar Marxist principle of the telling role of economic and class relations in determining a state's political orientation is still unquestionably operative, it is equally true that the way it is carried out in practice and its particular mechanism are not always easy to determine, because in addition to the basic determination of class interest there are many other motivations for making decisions that may conflict at times with the interests or ideology of leading groups in the developed capitalist countries.

CONSTANTIN VLAD: As it has been pointed out in the course of our discussion, the close interdependence of Romania's domestic and foreign policies is an important factor in their unity. I mean, on the one hand, that the domestic policy of national development on all levels can succeed with further expansion and diversification of Romania's foreign relations. This requirement is reflected in the Romanian state's and party's continuing emphasis upon development of co-operation with the socialist countries, with the developing countries, with the developed capitalist countries, and with all states of the world regardless of social order and on a basis of mutual benefit. And on the other hand, national economic development, technical-scientific progress, cultural development etc. create objective conditions for Romania's increasingly wide and diversified participation in the world exchange of material and cultural values.

VASILE BUGA: Actually, in the view of the RCP and its secretary general, socialist and communist construction in Romania can succeed only in an international climate of calm, security and extensive, all-around and equitable cooperation with all countries of the world. The vitality acquired by the whole process of revolutionary reform in Romania since the Ninth Party Congress is logically and entirely reflected in the policy wide receptiveness on the international level, in the active dialogue maintained by Romania's party and state leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, with other party and state leaders everywhere, and in Romania's responsible participation in the solution of the great international problems.

As we know, Romania is emphasizing consolidation of its friendship, collaboration and solidarity with all socialist countries and especially the neighboring

ones. There are cogent objective reasons for this programmed objective, for the very nature of the system we are building, the whole process of socialist construction, and the ideology, hopes and goals in common call for expansion and diversification of all socialist countries' all-around cooperation as one of the main requirements for the success of this historic task and for the advancement of the power and influence of socialism in the world.

The fruitfulness of this constant objective is conclusively demonstrated by the annually rising level of Romania's all-around collaboration with the other socialist countries in all fields on behalf of each individual country and of socialism as a whole. Nicolae Ceausescu's meetings and conversations with these countries' party and state leaders and the accords and agreements concluded on those occasions have also made a vital contribution to that end. The dialogue at the summit has occasioned productive exchanges of opinions every time and lent a new impetus to mutually advantageous collaboration.

The steadily rising evolution of Romania's relations with the other socialist countries is reflected by the development of economic collaboration. Romania, a founding member of CECA, participates intensively in that organization's efforts to aid the harmonious development of every national economy and the equalization of the member nations' levels of economic development. As we know, the high-level Economic Conference of the CECA countries held in Moscow in June 1984 opened up by its decisions the prospect of improving both bilateral and multilateral mutually advantageous collaboration and cooperation. As provided by the Draft Directives of the 13th Party Congress, "Romania will take consistent action to expand and intensify economic and technical-scientific collaboration under CECA on behalf of every member nation's socioeconomic development, successful construction of the new order, and the greater prestige of socialism in the world."

The RCP considers it more necessary than ever, especially in the present particularly serious international situation, to unite the efforts of all socialist countries and to strengthen their cooperation with all contemporary progressive forces in order to eliminate the nuclear threat, to accomplish disarmament, and to secure world peace.

The RCP feels it is the socialist countries' historic mission to set the example of relations of a better kind based upon full equality of rights and mutual respect, relations that will serve as the model for the future relations among all states of the world. As Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out in his address to the Solemn Session on the 40th anniversary of the Revolutionary Act of 23 August 1944, that has "a particular significance for all international affairs, for the greater prestige of socialism in the world, and for a policy of peace and collaboration on our planet."

Meanwhile Romania is developing extensive collaboration and cooperation with the developing and unaligned countries, expanding and diversifying its economic and technical-scientific collaboration with them, actively supporting their efforts to secure their economic and social progress and consolidate their national independence, and working with them to eliminate underdevelopment and build a new international economic order.

Furthermore, in the spirit of peaceful coexistence Romanian is expanding its connections with the developed capitalist countries and with all states of the world regardless of social order on behalf of international cooperation and peace. Romania bases all its international relations squarely upon the principles of full equality of rights, respect for national sovereignty and independence, noninterference in internal affairs, mutual benefit, abstention from the threat or use of force, and every people's right to self-determination. In the future too, as President Nicolae Ceausescu has pointed out, Romania "will base its relations with all states of the world on those principles, in the belief that the independence of every people is the certain guarantee of socioeconomic development, resolution of the contradictions among states, and achievement of a world of international collaboration and peace."

ION MITRAN: Peaceful cooperation among all states is a first necessity of our time. As we know, the states of the world of today differ in various respects. Some countries are socialist, others are capitalist, and many countries freed from colonial slavery are opting for a socialist development. Some states are developed while most of them are in the course of development. There are great powers, small and medium countries, countries involved in military blocs, and unaligned and neutral countries. And due to national characteristics and historical, economic, religious or other circumstances, there are more or less great differences even among countries with similar social and political structures. Naturally this fact of our period occasions and maintains different philosophical and political conceptions that are sometimes unreconcilable and various specific ways of interpreting the contemporary situation and future prospects. Nicolae Ceausescu says, "Under these circumstances the treatment of all the complex problems of international politics must be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems and on the necessity of active collaboration among all states in order to solve the problems in a new spirit of respect for every nation's right to choose its course of development according to its own interests and to build its future in freedom and independence with no outside interference."

The irreversible historical fact of the existence of countries with different social systems logically calls for their peaceful coexistence as an objective historical necessity and the only rational way to organize international relations in view of the current development of destructive weapons and especially nuclear ones. Peaceful coexistence is accordingly the only alternative to a thermonuclear war that would destroy mankind. The shifts and changes on the international level and in the world balance of power and especially the greater power of the socialist countries thanks to their progress in economic, scientific and social development, which progress is enhancing the power, authority and influence of socialism in the world, are the objective reasons for the increasingly widespread assertion and recognition of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Of course if it is to be viable peaceful coexistence cannot be regarded as a temporary situation merely characterized by absence of war and military confrontations between states, although that would certainly be a great historical gain. No clear or realistic position can overlook the reality of our period, whereby the accumulation of contradictions can lead to the outbreak of armed conflicts or even to a wider conflagration. Peaceful coexistence requires an active, militant resolve to settle all international disputes by political negotiation

and to permanently abolish the use or threat of force in international relations. Under those circumstances the vitality of peaceful coexistence is fostered by consolidation of detente and world peace, by political, economic, technical-scientific and cultural collaboration and cooperation of the peoples of the world, and by cooperation among the states in order to solve man's urgent problems. Peaceful coexistence requires vitality, an active spirit, and constructive initiatives in relations among states and in international affairs in general, and it is foreign by its very nature to passiveness, isolation and a destructive policy. It presupposes understanding and close collaboration among states, extensive development of their relations on many levels, fair exchanges of values, and cooperation on behalf of every people's progress and prosperity and all nations' security.

The differences among states in the political philosophies that inspire them, their forms of social and state organization, and the ideologies they profess pertain to the will and aspirations of their peoples and should not interfere in any way with the possibilities of establishing and developing peaceful cooperation. In the light of the revolutionary humanism upon which the new social relations in Romania are built, the RCP considers it vitally important for all states' foreign policies to be based on development of international collaboration on the basis of respect for every people's sovereign right to choose their own form of socioeconomic organization in keeping with their wishes and vital interests and aspirations without any outside interference. Complete confidence in the superiority of socialism has nothing in common with imposing it upon other peoples, just as no one should claim or try to replace the philosophical conception of socialism or the political options for building it with other conceptions or options. Accordingly peaceful coexistence does not mean giving up one's own philosophical, political or ideological concepts. It has to do with relations among states, while the ideological struggle has to do with relations among classes, and those are quite different phenomena that cannot and must not be confused. It is the inalienable right of the people in any country and of the progressive social forces to fight for democratic, revolutionary social reforms. To see here only the confrontation between the two social-political systems and to confine oneself to that and fail to see the necessity of collaboration to resolve problems and especially global ones is actually to ignore the validity of the dialectical principle of the conflict, unity and interdependence of opposites and to disregard the realities of today.

The radical socioeconomic changes of our period, the widespread technical-scientific revolution, the swift development of the productive forces, and the cultural development of the peoples are bringing about an increasingly complete interaction of the relations among independent and sovereign states and their all-around cooperation. The operation of an essential principle of materialist dialectics is accordingly evident in this area too, namely the principle of the objective, specific connection and links between distinct factors and phenomena whose interaction forms the basis of the existence and modus operandi of the whole.

CONSTANTIN ENE: One of the major aims of the party's and state's foreign policy that makes its dialectical unity with domestic policy very striking is the tireless effort to protect peace, prevent another world war, stop the armaments race and begin disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. The perseverance of Romania and President Nicolae Ceausescu in this effort reflects the inherent bond

between socialism and peace and social progress, expresses in international relations the nature of the Romanian socialist system, meets the requirements of Romania's socioeconomic development as well as that of all countries of the world, and takes account of the lessons of Romania's national history, while also incorporating the most advanced principles of mankind.

Being actively engaged in the task of building the fully developed socialist society and of Romania's advance toward communism, the Romanian people are vitally concerned that a climate of peace, understanding, collaboration and security shall reign throughout the world and the principles of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems shall meet with the widest possible reception and application, so that all peoples and nations can be certain of their existence and development as sovereign entities and beneficiaries of the contemporary scientific, technical and cultural advances, especially under the conditions of today, when the armaments race has entered a new and very dangerous stage and the huge stockpiles of weapons, especially nuclear ones, have seriously aggravated the danger of a nuclear war. Use of only a fraction of the existing nuclear arsenals not only would cause huge losses of human life and destruction of numerous socioeconomic capacities but would also put an end to living conditions on our planet. Therefore the firm commitment to the struggle to preserve peace, man's most precious gift, and to secure the people's fundamental right to life and a free and independent existence stands out as a common factor in all of Romania's foreign-policy actions.

Romania's positions and initiatives on matters of peace, war, stopping the armaments race and achieving disarmament are firmly promoted in the bilateral relations Romania maintains and in the international forums for discussion and negotiation as well. Romania and President Nicolae Ceausescu have been very strongly advocating elimination of the danger to the European peoples and world peace presented by installation on our continent of medium range nuclear missiles and stockpiling of nuclear weapons in general. Romania has warned in advance of the deadly serious consequences of starting emplacement of new medium-range nuclear missiles in various European countries and has never ceased to request cessation by both parties of the dangerous course toward intensification of the armaments race, and it has militated tirelessly for resumption of negotiations and elimination from Europe of all nuclear missiles, both medium range and tactical, and all nuclear weapons as well.

Nicolae Ceausescu's personal initiatives to extricate the Soviet-American negotiations from their impasse and his firm measures against fatalism and resignation about the course of events are supported by the Romanian people's firm resolve to prevent a new, more dangerous stage of the nuclear armaments race, a resolve expressed at thousands of peace demonstrations and meetings and by millions of signatures on appeals to the world for peace and cessation of the course toward a nuclear war.

Romania's options are accordingly developed in close and inseparable connection with experience and based upon the interests of the Romanian people and those of the whole international community as well. Nicolae Ceausescu says, "We are concerned with and emphasize the problem of Romanian society's development and the problems concerning the Romanian nation, but we are fully aware of our responsibility and of the part the Romanian people and socialist Romania have to play in the world. We realize that we need peace and international collaboration with

all states of the world regardless of social order if we are to secure the implementation of the program to build the fully developed socialist society."

Sustained Efforts to Prevent Nuclear War and Preserve Peace

ION MITRAN: There is an inseparable unity between the task of building the new society and securing a lasting peace, and from this viewpoint, already advanced by the founders of scientific socialism, the relationship between domestic and foreign policy embodies high humanistic values. As Marx said a century ago, "As opposed to the old society and its economic misery and political madness, a new society is born whose international principle will be peace, because all nations will have one and the same master, namely work." Socialism, an eminently constructive historical work, is opposed to war by its very nature and ideals and by the ideological and political aims it pursues. The new order necessarily requires a climate of peace and collaboration among nations because it is only in such a climate that it can fulfill its aspirations to socioeconomic development and the peoples' welfare. That is why complete rejection of war and abolition of military conflicts and "the furies of private interest," as Marx put it, are among the very factors giving rise to socialism. The RCP Program includes among its major aims and objectives the idea that "Concentrating all of society's efforts and resources upon socialist and communist construction objectively requires the assurance of peaceful conditions."

The socioeconomic facts of our period and the new order reflect a historical process of human society's objective development on new and higher levels, while the construction of the new order in each country reveals the unity of domestic and foreign policies, which unity reflects an objective requirement. The development of this unity is based upon the existence and regular operation of a series of socioeconomic and political-ideological factors. As Nicolae Ceausescu points out, "In order to fully understand the complex problems of the new stage of Romanian society's development, we must take account of the great revolutionary changes in the world and the characteristics of the present international situation, in the light of the fact that there is a close dialectical unity between Romania's domestic and foreign policies and they interact with each other."

Socialist Romania's development emphatically confirms that truth. The great revolutionary reforms during the 40 years since the victory of the revolution in August 1944 and especially since the Ninth Party Congress, the nature of the socioeconomic relations and the political power, the RCP's management of all social activity, and the growing participation of the masses and the entire nation in social management are the solid foundation as well as the guarantee of the consistent and uniform fulfillment of the RCP's general objectives on both the national and international levels.

The objective requirements of Romania's advance on the path of socioeconomic progress as they are anticipated in the Draft Directives of the 13th Party Congress and the Romanian people's vital interests in close correlation with the other peoples' interests determine the promotion of a foreign policy of peace and extensive international collaboration. This policy secures Romania's national sovereignty and independence, its security from any pressures or interference, development of its collaboration with all states of the world on terms of mutual respect and benefit, and its active participation in international

affairs, while contributing to the establishment of a new world order and to the creation of a world freed forever from the policy of force and dictation and the nightmare of armaments and wars. That is to be the world wherein the simple laws of morality and equity ideally characteristic of relations among individuals will become supreme laws of international relations.

The rapid development of the national economy on a qualitatively higher level in the current five-year plan and the long range, the growth and modernization of production, the greater effectiveness of all economic activity, better use of material and human resources, and the development of science and culture will bring about a new advance on the path of material and cultural progress and socialist civilization. As the productive forces are developed, social and production relations and uniform management of socioeconomic development are continually improved. The principles of scientific organization of labor in all activities are promoted and socialist democracy is enhanced, while the entire people's participation in social management is assured. In that sense the unity of the party's and state's domestic and foreign efforts is a unity of basic aims and objectives and of principles and doctrines which, in the light of the conception of scientific socialism, are components of its general political policy, characterized by consistency, integrity, realism and a creative, constructive spirit.

CONSTANTIN FLOREA: I should like to emphasize here the high integrity, consistency and firmness with which Romania and Nicolae Ceausescu are working to solve the vital problem of our era, namely defense of peace, cessation of the armaments race and especially the nuclear one, preservation of mankind from a catastrophe, and protection of the fundamental right of persons and peoples to life, peace and a free and worthy existence.

In promoting this policy (in complete accord with the Romanian people's vital interests, with the revolutionary principles of socialism, and with the most progressive historical traditions of the international communist and workers movement), the RCP proceeds from a number of fundamental considerations such as the priority on the problem of preventing war and securing peace in the series of problems facing mankind today, since the very fate of human civilization ultimately depends upon its solution in the peoples' interest; the profoundly bad social and economic effects of the armaments race and especially of the escalation of the nuclear armaments race, a huge obstacle to all countries' efforts toward progress and prosperity, encouraging the policy of force and dictation, hegemony and redivision of the world into spheres of influence and fostering distrust and tension among states and peoples; the continued escalation of armaments, especially nuclear ones, which is aggravating the danger of another world war that would inevitably become a general nuclear war threatening the destruction of the human species, civilization and life on our planet; the absolute necessity of striking the military balance not by stepping up the armaments race but by further reduction of armaments and especially nuclear ones as the only viable and rational solution serving the interests of peace and the peoples' progress and the aspirations of every country and all mankind to security and independence; and the necessity of securing the basic right of persons and peoples to existence, life and peace as essentials for enforcement of all other social, economic and political rights.

As we know, Romania keeps stressing the fact that the military imbalance can no longer be invoked to justify increased military outlays or intensification of

the armaments race when each party has already accumulated an arsenal of nuclear weapons that can destroy mankind several times over. Armaments do not and cannot provide more security but, on the contrary, they aggravate the peoples' insecurity and the danger of nuclear destruction.

In view of these objective facts of the current international situation, the RCP and the state are militating with the greatest determination for the start of disarmament and especially nuclear disarmament. In view of the very serious situation recently created in Europe, Romania is taking firm action to halt the dangerous course of events, to stop the emplacements of American missiles and Soviet countermeasures, and to renew the negotiations at Geneva in order to completely abolish the medium-range missiles and then all nuclear weapons from the European continent and the entire world. President Nicolae Ceausescu keeps openly emphasizing the fact that the countries on whose territory the new nuclear missiles are being emplaced are assuming a great responsibility to their own peoples and to the life and peace of all nations.

The RCP feels that because the peoples of Europe would be the first victims of the nuclear missiles, all European countries and especially those in NATO and the Warsaw Pact must take more responsibility and more united action to change the present situation and return to a policy of detente, collaboration and peace. Nicolae Ceausescu says, "Above and beyond any considerations or differences of social systems, ideology and affiliation or nonaffiliation with any military bloc, all the countries on our continent must take united action and work more and more closely together for disarmament and detente and for a united Europe of peace and collaboration without missiles or nuclear weapons of any kind."

CORNELIU SOARE: Actually, as it has been pointed out here, Romania needs peace to succeed in its whole task of building the new society and to secure its socioeconomic development and material and cultural progress. It is threatening no one and has no kind of expansionist tendencies but, on the contrary, is taking firm measures to eliminate such methods and tendencies from the practice of international relations and to accomplish disarmament and especially nuclear disarmament. Meanwhile the RCP and the state have drawn the right conclusions from the evolution of the international situation and the threat of war and are making a legitimate and unrelenting effort to strengthen national defense, to outfit the army with modern military equipment, and also to prepare the entire people to defend their country and repel any imperialist aggression.

Romania's military doctrine, developed by Nicolae Ceausescu, and the national defense system organized in conformity with that doctrine are in a natural and complete agreement with the Party's and state's domestic and foreign policies as a whole. The main guidelines and ideas of the doctrine (national defense, the entire people's war, territorial defense, conversion of all localities to citadels of work, combat and defense, close cooperation of the army with the Patriotic Guards, and detachments of youth and other popular units in the national defense system) vividly reflect what the president and supreme commander of the Romanian armed forces succinctly formulated by pointing out that "National defense is our strategic objective... Therefore our only strategy is to make sure that Romanian soil will not be victimized by any imperialist aggression or policy of force... Our strategy is to secure national independence and peace for the Romanian people."

Meanwhile Romania has been fulfilling all its obligations as a member of the Warsaw Pact and is making an active contribution to development of close collaboration among the socialist member countries and among their armies. It is also trying to expand military collaboration with the armies of all the socialist countries and also with those of other states favoring a new and independent policy of peace, detente and international security.

It is a well-known fact that Romania decided to keep its military expenditures at the 1982 level until 1985, thus setting a specific example of implementing its suggestion to freeze military budgets as a first step toward stopping the armaments race. It is also significant that the soldiers of the Romanian army, while paying unflagging attention to combat readiness for national defense, directly participate in implementing the party's and state's domestic and foreign policies as a whole, in the task of socialist construction, and in attaining some impressive goals of socioeconomic development. This strengthens the indestructible unity of the army and the people even further and demonstrates that the Romanian army is completely integrated in the extensive process of peaceful, constructive development of Romanian socialist society.

TRAIAN GROZEA: Actually the military element in Romania was formed solely for defensive action. This purpose was also accomplished by the way the national defense system was set up, to include the popular defense units (Patriotic Guards, youth units and civilian defense units) of a strictly regional nature, in addition to the army, its power nucleus. Because of the way they were established, the popular defense units can operate only on national territory and in its defense. The Romanian Constitution and the Defense Law expressly and unquestionably stipulate that Romania can be engaged in a defensive war only, and they arrange the decision-making process so as to secure this important political option under any circumstances.

Accordingly, in Romanian theory and practice the military force is intended for defense only and consequently it can be no threat to other peoples' security or to peace. This policy is correlated with a firm and consistent attitude of unswerving opposition to the use or threat of force in international affairs. It is manifested in denouncing the grave dangers presented by the armaments race, especially the nuclear one, in the repeated and insistent appeal not to resolve any international conflicts or problems by resorting to military force but only to political negotiations, and in the extensive disarmament proposals submitted to the attention of the international community and advanced in the United Nations and other forums for negotiations.

CONSTANTIN FLOREA: In connection with Romania's policy on disarmament, I would point out here that Romania, in view of the consideration that the military blocs have become an anachronism and are actually an obstacle to international collaboration, consistently favors simultaneous dismantling of both military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and a new collaboration in Europe based on assurance of every nation's security and independence. Moreover it should be said that the Warsaw Pact countries have proposed the simultaneous dismantling of both the military blocs innumerable times. Continuing reduction of the role of the blocs until their simultaneous dismantling would serve the interests of the peoples on the continent of Europe and throughout the world as well as the general cause of international collaboration and peace.

Romania is also strongly in favor of dismantling the military bases on other states' territories and withdrawal of foreign troops inside national borders. Moreover in its many proposals to stop the armaments race and turn to disarmament and a policy of peace Romania has consistently advocated cessation of military maneuvers and any shows of force by both parties, considering them likely to aggravate distrust and discord among states.

And finally I would like to mention here the particular importance Romania attaches to the Stockholm Conference, an important occasion for maintaining contacts and discussing ways and means leading to specific and effective measures for confidence, security and disarmament, including the problem of nuclear weapons.

IOAN-MIRCEA PASCU: I think Romania's position concerning the geographic area in which it is located, namely the Balkans, is another graphic example of the unity of its domestic and foreign policies. Of course Romania's efforts and accomplishments in this area in the period between the wars are well known. They had as a common denominator the desire, shared by other states in the area, to do away with outside interference and intervention in the lives of the peoples, that is to eliminate the factor that was chiefly responsible for the area's explosive situation, characterized as the "powder keg" of Europe. Meanwhile the effort was made to consolidate collaboration among the states in the area as a solid basis for its security.

Accordingly it is no accident that the proposal to denuclearize the Balkans was one of the first diplomatic moves of the young Romanian socialist state, reflecting an independent, overall view of the peninsula, nor that this objective is an important constant in the foreign policy pursued by socialist Romania and President Nicolae Ceausescu. I might say that the motivation and perseverance with which these Romanian objectives are promoted, as well as the specific content of the ways of carrying them out in practice, have acquired new and qualitatively higher dimensions since the Ninth RCP Congress.

Essentially, the main objective of Romania's foreign policy in the Balkans is to make them a good-neighbor zone of peace and collaboration without nuclear weapons, a "zone wherein there will be no more foreign troops or bases, the policy of force and threat of force will be entirely abolished, and the peoples will take united action to solve the important economic, social and political problems of common concern," as the party secretary general says. Moreover, as we know, Romania is supporting the formation of such denuclearized zones in Northern and Central Europe and in other regions of the world as well.

TRAIAN GROZEA: Construction of the fully developed socialist society in Romania and of communism in the future is a process taking place in an international environment characterized by a series of contradictions that are associated, interdependent and expressed on various levels. In our time the world arena has become an extensive global and dynamic system composed of sovereign states that are subjects of rights or obligations in international affairs and sources of the actions within the world system. Therefore the states interact in a general, regional or bilateral framework, transmitting and receiving "impulses" of various kinds, political, economic, military, cultural-scientific etc., which have effects upon the international relations and exert influences upon the national processes.

The strategy of socialist Romania's development includes, as an organic component, international promotion of a policy designed to create the climate of calm and security essential to the historic task the Romanian people are accomplishing and to generate "impulses" in the world system that are favorable to détente, understanding and collaboration among nations while the practices of the policy of force, dictation and maintenance or reallocation of spheres of influence are still making themselves strongly felt in international affairs.

The policy of force and dictation takes many forms in action and seeks its theoretical support in various explanations of the nature and purpose of "power" in international relations. Thus H. J. Morgenthau, considered the father of the "realist" school, maintains in one of his works ("Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace") that international relations are by nature a "struggle for power" and that the main national interest of a state is the "acquisition and use of power." Morgenthau accordingly recommends that "All nations actively engaged in the struggle for power should, in fact, strive not for a balance, which is an equality of power, but for a superiority." Opinions of this kind are also expressed by other authors. The theoretical interpretation of the concept of "power" is quite varied, but there are also certain factors that many authors as well as politicians regard as basic indicators of "power," such as economic strength and the military factor. Experience tells us that those are frequently used to justify resorting to force and dictation. By means of the said instruments, in addition to others, some political circles try to generate "impulses" that will structure international relations according to the views of the world and interests of some great powers and the "leaders." As K. Deutsch puts it, "Only the biggest and strongest nations can have the least plausible image of the world, which they, through their national effort, will shape, change or maintain entirely or largely in accordance with their own wishes." ("The Analysis of International Relations")

On the basis of the dialectical-materialist conception of international relations and the firm conviction that in the world system the international relations that compose it must be based upon the principles of equality of rights, respect for national sovereignty and independence, noninterference in internal affairs, mutual benefit, and abstention from use or threat of force, President Nicolae Ceausescu's innovating and dynamic thought has promoted extensive political actions in the world arena to assert those values. In the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and in its bilateral relations as well Romania consistently militates to put an end to the policy of force, hegemony and any form of interference in other states' internal affairs, so that any state, large or small, will assume its responsibility for solving world problems and take an active part with full rights in the settlement of those problems solely by political means through negotiations in keeping with every nation's interests. It is an attitude and a militant political position that is clearly promoting, in the world system of international relations, values that benefit not only Romania but the entire system as well.

MIRCEA NICOLAESCU: Unity of a new and qualitatively superior kind between the two aspects of social activity, that is between its national structure and international affairs, clearly calls for a new treatment of the contradictions and disputes among states and new methods of resolving them to be based upon their proper investigation on scientific grounds in order to exploit what joins and

unites the states and peoples and to reduce and eliminate what separates and divides them. As Nicolae Ceausescu said in his speech at the Solemn Session of 22 August 1984, "Every effort must be made and the most responsible action must be taken to stop the military conflicts and start resolving all disputes among states by peaceful negotiations only."

This profoundly realistic and scientifically substantiated position, characteristic of Romania's political conception and action, has solid grounds in its thorough understanding of the contemporary realities, the objective requirements of social development, and the vital interests of the peoples. Such a position, reflecting the complete unity of the RCP's domestic and foreign political aims, is determined by clear understanding of the fact that today any resolution of the international problems other than the peaceful, political one through negotiation may lead to a nuclear catastrophe.

Negotiation is advanced as a universally valid course of action because, as the RCP and Nicolae Ceausescu point out, there are no problems in the world, whether global, regional or bilateral, that cannot be constructively treated and resolved by dialogue, discussion and negotiation if the necessary political will exists and if every people's right to free and independent development without outside interference is observed.

Negotiation is a major necessity of the contemporary world as well as a responsibility no chief of state can shirk without suffering the consequences of history. Negotiations offer invaluable opportunities to know and understand the questions in dispute, they dispel states of isolation and division causing suspicions and misunderstandings, and they open the way to determination and use of the points of agreement among states and to settlement of the difficulties through mutually acceptable solutions. Essentially, negotiations meet the requirements of detente as a state of coexistence of the nations, which objectively entails repudiation of any pressures or threats and any manifestations of the policy of force or threat of force.

In the spirit of this high commitment, Romania has been appealing to both the opposed military blocs to abandon the armaments competition and begin negotiations with the participation of all their members. Meanwhile Romania's determination to promote the policy of peaceful settlement of international problems is also reflected in its proposals to enhance the United Nations' role in promoting negotiations and to form a special body within the worldwide organization to take steps to arrange negotiations and settlement of international problems solely by those means, and it is further reflected in Romania's proposal to conclude a Treaty on General Prohibition of Force and to sign a Declaration on Settlement of International Differences Solely by Peaceful Means.

In view of these considerations Romania and President Nicolae Ceausescu are taking firm action to settle any disputes among states and any international problems by peaceful means alone, through negotiations. There is no major problem in the world that Romania has not been trying with every determination to resolve by negotiation alone, be it the situation in the Near East, Southeast Asia, Central America, Europe or Africa, or the problems of disarmament and development.

Eliminating Underdevelopment and Creating a New International Economic Order

GEORGE MARIN: In close correlation with the primary domestic effort, the RCP is securing Romania's increasingly active participation in the world economic cycle and taking firm and persevering action to make some radical changes in the world economy and to create a new world economic order based upon equality and equity.

As the RCP secretary general has pointed out, "In the present economic crisis not a restriction but intensification and development of exchanges, collaboration and cooperative production are necessary." As Nicolae Ceausescu said, in view of the universal nature of the world economic cycle and of the great problems facing the world today, international economic relations must not be compartmentalized or come to a restriction of collaboration among various groups of states but, on the contrary, they must be broadened and this collaboration must be developed because the world economic crisis and other economic problems cannot be resolved without extensive participation of all states and intensified economic collaboration in other fields as well.

By applying the party's directives and relying upon the great achievements of the national economy in the years of socialist construction, Romania is participating more and more actively in the world economic cycle and developing exchanges and economic collaboration, while always basing these relations on the principles of equality, mutual benefit, respect for national sovereignty and independence, noninterference in internal affairs, and abstention from force or threat of force.

The structural changes and higher technological level of the national economy in the 1986-1990 period and henceforth up to 2000 provided by the Draft Directives of the 13th RCP Congress will result in Romania's even more intensive participation in the international division of labor and in stable and long-term cooperation in production, science and technology with the CEMA countries, the other socialist countries, the developing countries and all countries regardless of social order. In the 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan the volume of foreign trade will be up 41-45 percent and exports will show a more pronounced gain of 52-56 percent. Emphasis will be placed on the higher forms of economic and technical-scientific cooperation, namely joint construction and operation of production capacities, founding of mixed companies to export products, joint construction of capacities on third markets, etc. The RCP's special programs for higher quality and technical levels, greater labor productivity and a more pronounced gain in economic effectiveness in all sectors and other measures adopted recently can contribute considerably to the economic effectiveness of foreign trade and of international economic and technical-scientific cooperation.

All this is being done alongside Romania's active participation in the solution of the great economic problems facing mankind, in order to overcome the effects of the economic crisis, to solve the problems of food, energy, raw materials and international trade and finance, to close the gap between the rich and poor countries, to accelerate the progress of the developing countries, and to eradicate underdevelopment and build the new international economic order. Moreover the Draft Directives of the 13th RCP Congress provide that Romania will make continued efforts to eliminate underdevelopment and establish a new international economic order that will permit development of exchanges on an equitable and

fully democratic basis, will provide for all countries' active and mutually advantageous participation in the world economic cycle, unrestricted access to modern science and technology, and abolition of any barriers or discrimination in international relations, and will encourage the course of collaboration, detente, security and consolidation of world peace.

A. D. ALBU: In connection with the correlation of domestic with foreign policy, I too would like to mention some aspects of Romania's contribution to expanded international economic cooperation that are likely to favor Romania's development as well as that of the world community as a whole.

Economic cooperation that observes the principles of international law and agrees with the national and general economic interests and the requirements of the world economic balance does not bring economic benefits to just one state or some states but serves the interests of all peoples' progress and helps to create a climate of confidence, peace and stability among states and peoples.

Romania's efforts to develop its international economic cooperation, to secure favorable conditions for strengthened economic and technical scientific cooperation among all states without barriers of any kind or artificial restrictions, and to inculcate the constructive idea that close cooperation and collaboration among all peoples are the only ways that the great economic problems of the contemporary world can be surmounted and resolved have been redoubled in the years since the Ninth RCP Congress and have received widespread recognition and appreciation.

Socialist Romania's efforts in this direction are helping to create an international climate favorable to Romania's development and also make a notable contribution to the favorable course of all international affairs and to the advancement of relations, standards, principles and mechanisms benefiting all peoples. Romania's efforts in its bilateral relations and in the organs and bodies with all-around international missions and their good effects are in my opinion a striking reflection of the effectiveness of the Romanian conception of the need of the small and medium countries' active participation in the solution of problems of general concern in the course of the efforts to democratize international affairs.

As an important component of the general, all-around cooperation among states, economic cooperation meets the objective requirements for new international relations and application of new principles for relations and accordingly serves the efforts to do away with underdevelopment. Romania is making a notable and unanimously recognized and appreciated contribution in this respect too, and in this connection I would like to mention a major fundamental aspect of Romania's activity, namely the expansion and diversification of its economic cooperation with the developing countries in the fields of industry, agriculture, construction, transportation etc. As we know Romania is lending technical aid to the developing countries as well as considerable help in training thousands of experts. All this is an important contribution to the development of those countries' productive forces and to the efficient use of their national resources, while this collaboration also meets, on an equitable basis, some needs of the fully developing Romanian economy. I should also like to point out that by constantly expanding its economic cooperation with the developing countries Romania is making an active contribution to consolidation of these countries' solidarity and to the peoples' struggle to abolish the imperialist and neocolonial policy, to

establish new relations in the world of national independence and equality, and to eliminate underdevelopment and build a new international economic and political order.

GEORGE MARIN: Objectively, in our period, every national economy can benefit by the good effects of participating in the world economic cycle. Moreover the great economic problems of the world today, with their effect upon all states, cannot be solved without the active participation of the national economies, the primary cells of the world economy, in international collaboration or without incorporating the individual effort in the collective effort of all countries. That is an objectively necessary dialectical relationship. But the form it takes in practice is a question that heavily depends upon the subjective factor, the nature of the political power, and its capacity to perceive the direction of the international changes, to help accentuate the democratic changes, and to act in the interests of its own nation and those of all mankind's aspirations as well.

Under the conditions of the world economic crisis, for example, every national economy is called upon to find ways of meeting the demands of its own development by mobilizing its entire potential through a suitable policy, while also helping to create a climate wherein all national economies and the world economy as a whole will conform to a balanced development. Such developments would benefit all countries as well as international collaboration and detente, but unfortunately experience also shows very negative trends in international economic relations. For instance, in promoting not the entire nation's interests but those of ruling social groups, the big monopolies and the transnational companies or very powerful interests and ignoring the legitimate interests of other countries and especially the small and medium ones, some states have resorted to restrictions of various kinds (aggravated protectionism, excessive interest rates, etc.) that are actually intended to foist the effects of the economic crisis upon other national economies, especially those of the developing countries. This contributes to the further deterioration of the international economic and political climate, to elimination of the possibilities of overcoming the crisis, and to perpetuation of underdevelopment and backwardness over immense geographic areas.

Romania is resolutely militating for all conditions for extensive and unrestricted economic exchanges among states, and for development of mutually advantageous economic, financial, technical and scientific collaboration without artificial barriers and unobstructed by manifestations of the policy of force, interference and dictation, etc. Romania is proving by the facts that a real "cold war" in international economic relations and conversion of the economic levers and mechanisms into instruments of the policy of force and the struggle for world domination do grave harm primarily to the small and medium and developing countries but ultimately to all countries and to the stability of the world economy and the peace and security of the world.

MIRCEA NICOLAESCU: Through the thinking of its secretary general Nicolae Ceausescu and also through the extensive programs initiated and conducted by Romania, the RCP has made a very timely and promising contribution to the substantiation of the concept of a new international economic order. In the RCP's view, the need of building a new international economic order (based on values, mechanisms and institutions suited to the new state of the world that will provide the

international climate necessary to promote all peoples' vital interests) is occasioned by the necessity of completely abolishing the unfair and unequal relations of exploitation and oppression, and of overcoming the imbalances caused by the imperialist and colonial policy and by the present world economic crisis as well. It is also occasioned by the necessity of providing the peoples with constructive answers to the serious and very complex problems presented by the series of contradictions characterizing the world of today, chief among which is the contradiction between the developed and the developing countries and the rich and poor countries.

While the world economic crisis and the policy of excessive interest rates have seriously aggravated the economic situation of the "third world" and widened the gaps between the developed and the developing countries, Romania and its president Nicolae Ceausescu have been making constant efforts to make real progress in eliminating underdevelopment and building a new international economic order.

Those efforts are graphically illustrated by the presentation in the current session of the UN General Assembly of Romania's position and President Nicolae Ceausescu's views on the major international problems, including that of the new world economic order. In connection with this vital problem of mankind Romania recommends concentration of the states' efforts primarily upon finding ways of opening real negotiations in the United Nations between the rich and poor countries for the purposes of overcoming the world economic crisis, resolving the problems of underdevelopment equitably, and establishing the new international economic order. Romania recommends immediate agreement to start global negotiations either in a special committee or at a conference with the participation of all states. In that way a program should be drafted to aid the developing countries and to conclude a general treaty on the new principles for international economic relations.

It is particularly necessary to make every effort to find a radical, global solution to one of the most acute international problems, that of the developing countries' foreign debts. As Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out in his speech on 22 August 1984, "Some of these debts of the poorest countries must be canceled, and there must be a reduction of other developing countries' debts as well as a general rescheduling of the developing countries' debts over a longer period at a lower interest rate or even without interest."

Romania's efforts are also directed toward reorganization of the international monetary system on a new and equitable basis, developing countries' unrestricted access to scientific and technical advances, compilation of a code of conduct for transfers of technology, and opposition to the harmful practice of recruiting personnel. Romania feels efforts must be redoubled to expand and intensify international cooperation in general and that among the developing countries in particular, to strengthen their solidarity and unity, and to establish a common strategy for negotiating with the developed countries.

In the Romanian view and practice construction of the new international economic order has the value of a profoundly revolutionary process which reflects the vital interests of all peoples and all states regardless of size, system or resources and which allows an increasingly broad scope for united action of all progressive forces of today. Bringing out the strength of this unity, Romania's

conception of the new international economic order takes the form of an equally liberal and optimistic appeal to all states and all decision-makers responsible for the fate of the world to start specific actions that will lead to solution of one of the most acute problems facing the peoples of the world and all mankind today.

CONSTANTIN VLAD: I think the unity of Romania's domestic and foreign policies also has other aspects that may not always be brought out and the significance of which is not always revealed and emphasized. I refer, for example, to such aspects as the inherent correlation between national independence and international interdependences, and the fact that national independence is not opposed to the latter but, on the contrary, is harmoniously combined with them. The high value we attach to Romania's national independence naturally corresponds to Romania's respect for other states' independence. The determination to develop Romanian socialist democracy is naturally and inherently correlated with Romania's consistent effort to democratize international relations. And the list could be continued. Of course each of the indicated aspects would have to be examined separately in the light of its particular content and the similarities as well as the differences between the two levels of internal and international. But I think such aspects are real and merit closer theoretical scrutiny.

CONSTANTIN ENE: As it has been said here, the consistency with which Romania is trying to truly democratize international relations is closely related to the RCP's constant effort to further develop the ways and means of implementing the new socialist democracy. Accordingly Romania is specially emphasizing the greater role of the United Nations and other international organizations in solving the contemporary world's problems with the aid of all the states. In the last two decades especially Romania has maintained a sustained activity in the United Nations and other international forums, characterized by many constructive suggestions and contributions.

It may be said that the main positions of Romania, its foreign policy, conception and considerations and President Nicolae Ceausescu's proposals on all the major problems of the day have found a good ground for assertion in the worldwide and regional international forums. As a matter of fact, many important aspects of the Romanian state's international activity are connected with the United Nations as well as other international organizations, various forums for negotiating disarmament, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Group of 77, the Nonalignment Movement, et al. These are all specific instances of the efforts of socialist Romania as one of the small and medium countries to take joint action with all the other countries in order to build a world of free nations with equal rights, a world of peace and collaboration.

Firm Resolve to Democratize International Relations

CONSTANTIN FLOREA: It is true as it was said here that Romania and President Nicolae Ceausescu are making constant efforts toward real democratization of international relations and final abolition of the old imperialist policy of dictation and hegemony, inequality and inequity, interference in other states' internal affairs, and barring the small and medium countries from discussion and solution of the problems of general concern to mankind. The realities of the world of today make it inconceivable to continue such a profoundly antidemocratic

policy in complete contradiction with the interests of the vast majority of the peoples of the world and with the objective requirements of historical development.

To be sure the great powers have a major role and heavy responsibilities, but viable solutions to the contemporary problems serving the interests of every people and the causes of detente, national independence, collaboration and peace are to be found only in active participation of all states in discussion and solution of those problems on terms of full equality regardless of social order, size, economic and military strength, and material and human potential.

Vital to this end is the growth of the role of the small and medium countries and the developing and unaligned countries. So far from being any "deviation" whatever from the revolutionary, class approach to international relations, the conclusion as to the important part the small and medium countries can and should play in promoting a new world policy is the result of an in-depth scientific analysis, in the spirit of materialist dialectics, of the phenomena, processes and trends characterizing international affairs and contemporary social development in general. In my opinion it takes account of a series of objective factors such as the great revolutionary social and national changes in the world in the last decades, chief among which is the formation of a large number of new sovereign states, most of them small and medium; the major shifts that have been taking place in the world balance of power and the balance of forces in the international arena, which shifts take the form, among others, of a gradual elimination of the bipolarism and multiplication and diversification of the centers of power throughout the world; the process of accentuating the worldwide interdependences, strikingly reflected in the global, worldwide nature of the problems facing mankind today; the extreme gravity and complexity of the current international situation and especially the serious aggravation of the danger of a new world war which, under the present circumstances, would inevitably become a nuclear war threatening all mankind with destruction; and the vital direct interest of the small and medium countries, the first victims of foreign aggressions and interventions and imperialist wars in the past, in securing an international climate of detente, security and peace.

All this is necessarily augmenting the role of the small and medium countries in international affairs, and it requires, as a vital necessity of the present-day world, all countries' participation in a democratic spirit in the solution of the problems of general, vital importance to the independence, progress and peace of all humanity.

The small and medium countries of Europe and, in general, all the countries on the continent have a great responsibility today for promoting a policy of detente and disarmament, for renewing the dialogue and negotiations between the great powers, and for creating a united Europe of peace and collaboration without missiles or any kind of nuclear weapons. As Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out in an interview granted to the West German television station ARD, "The European countries and the countries on other continents, small and medium and, in fact, all the other states that will be directly affected by the nuclear weapons, must take a direct responsibility, must not merely await the result of the negotiations between the USSR and the United States but must make efforts themselves to bring about resumption of those negotiations and conclusion of agreements that will put a stop to the present policy of discord and armament. They must bring

about the start of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, for a secure peace, for detente, and for collaboration on the principles of equality and independence."

TRAIAN GROZEA: In the course of our discussion I would also like to point out that in substantiating its internal and international policies the RCP proceeds from the idea that socialism is the work of the masses and that the new order is being built by the combined efforts of all Romanian citizens regardless of nationality. By virtue of this conception, the masses function as producers, owners and beneficiaries of all fruits of their labor. They are the decision-makers, from the primary socioeconomic units up to the national organs, and the task of national defense is also theirs.

This extensive and decisive role of the masses in creating their own existence takes the form not only of internal development but also, on a broader level, of a vital factor in the defense of peace and of life on our planet. Interpreting the great problems that trouble the masses everywhere, understanding the deep concern expressed in various societies and social strata about the immense dangers that the nuclear weapons have caused and are aggravating, and proceeding from the conviction that the masses have a vast strength and fighting potential, the RCP and its secretary general keep pointing out that by their united action the peoples can halt the dangerous course toward nuclear catastrophe and can impose peace upon our planet.

The sense of this conviction is also expressed by the active, militant solidarity of the RCP and the entire Romanian people with the movements for peace and disarmament everywhere and with all the forces who, regardless of their philosophical, political or social options, are engaged in the fight for elimination of the atomic peril and for peace. Conclusive proof of this is also provided by the great peace demonstrations held in Romania in agreement with the basic aspirations of the peoples of the whole world. In expressing his high esteem for the activity of the peace movements and especially those in Europe, Nicolae Ceausescu emphasized their increasingly active role "in the struggle to halt the dangerous course of events, to stop the emplacement of medium-range missiles and other nuclear measures, and to achieve disarmament and secure peace."*

VASILE BUGA: On the basis of the masses' decisive role in the democratic, real solution of the contemporary world problems, the RCP and its secretary general are making a sustained effort to consolidate unity and collaboration with all the socialist countries, with all communist and workers parties, with all revolutionary, progressive and anti-imperialist forces, and with all peoples advocating a policy of peace, independence and international collaboration.

Since the Ninth RCP Congress especially, the RCP's relations of international solidarity, based upon a radically innovating revolutionary conception, have acquired new dimensions and taken a true qualitative leap. The RCP now maintains relations with about 200 communist and workers parties, socialist and social-democratic parties, other democratic and progressive parties and political forces, and anti-imperialist movements for national liberation.

I think an essential element is to be gathered from analysis of these relations, namely the consistency with which the RCP and its secretary general try to

*Speech at the Solemn Session on the 40th Anniversary of the Revolutionary Act of 23 August 1944.

maintain in practice the revolutionary principles for relations among the communist and workers parties, such as full equality of rights, observance of every party's independence and autonomy as well as its right to develop its general political policy and its revolutionary strategy and tactics according to the realities in its own country, noninterference in other parties' affairs, and friendly collaboration and solidarity. The RCP has made a widely known and recognized contribution to the definition and establishment of those principles and to consolidation of the unity of the international communist and workers movement. The RCP is making the most determined effort to settle the differences and create a unity of the new kind among the communist and workers parties that will allow for the very diverse conditions under which each party operates and the need to help strengthen the unity and power of every communist party. A number of good results have been obtained in asserting the new principles, which are now being more and more widely recognized and applied to relations among the socialist countries and among the communist and workers parties.

I would also point out that the RCP and its secretary general have lent the concept of international solidarity a new and far richer and more comprehensive content, suited to the facts of today's world and the present needs of the revolutionary effort, including in the concept not only the socialist countries and the communist and workers parties but all the revolutionary, progressive and anti-imperialist forces everywhere as well. The strengthened unity and solidarity of all these forces are of critical importance to the struggle for socioeconomic progress, national independence, a better and more just world, peace and international collaboration. Solidarity, the combined efforts of all democratic and progressive forces, and union of all peoples beyond any political convictions or social systems are now more necessary than ever in the face of the growing danger of a nuclear catastrophe now threatening all civilization and life itself on our planet. As Nicolae Ceausescu said in his speech at the Solemn Session on the 40th Anniversary of the Revolutionary Act of 23 August 1944, "If they act with determination and complete unity, the peoples can halt the dangerous course of events toward war and nuclear catastrophe and secure the triumph of reason and peace on our planet."

CONSTANTIN VLAD: Today's discussion has made it possible to bring out some essential aspects of the complete, inherent unity of the party's and state's domestic and foreign policy. It was quite rightly noted here that this unity characterizes the entire policy and activity consistently and firmly promoted by the RCP and the Romanian government, both nationally and internationally. The participants in the discussion have pointed out that the unity of Romanian domestic and foreign policy is brilliantly embodied in the innovating theoretical works and practical, revolutionary action of Nicolae Ceausescu, and they have described the RCP secretary general's decisive role in developing and implementing Romania's internal and international policies, noting that those policies are inseparably bound up with the Romanian people's creative efforts toward construction of the new social order and national prosperity and progress and that they reflect Romania's vital aspirations as well as those of all nations of the world.

Actually Romania's whole domestic policy for construction of the fully developed socialist society and the advance toward communism is a dynamic, peaceful and profoundly constructive policy in its most fundamental characteristics. Socio-economic development as well as growth of the material potential and national

wealth are intended to keep raising the entire people's level of civilization and to improve their material and cultural welfare. Of course such a constructive undertaking requires a stable international situation wherein Romania as well as all other countries can enjoy security in a world of peace and understanding among peoples that is freed of the armaments race and the policy of force and dictation, and in a world where the peoples can choose their course of development in an independent and sovereign fashion with no outside interference. Such a constructive undertaking also requires development of Romania's relations with all the other socialist countries, the developing an unaligned countries, the developed capitalist countries, and all states of the world on a basis of mutual benefit and full observance of the principles and standards of international law. And at the same time such a constructive undertaking requires further expansion of international cooperation on the economic, scientific-technical, cultural and all other levels.

Socialist Romania and its president Nicolae Ceausescu are persevering in those very directions. While concentrating their efforts on building a higher type of civilization, the Romanian people are also participating more and more actively in international affairs and making a determined effort to secure peace and detente, to start disarmament and nuclear disarmament especially, to eliminate underdevelopment and establish a new international economic order and, in general, to solve the great problems of the time in the peoples' interest.

The sustained efforts toward internal construction and the firm international commitment on behalf of peace and security lend purpose to the party's and state's policy as a whole. The unity of socialist Romania's domestic and foreign policies and the uniform implementation of those policies are among the main factors accounting for the immense growth in the last two decades of the worldwide prestige of Romania and the party secretary general, President Nicolae Ceausescu.

The 13th RCP Congress will denote a new stage and a new and higher level of the continuing complete unity of socialist Romania's domestic and foreign policies. Nicolae Ceausescu's reelection to the high office of RCP secretary general lays the solid foundation for firm continuation of Romania's domestic and foreign policies and for their complete unity, and it guarantees Romania's increasingly effective emergence as an active factor in the peoples' effort to build a better and a more just world of peace, democracy, national independence and social progress.

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